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Secretariat 	 Bureau of Secretaries, TsKa 
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Sovkhoz 	 Sovmestnoe Khozyaistvo (The Collective Farm) 
Sovnarkom 	 Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov (The Council of 
People's Commissars) 
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Pravitelstva SSSR (The Collection of Laws and 
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Trudstrakh 	 Trudovoe Strakhovanie (The Labour Insurance) 
TsGA SPb 	 Tsentralnyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sankt-
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TsIK 	 Tsentralnyi Ispolnitelnyi Komitet (The Central 
Executive Committee) 
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TsKK 	 Tsentralnaya Kontrolnaya Komissiya (The Central 
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TTP 	 The Trotsky Papers 
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Table IV.2. 
I Scope 
1. Introduction: scope and sources 
After the breakdown of Soviet communism in 1991, Russian society 
went through a period of turmoil; the new postcommunist democracy 
held a few elections, one failed "coup d'état" in 1993, and a strange 
revitalization of a new kind of national communism. Despite many 
doubts, the leadership of Mr. Yeltsin and his presidential rule have 
not proved to be a kind of a "kerenskiad" or "smutnoe vremya" in 
the fight for political supremacy in Russia. However, one power 
structure seems to stand out more firmly than any other in this society. 
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which was officially legalized 
only after 1991, has been able to function as a mediator between the 
opposing political parties. This new political role of the church was 
clearly in evidence during the 1993 "putsch", when Patriarch Aleksi 
II tried to negotiate between Boris Yeltsin and the leaders of the 
rebellious coalition of Aleksandr Rutskoi and Ruslan Khasbulatov. 
Moreover, the ROC has been active not only in meddling in the shady 
situation inside Russia but also in "defending" the Russian Orthodox 
population inside the now independent Baltic countries and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).' 
To sum up, we can say that despite the general goodwill towards 
religion, the historical burden of the Soviet period lies heavily on the 
shoulders of the ROC. The question of past history is still a burning 
issue inside the ROC. As the so-called Furov's Report' clearly 
demonstrates, the practice of interfering in the internal affairs of the 
1 	 On the relations between the ROC and the extreme right-wing political parties, 
see Parland 1995, 129-134. 
2 	 See the text of Furov's Report: V.G. Furov: Cadres of the Church and Legal 
Measures to Curtail Their Activities — Religion in Communist Dominated Areas, 
Vol. XX, No. 1-3, 1981. See evaluations on Furov's Report: Oppenheim 1991, 
291-311; Davies 1995, 95. 
19 
ROC was normal Soviet policy.' 
Nevertheless, the background of this strange interaction between 
the ROC and the Soviet state has been little investigated. It is only 
now that the whole picture of Soviet religious policy is beginning to 
take shape. Thus, new historical analyses and new investigations 
concerning Soviet religious policy are urgently needed. 
In order to discover new ways of approaching Soviet religious 
policy, the present monograph will focus on the history of one of its 
central organs in the 1930s, the so-called CSCRQ, Central Standing 
Commission on Religious Questions (1929-1938)4 and hopes to shed 
light on the religious policy of the Stalinist state. 
We shall look into the activities of the CSCRQ, its formal structure, 
and main functions inside the Soviet bureaucracy. The primary aim 
is to present "the rise and fall" of the central CSCRQ, located in 
Moscow, from the perspectives of the Soviet administration and 
20 
	
	 mostly in relation to the ROC. Therefore, this book will focus mainly 
on the central core of the Soviet institutions. For this reason, it will 
not stray far from the corridors of the Kremlin. The local perspective 
and the reality (how the orders of the Cult Commission were observed 
in the Soviet provinces) will be briefly examined from the viewpoint 
of the second capital, Leningrad. 
This eclectic approach of the investigation is justified in view of 
the fact that only a few monographs exist on this theme and because 
a good many problems still remain unsolved. For example: how did 
the methods of Soviet religious policy develop during the 1930s, by 
what organs and institutions was Soviet religious policy conducted at 
that time, was the Soviet policy-making process simply carrying out 
the general political directives of the Bolshevik party or did the special 
Soviet religious political organs, such as the CSCRQ, have any 
independent status of their own? How did the centre-periphery 
3 	 For Konstantin Kharchev's accusations about collaboration in 1989; demands of 
the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad on public repentance for past collaboration 
in 1990; on KGB-General Oleg Kalugin's statements on ecclesiastical KGB-
agents; concerning the revealing reports of Father Vyacheslav Polosin; on Father 
Gleb Yakunin and journalist Aleksandr Nezhny and Sergei Avanritsev's claims 
that state authorities had nominated open atheists as bishops, see Davies, 1995, 
46, 70-78, 95, 211. 
4 	 The official name of this commission was "[IIocro9HHo ,HehCTByJOHta3I 
KOMHCCHSI HpH Hpe3nanyMe 131.113K no PaCCMOTpeHHlo PeJIHrH03HbIX 
Bonpocos". Henceforth referred to as CSCRQ or Cult Commission. 
relationship affect Soviet religious policy? Were there any 
disagreements between various Soviet organs regarding how to deal 
with religious organizations? Did the local organs have their own 
special motives in their brutal persecutions of religion? Was the central 
government simply encouraging local Soviet officials to crush 
religion? Did the comrades in Moscow act as inquisitors or "guardian 
angels" for Soviet religious organizations in general? 
After the first years of perestroika, Western scholars rushed to 
become acquainted with Russian/Soviet primary sources. However, 
once the initial spasms of euphoria5 were over, some started to 
question the actual value of these newly opened archives. As Mark 
von Hagen has stated... 
"..the press and other media are fostering what has been called a 
"gold-rush" mentality by publicizing sensational finds in the 
archives...We return from the archives thinking that we here 
discovered America but are in fact often repeating — albeit with 
more detail — the findings of earlier scholars that were based on a 
very sensitive reading of the press or published material."6 
According to some scholars, the reliability of these archives is open 
to doubt partly because the Soviet decision-makers applied peculiar 
laws of their own. Indeed, some of the most important decisions in 
the Soviet period were made via telephone or private conversations. 
Moreover, some have even cast doubts on the primary sources because 
the Soviet Communist Party seems to have been utterly dishonest, 
falsifying its own documents. These authors have recognized the 
significance of these archival sources only when they have been able 
to confirm what had been discovered earlier. Inaccessibility to the 
Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF) and 
various archives of the Soviet security organs, together with rumours 
about the extortion of Western scholars by Russian archive officials, 
has also emerged as a problem for objective research.' 
Nonetheless, the authenticity of these documents is beyond doubt. 
As a rule, they were intended to be instruments of power only for a 
5 	 See, for example, Ragsdale 1989, 269-271. 
6 	 Hagen 1993, 96,99. 
7 	 See editorial note of Slavic Review 1993, Vol. 52, No.l. "Research, Ethics and 
Marketplace. The Case of Russian Archives." 
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very select circle of the ruling party. This can be seen from special 
captions such as cexpeTHo, cosepuleHHo cexpeTHo, cpo'HO 
CeKpeTHo, aOCOJIIOTHO CeKpeTHo, XpaHHTb KOHCHHpaTHBHo, 
cexpeTHblh oT,geJI, which were often prefixed to those papers. 
Moreover, the Soviet ideological jargon and the "double talk" that 
these documents often include does not diminish their historical value. 
However, this critical discussion on the reliability of the archives 
has been most valuable for Soviet studies. Nowadays, there seems to 
be a generally prevailing opinion among scholars that Soviet studies 
require a kind of "dialectical" method, i.e., a routine of utilizing both 
archival and public sources simultaneously. Nevertheless, it is 
essential to realize that without these primary sources, even if they 
do contain some questionable material, we lose an invaluable insight 
into the ruling communist regime. To maintain that these archives 
amount to no more than the record-keeping of criminals would be 
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	 absurd. Although we must be careful in using them, they constitute a 
new solid ground for Soviet studies, i.e., with newly discovered 
archival sources we should be able to establish the genesis and actual 
development of the Soviet religious-political organs.8 
Moreover, the information originating from the Soviet archives has 
opened up new perspectives for estimating the role of the leadership 
and initiatives from above. It seems that the Soviet leadership normally 
made decisions by the logic of the general political situation rather 
than on the basis of its ideological premises. Moreover, on the 
evidence of the material from the archives, the whole picture of Soviet 
religious policy seems to have been more confused than coordinated. 
Different institutions seemed to have acted independently and often 
contrary to orders from higher authorities. Accordingly, Sheila 
Fitzpatrick's or Robert Tucker's concepts concerning "revolution from 
below" and "revolution from above"9 could be replaced by the term 
of "anarchy in the middle." It seems that especially at the beginning 
of the 1930s there was only a minimum amount of guidance from the 
top and that local officials were able to act independently, if they 
8 	 On the historical value of the svodki made by informants of the GPU, see 
Shinkarchuk 1995, 8, 35. 
9 	 Fitzpatrick 1984a, 10-11; Tucker 1990, 74-77. See also Gill 1990, 117. For 
outsiders, the Soviet society appeared to be a centralized and well-governed 
monolith. The reality, however, proved to be different. As James von Geldern has 
emphasised:"...outsiders often imagined Soviet society to be united and uniform, 
and insiders sometimes shared, even encouraged, the illusion." Geldern 1995, xii. 
simply acknowledged, in nomine, the authority of Moscow, paying 
lip-service to its official liturgy. 
The archival sources utilized in this study consist of the minutes 
and protocols of different organs of the state or party as well as 
personal files and other archival material. The main group used here 
are the papers and protocols of the so-called "KoMuccna no BonpocaM 
KyJIbTOB" (CSCRQ) from the State Archive of The Russian 
Federation, GARF.10 The Russian Centre for the Storage & Study of 
Documents of Recent History, RTsKhIDNI, also contains valuable 
material, such as Politburo protocols with certain so-called "special 
folders" (ocoÖble nanf t)» In order to investigate the actual 
implementation and results of the CSCRQ's work outside its 
headquarters in Moscow, it is essential to scrutinize regional archives. 
In this study, the verification of how the Cult Commission was able 
to function outside the Kremlin is based on research done in the former 
Leningrad State Archive (TsGA SPb) in St. Petersburg.'Z 
Published primary sources are utilized in this study in order to place 
the activity of the commission against its proper historical background. 
Combining material from newspapers and Soviet periodicals as well 
as accounts from Soviet congresses and party conferences with 
archival sources has been essential to this work. This strategy is also 
justified in view of the fact that the whole area of Soviet religious 
policy is still understudied. Nearly all the previous studies depend 
heavily on the pre-archival investigations made before access to the 
archival sources was possible. 
The published sources used in the present study can be divided into 
two categories. The first category consists of the published protocols 
and stenographic minutes of the congresses and conferences of the 
Bolshevik party. Some of these were published before Stalin's "school 
10 (I'ocyltapcTBernmal apxxs POCCHHHCKON irDeilepaum, FAP(D). Documents 
concerning the earlier religious policy organs, such as the Ecclesiastical Subsection 
of the NKVD (fond 393) and VIII (V) Section of Comissariat of Justice (fond 
353), are also available. 
11 POCCHHCKHFI IteHTp XpaHeHHA H H3y`IeHHA AOKyMeHTOB HOBehme}i HCTOpHH. 
PLIXHIJIHI4. This archive contains the material of the earlier antireligious 
Committee, the CAP. In 1922-1928 it was officially called "KOMHCCHA no 
nposeAeanio oueneHHA uepxsH OT rocyitapcTBa npH UK PKII (6)" and from 
13 July 1928 to November 1929 it was renamed "AHTHpenxrao3Hasi KOMHCCHA 
npH llosurr6lopo LIK BKJI (6)." The party's Central Committee dissolved this 
commission in November 1929. 
12 LIeHTpanbHbii FOCy.aapCTBeHHbiH apxits CaHKT-11eTepc6ypra. 
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of falsification" evolved and some in the post-Stalin period.13 A second 
group is miscellaneous: edited archival material from the ROC,14 
party resolutions,15 printed volumes of Soviet legislation16 or 
publications of party ideologists and antireligious cadres such as Em. 
Yaroslaysky (Emelyan [Minei] Israilevich Gubelman, 1878-1943)." 
13 A36yxa KoMMyHH3Ma (The ABC of Communism). IIonynnpHoe o6bacHemme 
npOrpaMMBI PoccuxcxoH KOMMYHHCTHYeCKOH IIapTHH (6onbmesnxoB). H. 
ByxapHH, E. Hpeo6paaceacxHH. FocyuapcTaeanoe 1H3 taTenbCTBo. 1920. 
IIeTep6ypr: Cbe3Jt PoCCHHcKOH KOMMYHHCTHYeCKOH napTHH (6onbmeBHxoB). 
MocKBa: 18-23 Mapra 1919 rolla. CreHorparpHHecxHH orveT. 
KHHrOH3.taTenbCTBO ' KOMMyHHCT". Mocxsa. 1919: see XIV BcepoccHHcxHH 
Cbe3,t COBeTOB. CTeHorpa(pHYeCKHH OT9eT. HaaaHHe BUIWK. 1929 Mocxsa, 
KpeMnb. The Central Committee of the CPSU has published some useful 
documents and minutes of the Central Committee and Politburo. See H3BecTH51 
LIK KIICC. H3xasanacb B 1919-1929 rr. Bo3o6Hosnenbl B 1989 r. Tom. 4. 
(303). 143Aaaue UeHTpanbHoro KoMHTeTa KIICC. 1990. Mocxsa. See also the 
documents preserved in Trotsky's archives. See, Apxns Tpouxoro. 
KOMMyHHCTHYeCKas O111103HUHA B CCCP. Tom I—IV. 1923-1927. 5lpocnasnb. 
PeliaKTop-cocTaBHTenb '.DenbIHTHHCKHf. H3,aaTenbCKHH ueHTp "Teppa". 
1988. See also The Trotsky Papers I—II, 1917-1922. Edited and annotated by Jan 
Meijer. The Hague. 1971. 
14 	 See Russian collection of the documents concerning the history of the Patriarchy 
and the ROC. See, AKTbI CBATeHmero IIarpnapxa THxoHa H no33tHermne 
, tOKYMeHTbI 0 npeeMCTBeHHOCTH BMCmeil LtepKOBHOH BnaCTH 1917-1943. 
C6OpHHK B JtBYX MaCTAX. COCTaBnTenb M.E. Fy60HHH. FaaBHbIN pejiaxTop: 
nporokleperi Bna%tHMHp Bop06beB. IH3AaTenbCTBo IIpaBocnaBHoro 
CBATO-THXOHOBCKOrO BorocnOBCKOTo HHCTHTYTa. MOCKBa. 1995. See also 
PyccKaa ITpaBocnaBHas IlepxOBb H KOMMyHHCruxecxOe FocyliapCTBo 
1917-1941. HoxyMeHTbI H CpOTOMaTepHanbl. H3,gaTenbCTBO Bn6nehcKo-
BorocnoscKoro HHCTHTyTa CB. anocrona AHJtpes. 1996 (Unfortunatelly, this 
work contains some factual errors). See also a collection of documents edited by 
Gerd Stricker. See PyccxaA IIpaBocnasaaa Ilepxosb B coBercxoe BpeMA 
(1917-1991) (The Orthodox Church of Russia during the Soviet Era (1917-1991) 
MarepHanbl H rioxyMeHrM no HCTOpHH OTHOmeHHH Me)Kj[y rocy tapersoM H 
IUepKOBblo. KHHra I-II. COCTaBHTenb repa IIITpnxxep. II3aaTenbCTBO 
" HponnneH." 1995. Mocxsa. See also new textbook for the history of the ROC, 
see 1'IcropHA Pyccxot IIpasocnasaoh [lepton' 1917-1990 r. YMe6HHK ANA 
npasocnasablx ,gyXOBHbIX CeMHHapHH Mocxoscxaa rlarpnapxHA. 
H3uarenbcxHH AOM XpoHHxa. 1994. Mocxsa. 
15 	 See, for example, KPSSvr — KOMMyHHCTH9eCKa51 IIapTHA CoseTcxoro Co1o3a 
B pe3onlouHAx H pemeuHAx cbe3{toB, xoncpepenuHH H nneHyMos LIK 
(1898-1970). Tom I-IV. I33A. BocbMoe. £t0110AHeHHOe H HCIlpasneHHOe. Mocxsa. 
1970. 
16 See, for example, P.V. Gidulyanov: OTueneHHe uepxBH or rocy1iaperBa B 
CCCP. Printed originally in Moscow in 1926, followed by a supplement, Moscow 
1928. Richmond, Surrey. 1971. 
17 	 See collected works of Yaroslaysky. See, IIporHB penHrHH H uepxBH. Tom I-IV. 
OrH3. hocyl&aperBeHHoe aHTHpenHrH03HOe HaaaTenbCTBo. 1932-1935. 
MOCK Ba. 
To mention but a few Soviet newspapers and periodicals, we may 
start with the mouthpiece of the ruling party, Pravda, and the 
newspaper of the Soviet government, Izvestiya. Moreover, Bolshevik, 
Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, Pod Znamenem Marksizma (Under 
the Banner of Marxism) etc. are significant sources as periodicals of 
party ideologists. Furthermore, the Soviet antireligious newspapers 
such as Antireligioznik (of a more scholarly nature), Bezbozhnik, 
Voinstvuyushchii Ateizm (Militant Atheism), etc., constitute another 
body of sources and are worth studying as mouthpieces of the Soviet 
antireligious movement. 
This "dialectical" use of archival and public sources can be justified 
for various reasons. First, the mission of the Soviet newspapers was 
to function as mouthpieces for the totalitarian government, as the most 
important instruments for mass-mobilization of the Soviet regime. 
Moreover, it was a common Soviet procedure to utilize newspapers 
as initiators of public campaigns. In their peculiar way, they often 
contain invaluable information in a hidden form. Also, newspapers 
often revealed something of the intentions of the ruling regime and 
also something of those particular sections of the Soviet regime they 
represented. The debates and intrigues of the Soviet system were 
usually concealed under the mask of solid ideological conformity. 
Although the surface seemed to be quite dogmatic, in practice there 
prevailed a hidden and fierce struggle between different interest 
groups. For example, the interests of the Comintern and Soviet 
antireligious institutions were not always identical. 
For this reason, special attention will be paid to the role of the 
SVB movement (Soyuz Voinstvuyushchikh Bezbozhnikov — League 
of the Militant Godless).18 The Cult Commission and SVB movement 
had the same field of activity with overlapping missions. It is therefore 
natural that this study will scrutinize the sources of the League in 
greater detail. The League was from its beginning an auxiliary 
instrument in the antireligious battle. As Walter Kolarz has remarked, 
in the beginning the role of the Godless-movement was marginal, 
especially during the NEP when the Soviet regime wanted to appease 
peasants with concessions.19 In the early 1930s everything changed; 
henceforth the role of the League was more and more significant in 
18 Henceforth referred to as the League or SVB. 
19 Kolarz 1961, 8. See also Delaney 1971, 116. 
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the Soviet "Cultural Revolution" (1928-1931). In the middle of this 
Cultural Revolution we could say that the League of the Militant 
Godless and the Cult Commission were twins of Bolshevik atheist 
ideology — both had a common goal to reach. However, there were 
some differences: the League represented the far-reaching telos of a 
totally atheist Soviet society, while the Cult Commission as a state 
organ was obliged to comply with the often disheartening reality. The 
"rise and fall" of the SVB movement nearly coincides with the history 
of the Cult Commission. Originally, the League was an offspring of 
the early NEP policy. Towards the end of the Russian civil war 
(1918-1921), the ruling clique was anxious to settle its scores with 
the internal opposition, i.e., with religious organizations. The party 
needed a new instrument to launch this battle against religion, and 
the band of zealous antireligiozniki who had rallied around the weekly 
newspaper Bezbozhnik in 1922 was a suitable instrument for this 
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	 purpose. After the 13th congress of the Soviet Communist Party, a 
special meeting of its correspondents established a society of "Friends 
of the Newspaper Bezbozhnik" and later the "League of the Militant 
Godless", which became a stronghold of official atheism.2° 
2. The period under examination 
The period under examination from 1929 to 1938 was the period in 
which the Soviet regime was dealing with almost subordinated and 
loyal churches and religious organizations!' However, not even total 
compliance or servility could guarantee the safety of the religious 
organizations in Stalinist society. It was also a period that profoundly 
changed the appearance of Russian society. During collectivization, 
the traditional and cultural roots of the Russian countryside were 
turned upside down when the centuries-old system of the mir was 
destroyed. Moreover, at the time of the first pyatiletka, agricultural 
20 	 On the political paradox of the early 1920s in the Soviet Union, see Schapiro 
1970, 195-196; Carr 1985 II, 176-178; Brovkin 1987, 294-299; Broido 1986, 
159-160. On the SVB movement, see Delaney 1971, 114-116; Newton 1990, 
87-89. On the religious policy situation after the civil war, see Luukkanen 1994, 
96-103. 
21 	 See declaration of Sergii in 1927. See Fletcher 1971, 54-57; VS, 69-70, Issue 
No. 6. "Pocc»st x ueprcoBb ceroa,Ha." See also Struve 1992, 188-192; Shkarovsky 
1995, 368-375. 
Russia rose along the trajectory of an industrialized superpower. The 
purges and the initiation of a reign of terror on Russian society laid 
the foundation for Stalinism and consequently future dilemmas 
experienced by the Soviet state. In a word, the cultural atmosphere 
of the country was transformed, the role of religion together with the 
whole outlook of religious organizations being deeply influenced. 
The present monograph will employ a historical methodology and 
will be divided into three chronological sections. The second chapter, 
"The great leap and hasty retreat — The years of the formation and 
early activities of the CSCRQ (1929-1932)," will investigate the 
political role of the CSCRQ during the early years of its existence. 
In 1929 the unofficial declaration of war made by the Politburo against 
all religions inside the USSR was- implemented by means of an 
informal three-step plan to crush the churches. However, Stalin's (Josif 
Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, 1879-1953) article, "Dizzy with 
Success," published in March 1930, proved a bombshell which 
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suddenly interrupted the intensive antireligious frontal attack. All 
Soviet officials, including the Cult Commission, were obliged to pay 
heed to Stalin's unexpected initiative. Although Stalin's article had a 
tactical purpose and its impact was quite shortlived, it represented the 
beginning of a sedate religious political debate inside the Soviet 
regime — between the CSCRQ, the Soviet Prosecutor and local party 
organs. Certain Soviet state officials inside the Soviet parliament, 
VTsIK and the Cult Commission in Moscow now started to show 
some impatience with the most brutal aspects of local antireligious 
campaigns. 
The third chapter, "The years of stabilization and consolidation of 
the committee's position (1933-1935)," deals with how the CSCRQ 
attempted to consolidate its position as a leading religious political 
organ in the USSR. During these so-called "good years" of the 1930s, 
just before the commencement of the Great Purges, this organ made 
a serious attempt to regulate local officials and their operations. In 
order to perform this "pacifying" of local party officials, the Cult 
Commission began its counselling operations and collected statistics 
to show the importance of the CSCRQ to higher officials and justify 
its calls for a centralized religious policy. This commission had also 
to comply with Soviet foreign policy and the attitude the Comintern 
had adopted in its fight against Nazism (the policy of the "open hand"). 
Consequently, members of the Cult Commission were obliged to 
explain and justify the Soviet religious political line to foreign guests 
coming to the Soviet Union. 
The fourth chapter, "The quest for unification and the years of the 
Great Terror (1936-1938)," outlines the final efforts of the CSCRQ 
to consolidate its position. It also shows how the Great Terror of 
1936-1938 had a devastating influence on the activity of the CSCRQ 
and the Soviet antireligious work in general. The whole work of the 
commission and the League were endangered by the "discovery" that 
there were "wreckers" or "Trotskyite-Zinovievites" inside its 
organization. The liquidation of the Cult Commission was executed 
together with the reorganization of the Soviet ruling apparatus in the 
late 1930s. The sudden death of the Cult Commission also revealed 
the fact that the Cult Commission, dedicated to Soviet religious policy 
could not stand against the tide of history; Stalin was finally starting 
to cherish the Great-Russian past and partially turning his back on his 
ideological heritage. The official Census of 193722 constituted a shock 
to the ruling regime as it revealed a high percentage of believers. The 
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	 existing organs, including the Cult Commission, proved ineffective in 
handling Soviet religious policy and the Soviet security apparatus 
displaced the latter. Moreover, the purges in the central antireligious 
establishment accelerated the liquidation of the Cult Commission. 
Henceforth, the supervision of religious affairs came directly under 
the jurisdiction of the Soviet security organs.23 
a. The question of Stalinism 
One of the basic questions arising from the period under investigation 
is linked with Stalin and Stalinism. The classical question is whether 
this period is related to the historical role of Stalin. Was the Soviet 
religious policy of the 1930s merely the natural outcome of a Stalinist 
state or was it linked to Stalin's personality? Was it connected with 
his ecclesiastical background or to his desire to play the role of his 
notorious Russian antecedents Ivan IV, the Terrible (1530-1584), and 
Peter the Great (1672-1725) — thus reflecting his special psychological 
preferences.24 The foregoing set of problems reflects the old dispute 
22 	 For the general census of 1937. See Corley 1994, 404-410. 
23 	 Roslof 1994, 289. 
24 	 Agursky 1984, 1-4, 9-14; Perrie 1992, 77-78, 96-97; Nove 1993, 1-33. See also 
how Stalin himself established his own personal cult. In particular all official 
congresses and meetings of the leadership of the ruling party had a strict hierarchy 
of various ovations and acclamation depending on the position of the individual 
communist leader. Stalin, of course, received the most sychophantic and pompous 
between the totalitarian school and the pluralist/revisionist school of 
interpreting Stalinism!' The totalitarian approach, originating from the 
conflicts of the Cold War, provides a solid explanation for many of 
Stalin's own initiatives and some of the peculiarities in the Soviet 
religious policy. Although the interpretations of the totalitarian school 
seem to be valid when dealing with Soviet ideology, the picture we 
receive from the archives contradicts the image of an iron-disciplined 
country moving according to Stalin's orders. Actually, from the point 
of view of the historian, the everyday Soviet reality seems to display 
a mixture of semichaotic actions under the monolithic surface of the 
ruling regime — "anarchy in the middle," as mentioned earlier.26 
Stalinism did its best to fuse all spheres of life under the monolithic 
domination of the party. Whatever the theory, in practice, this was 
not always the case?' The most original feature in Stalinism seems 
ovations of all. When Stalin entered the speaker's podium, the congress of 
hurraying delegates burst into eulogies such as: " Sypuax osau nt. Bce BcraIor. 
B031-11ac61 -Ypal. Xah )KHBe, rompHai CranHH!, JIB wan-Byer Bo)KJlb 
naprHH roaapHlrt CranHH! ,Ljoaro Ha acex $i3bIKaX pa3J[alorca B sane 
npHBeTCTBHB B `iecrb rosapHma CI-amnia!" Shinkarchuk 1995, 13-14. 
25 This "classical" debate on methodology and approach in Soviet studies was 
published in October 1986 in the Slavic Review. In her polemical article, Sheila 
Fitzpatrick demanded a new approach (social history) to studies of Stalinism and 
argued that the traditional state/society approach "encourages scholars to 
investigate the state mechanism rather than social processes". Fitzpatrick 1986, 
359. Other scholars ("totalitarians") criticized this, believing that the "revisionist" 
approach was trying to absolve the crimes of Stalins regime. Together with these 
disagreements, the participants in this debate resorted very often to moral 
judgements. As Alfred G. Meyer stated, this moral issue made the debate more 
than heated. "...In short, neither the old cohort of the totalitarians school nor the 
present-day revisionists deny that some dreadful things happened during the reign 
of Stalin. Their argument is only over who is to be blamed for them." Meyer 
1986, 405. See also Russian Review, 1987. Vol.46, No.4. For shorter introductions 
to this classical discussion, see Fitzpatrick 1993b, 77-83; McCauley 1995, 78-88. 
Also, for a summary of the Russian Review debate, see Andrle 1996, 25-34. See 
also discussions on Stalinism, totalitarism and pluralism: Tucker 1977, xii—xiii; 
Cohen 1977, 3-12; Campeanu 1986, 51-52; Getty 1993, 104-117, 121-129. 
137-142; Vihavainen 1997, 122-123. See the excellent monograph of Roger 
Pethybridge: The Social Prelude to Stalinism. The MacMillan Press. London & 
Basingstoke. 1974. For studies of new cohorts of historians, see Stephen Kotkin's 
magnificent history of Stalinism and the 1930s from the point of view of 
Magnitogorsk. See Magnetic Mountain. Stalinism as a Civilization. University of 
California Press. Berkeley, Los Angeles & London. 1995. 
26 Fitzpatrick 1993b, 82-83. 
27 This confusion between ideology and everyday life was actually revealed by 
Gorbatchov's perestroika. As James R. Ozinga has stated, M.S. Gorbachov "acted 
like a Martin Luther who wanted to become a different kind of Roman Catholic 
29 
to have been a sharp dichotomy between the infallible political theory 
and the real world, between the idealistic Homo Socialisticus of theory 
and the homunculus of reality. Stalin tried to solve this problem by 
terror, implying that socialism could be created if there would be no 
lurking enemies. This distinction between the evil of the present and 
good potential worlds, between the militant reality and the glorified 
telos of communist society, was as clear as St. Augustine's ideas on 
the differences between the Civitas del and Civitas diaboll. Or as 
Gabor Rittersporn has stated, this contradiction of reality and the 
propagated ideal of communism could be explained by Stalin's 
favourite idea concerning the "omnipresent conspiracy." To quote 
Rittersporn, the paranoia of enemies and wreckers... 
"...became central paradigms by which the regime sought to explain 
political processes and social conflicts, and official as well popular 
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	 milieux were disposed to suspect the work of subversive 
machinations behind the apparently inexplicable turmoil that turned 
into an unmanageable daily reality..."28 
When considering the personal convictions of Stalin himself, it 
appears that his position was based on a low level of ideological 
conviction. This is quite striking — as we know, Stalin had a religious 
background and a theological education. Considering this, we may get 
the impression that Marxism was for him something more concrete 
than it was for, e.g., Lenin or Trotsky. The latter came from a 
prosperous background and had possibilities for advancement in the 
autocratic Russian society. For Stalin, turning to socialism amounted 
to more than adopting a totally new view of the world. It was, actually, 
a new form of "religion," which pushed aside Orthodox faith and 
Georgian nationality. It is therefore rather surprising that Stalin did 
not, for example, profess any particularly atheist conviction. Stalin 
presented very few antireligious arguments and there seems to be no 
basis for talking about "Stalin's religious policy" as such. He was 
relatively indifferent to the ideological reasons for the antireligious 
struggle, which, considering his own background, is somewhat 
rather than a different sort of Christian." Ozinga 1992, 28. However, "the anarchy 
in the middle" was stronger than Gorbachov's attempts to reform the Soviet 
system. 
28 	 Rittersporn 1996, 102. See also Hellbeck 1996, 345, 349-355. 
surprising. For example, in his interview with American communists, 
Stalin stressed that it was not necessary to be an atheist when being 
a member of the party. He added, however, that the party could not 
be neutral in relation to religion because the party stood for science 
and religion for its part was against science!' It would appear that 
the great ruler of the Marxist state was not so interested in the 
ideological side of "the Storming of Heaven." For Stalin, there were 
no such obstacles as God, ideology, friends or relatives. He was able 
to get rid of his best friends or modify Bolshevik ideology when they 
proved to be obstacles in his path to supreme power.3° 
b. The historical background of the study 
Various stereotypes exist concerning Soviet religious policy during 
the first decades after the October Revolution of 1917. However, the 
reality proved to be rather different from these cruder stereotypes, 
which visualized Soviet religious policy as a never-ending horror 
story. 
First, the early religious policy of the Bolshevik party was 
vacillating; there being hardly any co-operation between different 
factions of the communist regime in this matter. Several ad hoc 
commissions and organs were put in charge of dealing with religion.31  
Secondly, the early decades of Soviet power cannot be portrayed 
simply as an era of merciless persecution of the ROC, right from the 
very beginning and with accelerating tempo.32 In actual fact, Bolshevik 
religious policy was not formed on the basis of its ideological 
29 	 SS 10, 131-133. " Secejta c nepooii aMep ixancKoii pa6o'ieti AenerauHeW'; 
Deutscher 1967, 26, 35; Billington 1970, 534-535; Tucker 1990, 3-7. Dimitry 
Volkogonov has given an interesting depiction of the principles behind Stalin's 
order to his personal secretary I.P. Tovstukha (1889-1935) in relation to the 
establishment of the Gensecs private library. Stalin stipulated that "antireligious 
literature fit for pulp" should not be included in his library. "...HCKnIOMHB H3 
KnaccHCIMKBHHH H OTAO?KHB B cTopoHy: yge6HHKH BCAKHe. MenKHe 7KypHaJbl, 
a Hrepenarxo3Hyio MaKynarypy H.r.n." See also Volkogonov 1989, 119-120; 
Ree 1997, 23-24. For opposite opinion, see preface written by Lars Lih: Stalin's 
Letters to Molotov 1925-1936. Edited by Lars Lih, Oleg V. Naumov and Oleg 
V. Khlevniuk. Yale University Press. 1995. 
30 	 See Milovan Djilas's opinion of Stalin's political and moral cynicism. Djilas 1962, 
110-115, 142-145, 153, 174-177. See also a psychoanalytical investigation of 
Stalin's "irrational" behaviour, see Rancour-Lafferiere 1988, 18-19, 24-25, 54. 
31 Luukkanen 1994, 64-65, 101. 
32 Pospielovsky 1987, x, 4-5. 
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premises, but by the general political situation and sudden changes in 
the power struggle inside the Soviet regime 33 Moreover, on questions 
of religious policy the Bolshevik party itself was divided into two 
basic factions, "doves" and "hawks." Points of disagreement lay 
mainly in the tactics to be employed in religious policy; no one in 
the ruling party denied the importance of the class struggle and the 
fight against religion. The main argument of the "doves" was that 
brutal actions against believers and especially against peasants could 
endanger the revolution.34 Some authoritative members of the party, 
such as V. D. Bonch-Bruevich (1873-1955) and L. B. Kamenev 
(Rosenfeld, 1883-1936)35, had influential positions inside the Soviet 
regime and could actually establish more tactful relations with 
religious organizations. 
The "hawks" were located in the Komsomol and to some extent in 
the Commissariat of Justice (See Table I.1.). These organs were filled 
32 
	
	 with more ideologically-minded communists. Nonetheless, during the 
civil war the religious policy of the ruling party constituted a 
compromise between these two factions. Terror and sporadic violent 
actions were officially directed only against politically hostile 
clergymen, but on a local level Bolshevik tenor tended to be 
"pre-emptive" in nature. In accordance with their "isolation policy", 
the Bolsheviks even attempted to encourage "neutral" priests. Only 
during the most ferocious battles of the civil war did the Soviet regime 
decide to move systematically against the monasteries. Especially 
during the NEP, the religious policy approach of the communist 
regime included "soft" techniques such as enticing leading clergymen 
to collaborate with the Soviet system. Moreover, inside the ruling 
regime there was a substantial group of communist leaders, e.g., L.B. 
Kamenev, M.I. Kalinin (1875-1946) and V.D. Bonch-Bruevich, who 
favoured adopting sectarians as models for Soviet agriculture. The 
founder of the Soviet state, Lenin himself, seemed to accept the 
experimental sectarian collectives as models for future Soviet 
agriculture. It is probable that Lenin and these moderate leaders 
33 	 See RTsKhIDNI f. 150, op. 1, d. 62. "LiepKoBb H rocyt[apereo s CCCP (1923)." 
Curtiss 1953, 89. The communist regime was especially cautious not to revitalize 
links between religion and nationality, see AK, 201. 
34 	 See, for example, BB I, 351-354; S13, 472-477; Winter 1972, 24-25. See also 
Pravda 15 May 1924, No.108. 
35 	 See Merridale 1995, 22-24, 34-37. 
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Zam.NK. 
D. I. Kursky 
N. V. Krylenko 
Cheka / OGPU / GPU / MVD / NKVD 
VI Section / ecclesiastical subsection / E. A. Tuchkov 
- information 
- political supervision 
- implementation of religious policy 
- interrogation 
APO * 
Sovnarkom 
Politburo CAP 
1922-1928 
CSCRQ 
1929-1938 VTsIK 
NKYust 
V/VIII Section 1918-1924 / P. A. Krasikov 
- circulars 
- Journal Revolvutsva i Tserkov 
- administrative orders and instructions 
- specialists 
NKID 
- international relations and propaganda 
Narkompros 
- education (non-religious) 
Glavpolitprosvet 
Table I.1. Organizational structure of Soviet religious-political organs 
1922-1938 
33 
*) Special section for coordinating party's agitation and propaganda. 
preferred a more gradual tempo on the path towards socialism and in 
the antireligious struggle.36 
On the one hand, the ideological confrontation between Marxism 
and religion, together with the historical background of the Bolshevik 
party, made relations between the religious organizations and the 
Soviet rulers more tense. But on the other hand, the general political 
situation and sudden tums in the power struggle inside the ruling party 
were nonetheless more influential in this field. When confronting 
political reality, the Bolsheviks were able to push their ideology and 
historical aversions aside. The religious policy of the Bolshevik party 
was guided more by the political reality than by ideology. 
The explanation for this cautious Bolshevik approach was obvious. 
Their ambition was to drive religion to the margins of society, and in 
doing so they had no qualms about terrorizing and executing people 
linked to religion but the ROC remained a significant political force 
34 
	
	 in Soviet Russia during the 1920s. This was especially apparent during 
the civil war, when religious questions were only of secondary 
importance to the ruling regime. The Bolsheviks were fighting for 
their survival and the ROC was allowed to continue its basic functions 
as before, as long as it did not engage in activities directly hostile to 
the Soviet regime. Finally, after the October Revolution and especially 
after the civil war, the new govemment soon realized that the ROC 
was deeply rooted in the traditional Russian society.37 By their early 
legislative acts, the Bolsheviks were able to build only some of the 
foundations of a secularized state.38 
36 	 The ruling regime was at that time trying to establish better links with sectarians 
by creating a special commission to deal with this matter. See RTsKhIDNI f. 5, 
op. 2, d. 55, 1.38. See also facts on the special communist commission dedicated 
to work among the sectarians "Orgkomsekt". See GARF f. 353, op. 8, d. 8. 
"3aHHcKa 0 BOCCTBHOBneHHH aeATenbHOCTH oCo60N KOMHCCHH OprKOMCeKT"  
npH HapKOM3eMe H 00060N pecpopMe n0 COKTAHTCKOMy BOHpOCy B CBA3H C 
nocTaHOBneHHAMH XIII cbesaa PKII." See also how Soviet officials assisted the 
sectarians in the early 1920s: VSS VII, 228; Izvestiya, 19 October 1921, No. 234. 
The Soviet regime allowed sectarians to act relatively freely during the high NEP 
(1924-1927). However, the civil peace of "religious NEP" did not prevent political 
supervision of the security organs. Luukkanen 1994, 181-185. 
37 See especially RTsKhIDNI f. 89, op.3. d. 1 "BcepoccHticKoe coseutarme 
3aBeayIOWHX arHTOTaenaMH ry6KOMOB H 06naCTKOMOB PKII 7-11 MaR 1921"; 
RTsKhIDNI £89, op.4, d.184 "BceM o6KOMaM. o6n6!opo H ry6KOMaM P.K.H. o 
nocTaHoBKe a HTHpeJIHrHo3Hon nponaraaabl. LlnpKynApxo. 6/a." See also 
KPSSvr II, 243; Curtiss 1953, 104-105. 
38 	 See early Bolshevik legislation on the church-state relationship: SU I, 260-261; 
The secularization of the Soviet state was put under the Soviet 
judicial system; under central "Liquidation Committee"39 and a 
network of local "Liquidation Committees" were given the 
responsibility for stripping away the vestiges of religion from Soviet 
society. Moreover, the Soviet security organ, the Cheka (later GPU, 
OGPU), and its 6th section had shown a keen interest in Soviet 
religious policy. The Cheka, together with the NKVD's "Ecclesiastical 
Subsection", worked mainly as supervisory organs in Soviet religious 
policy, but they also functioned as the "strong arm" of the communist 
regime. The security apparatus performed the dirty work by arresting, 
interrogating, imprisoning, and executing the servants of religious 
cults who were categorized as enemies of the existing order. The 
Cheka's special commission, the so-called "Ispolkomdukh" also 
exercised more refined methods by attempting to entice the high clergy 
to abandon their ecclesiastical duties.40 Later, when the civil war was 
over, the party consolidated its role in Soviet religious policy. At first, 	 35 
Trotsky was the leader of the APO and the main executive in the 
"confiscation-conflict" of 1921-1922.41 Moreover, it seems most likely 
that only a small inner circle of the communist regime (Trotsky's 
commission and the inner circle of the Politburo: the already 
incapacitated Lenin, Stalin, and Molotov) was in charge of the 
"confiscation conflict" of 1921-1922. This operation had two political 
objectives: firstly, the confiscation of valuables from churches was 
done in order to finance Soviet power; secondly, Trotsky's plan (fully 
accepted by Lenin)42 had the strategic goal of undermining the 
DSV I, 371-374. See also the publication of the "separation-decree": Izvestiya, 
21 January 1918, No.16(280). See also SURa, 685; ORTs, 82-84. See the 
documents and legislation on the first Soviet Constitution 1918: GARF f. 6980, 
op.l.; DSV II, 552-554. 
39 	 This organ was led by P.A. Krasikov (1870-1939). The official name of this 
commission was "The Department for Implementing the Separation of Church 
and State" (Or,ten no npoee,teHMto B )KH3Hb aexpera o6 or teneHHM uepxBH 
OT rocyuaperaa). See also Luchterhand 1993, 55. 
40 See NR, 34. "IIMcbMo 3aseaytotuero cexperHb!M orrtenoM WIK T.II. 
CaMcouoaa 1.D. IL3epAnticxoMy 4 peica6pst 1920 r." 
41 	 See TTP II, 670-672. 
42 	 See the "famous" letter of Lenin which seems to be more a report about a trauma 
than a real directive or order for the security apparatus. In this letter Lenin urged 
the Politburo to act without mercy and hesitation. The famine in Volga area would 
have been a good pretext so that the Soviet power could root out the ecclesiastical 
opposition. According to Lenin, the populance would accept the terror against the 
clergy. Moreover, a few days after dictating this letter, Lenin suffered a second 
authority of the ROC. In order to weaken resistance among believers, 
Trotsky introduced a policy of fomenting schisms inside all the 
religious organizations in Russia. Trotsky's ultimate political objective 
seems to have been nothing less than the total destruction of the ROC 
and other religious organizations.43  
It was not too difficult for Trotsky to foment a schism within the 
ROC; social tensions between "white" and "black" clergy could easily 
be exploited by the communist regime. Moreover, as a result of the 
"confiscation conflict", the ROC was forced to change its policy from 
hostile neutrality to one of loyalty. The case of Patriarch Tikhon 
(Belavin, Vasily Ivanovich, 1865-1925) reveals how effectively the 
ruling regime was able to exploit the antagonism between the ROC 
and the Renovationists, The Living Church movement. 
As already stated, Lenin's illness complicated the situation within 
the Soviet leadership. As soon as Lenin became seriously ill without 
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	 hope of recovery, Trotsky's position was at risk and the triumvirate 
of Stalin, Zinovev and Kamenev had a free hand to alter the direction 
of Soviet religious policy. One of the main reasons for the change 
was the triumvirate's desire to discredit Trotsky during the hidden 
power struggle. In order to do so, the triumvirate and, especially, G.E. 
Zinovev (Radomyslsky, Grigory Evseevich, 1883-1936) introduced 
slogans that contradicted Trotsky's more aggressive policy by 
appeasing the peasants and the neutral intelligentsia.44 Moreover, 
certain members of the Soviet government, for example, from the 
Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, had appealed to Stalin to 
pacify the "hawks" in the Soviet leadership 45 The decline of Trotsky 
and the rise of Stalin were among the salient features of 1923. Stalin's 
position was further secured when he was appointed General Secretary 
of the party in 1922 and was given the task of harmonizing different 
party organs. Consequently, it was a simple enough task for him to 
stroke. See lzvTsK KPSS 1990, 192-193. See also PSS 45, 666-667. It seems, 
that Trotsky was a mastermind behind the whole operation, see Trotsky's secret 
letter to Lenin (dated 30 January 1922) in which he hints that the confiscation of 
the ecclesiastical valuables was under "political" preparation on different levels 
in order to avoid publicity and to keep this matter hidden from the foreign press. 
See TTP II, 670-672. 
43 	 RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 280 (Pp 111, 13/3-22); IzvTsK KPPS 1990, No. 4, 
192-194. See also Luukkanen 1996, 31-45. 
44 	 Compare S12, 44; S12, 716 and KPSSvr II, 469-472. 
45 	 GARF f. 5446e, op. 55, op. 409 "Toe. CranHHy. Cekperapro LIK PKI7. 1 anpenn 
1923 r." 
wrest control of the party's antireligious work away from Trotsky. At 
the same time, the triumvirate of Zinovev, Kamenev and Stalin halted 
the antireligious campaigns of the early NEP. 
At the same time as Trotsky's authority was diminishing, the 
official Commission of Antireligious Propaganda, CAP,46 took control 
of Soviet religious policy. Especially the CAP possessed substantial 
authority as an organ planning and coordinating Soviet religious 
policy. The network that this agency had built up with its members 
drawn from the Soviet judicial and security apparatus enabled the 
commission to function. 
The 12th party congress in 1923 was a turning point in Soviet 
religious policy. It seems that Trotsky himself had prepared the 
outlines of the resolution concerning religious organizations. However, 
Zinovev and the other members of the triumvirate nullified Trotsky's 
more aggressive resolution with their conciliatory speeches.47 In order 
to appease the peasants and discredit Trotsky's antireligious 	 37 
campaigns during the early NEP, the triumvirate adopted a more 
conciliatory attitude towards religion. This also meant that the party 
was obliged to turn away from the antireligious methods of the early 
NEP to peaceful techniques such as the propaganda and agitation of 
the high NEP. The 12th congress was from this point of view the 
beginning of a new religious policy, "religious NEP", representing the 
start of organized antireligious propaganda in place of administrative 
measures. 
To summarize the organizational view of Soviet religious policy at 
the height of the NEP: the party's religious policy was concentrated 
in special supervisory and governing organs (the CAP and the secret 
police). The Fifth Division of the Commissariat of Justice was 
abolished and the role of the APO diminished to nil. As before, real 
decisions were made in small circles of the party: during Lenin's time, 
in the Sovnarkom, the Politburo, and in Trotsky's antireligious 
commission. Important decisions were always taken in the Politburo, 
and, during the high NEP, also in the CAP. Moreover, there were real 
open debates inside the party before and during the 12th and the 13th 
congresses, but in practice religious policy decisions were made in 
closed party circles. 
46 	 See RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op.112, d. 378, rol. 197, 1. 4. 
47 	 Compare KPSSvr II, 469-472 and S12,39,44-45,716.  See also Luukkanen 1996, 
41-45. 
The new method that the ruling party developed during the 
"confiscation conflict" involved the creating of a loyal wing inside a 
particular religious organization. This method suited the "peaceful" 
NEP period better and active participation by the representatives of 
the Soviet regime often produced more effective results than plain 
terror could have done. The main objective of the high NEP religious 
policy was to create loyal churches with pro-Soviet attitudes. In 
practice, this simply amounted to promoting an internal schism in the 
ROC. The Renovationist church had only tactical value for the Soviet 
regime. The schism was initially planned as a temporary measure and 
when the loyal Renovationists attempted to secure their position the 
government abandoned the Living Church.48 
Finally we can say that despite sporadic and often merciless waves 
of terror in the civil war and during the "confiscation-conflict" at the 
beginning of the NEP, the years of the high NEP represented a brief 
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	 breathing-space for all religious organizations. Indeed, for the 
sectarian movement it was a period of great success. The split in the 
SVB movement between the followers of M.M. Kostelovskaya 
(1878-1964) and those of Yaroslaysky, together with the religious 
policy debate among the high officials in 1926, clearly bear witness 
to this. At the same time, the high NEP reached its peak at the 15th 
Party Congress in 1927. During the Cultural Revolution, the Bolshevik 
party turned more to the policy of direct attack on all "class enemies", 
and the religious organizations were the first to suffer.49 
3. Earlier studies and basic concepts 
a. "Pre-archival" studies 
Monographs investigating the religious policy of the Soviet regime 
might be classified in many ways. Perhaps the best way is to divide 
them chronologically into those published during the Cold War and 
those written after the opening of the Soviet archives. The best of the 
"pre-archive" monographs employ a politically dispassionate style and 
utilize a massive stock of primary and secondary sources. The strength 
48 	 Luukkanen 1994, 127-128, 132-135. 
49 	 Luukkanen 1994, 200-202; Penis 1995, 351. 
of these older studies, as for example, those of John S. Curtiss, lies 
in the systematic way in which they utilized published materia1.50 
Unfortunately, certain earlier Western studies dealing with the 
problems of church-state relationships in the Soviet Union carry the 
50 	 See John S. Curtiss: The Russian Church and the Soviet State 1917-1950. 1965. 
Little Brown & Co. Boston. Gerhard Simon: Church, State and Opposition in the 
USSR. 1974. Hurst. London. Pedro Ramet: Cross and Commissar: The Politics 
of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Indiana University Press. 1987. 
Bloomington, Indianapolis. William C. Fletcher: The Russian Orthodox Church 
Underground, 1917-1970. Oxford University Press. 1971. London. On the battle 
between Komsomol and Christian organizations, see David E. Powell: Religion 
and Youth in the Soviet Union — Politics and The Soviet System. Essays in Honour 
of Frederick C. Barghoorn. Edited by Thomas F. Remington. MacMillan Press. 
1989. Basingstoke. On the nationality question and religion, see Pedro Ramet: 
The Interplay of Religious and Nationalities Policy in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe — Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics. 
Edited by Pedro Ramet. Duke Press Policy Studies. Revised and expanded edition. 
Duke University Press. 1989. Durham and London. On the legal status of religion, 
see Joshua Rothenberg: The Legal Status of Religion in The Soviet Union — Aspects 
of Religion in the Soviet Union 1917-1967. Edited by Richard H. Marshall, Jr. 
Associate Editors, Thomas E. Bird and Andrew Q. Blane. The University of 
Chicago Press. 1971. Chicago. See also Albert Boiter: Law and Religion in the 
Soviet Union — The American Journal of Comparative Law. A Quarterly. 1/1987. 
Vol. 35. American Association for the Comparative Study of Law, Inc. 1987. 
Berkeley, California. Concerning the historical role of the Russian peasantry and 
their religious practices, see Moshe Lewin: Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: 
A Study of Collectivization. Translated by Irene Nove with the assistance of John 
Biggart. With a Preface by Alec Nove. Northwestern University Press. George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1968. London. See also Society, State and Ideology during 
the First Five-Year Plan —'Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1928-1931 by the same 
author. Edited by Sheila Fitzpatrick. Indiana University Press. 1984. Bloomington 
and London. And especially his excellent work The Making of The Soviet System. 
Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia. Pantheon Books. 1985. New 
York. With regard to the collectivization and its impact to the ROC, see Robert 
Conquest: The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine. 
Arrow Books. 1986. London. See also the same author's general introduction to 
the religious political situation in the USSR: Religion in the USSR. Soviet Studies 
Series. The Bodley Head. 1968. London. With regard to the sociological 
dimension of the ROC. See Christel Lane: Christian Religion in the Soviet Union: 
A Sociological Study. Allen & Unwin. 1978. London. See also her work The Rites 
of Rulers: Ritual in Industrial Society — The Soviet Case. Cambridge University 
Press. 1981. Cambridge. With regard to the development of atheism as part of 
Soviet ideology, see Peter van den William Bercken: Ideology and Atheism in the 
Soviet Union. Translated from the Dutch by H.Th. Wake. Religion and Society; 
28. Mouton de Gruyter. 1989. Berlin. Concerning the SVB movement, see: Joan 
Delaney: The Origins of Soviet Antireligious Organizations — Aspects of Religion 
in The Soviet Union 1917-1967. Edited by Richard H. Marshall Jr. Associate 
Editors, Thomas E. Bird and Andrew Q. Blane. The University of Chicago Press. 
1971. Chicago. 
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burden of the Cold War or are loaded with missionary overtones and 
a stigma of partiality. They often lack deeper historical analysis or 
contain hardly any discussion on other studies on the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, these studies are overwhelmingly based on second-hand 
stories of samizdat or emigre sources, which scarcely show any hint 
of criticism of these sources. It may be that in some cases the 
speculations contained in these studies have been shown to be valid. 
However, it is regrettable that they transformed the history of the ROC 
and other religious groups into a "historia sacra", emphasizing the 
never-ending martyria of heroic Christians and heaping anathema 
upon their wicked adversaries, the Bolsheviks and their opportunistic 
hirelings, the Living Church, etc. Thus, bitter hostility against 
communism and atheism created an apotheosis of the ROC and 
Christians in generals' There is a considerable difference of opinion 
51 See, Trevor Beeson: Discretion and Valour. Religious Conditions in Russia and 
Eastern Europe. With a foreword by Sir John Lawrence. Collins. 1974. Glasgow. 
See also Michael Bourdeaux: Candle in the Wind, edited by Eugene B. Shirley 
Jr. and Michael Rowe. See also a book by the same author: Patriarch and 
Prophets: Persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church Today. And Opium of the 
People. The Christian Religion in the U.S.S.R. 1965. London. See also, Father 
Mikhail (MHxaen llonbckHH): IIonoaceHHe uepxsM a CoBeTCKoh PoccHH. 
OYepx 6eacasmero Hs PoccnH csstuteHHHxa. 1931 ilepyca.nHM. 1995. 
Caax-r-IIerepc6ypr. As an example of another kind of strong conviction than 
religious, see Robert Blick: The Seeds of Evil. Lenin and the Origins of Bolshevik 
Elitism. Second Revised Edition. Steyne Publications, London. 1995. Blick's book 
is a fine representative of a biased political study. Thus, having a "deutscherian" 
outlook and a Trotskyite central idea, it fails to meet the stylistic splendour and 
scientific interest of Mr. Deutscher. On religiously-motivated studies with a 
relatively wide focus, see a contribution by Johannes Chrysostomus: 
Kirchengeschichte Rußlands der neuesten Zeit. II Das Moskauer Patriarchat ohne 
Patriarchen 1925-1943. Anton Pustet München/Salzburg. 1966. See also a 
"masterpiece" of the Cold War attitudes: The Communist Conspiracy. Strategy 
and Tactics of World Communism. Prepared and released by the Committee on 
Un-American Activities, U.S. House of representatives, Washington, D.C. 1956. 
See also three classics of church-state studies, Walter Kolarz: Religion in The 
Soviet Union. MacMillan. 1961. London. See also Bohdan R. Bociurciw: 
Church-State Relations in the USSR. — Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma 
of Power. Edited by Max Hayward and William C. Fletcher. Published for the 
Centre de Recherches et d'Etude des Institutions Religieuses by Pall Mall Press. 
1969. London. William Chaunchay Emhardt: Religion in Soviet Russia. Morehouse 
Publishing Co. Milwaukee Wis. 1929. See a work done by emigre author, Wassilij 
Alexeev: Religion in Communist Land. Vol. 7. No. 1. Spring 1979. Centre for 
the Study of Religion and Communism. Compton Press. 1979. Tisbury, Wilts. On 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, see J.M. Bohenski: Marxism-Leninism and Religion — 
Religion and Atheism in the U.S.S..R. and Eastern Europe. Edited by Bohdan R. 
Bociurciw and John W. Strong. Assisted by Jean K. Laux. Carleton University. 
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regarding the fate of the church found in the two categories of studies 
mentioned. These disagreements are clearly seen in the case of the 
Renovationist schism. As Edward Roslof has pointed out, authors such 
as Curtiss and Philip Walters have described the Renovationists with 
great impartiality, picturing them as sincere reformists of the ROC. 
Moreover, as Roslof has remarked, D.V. Pospielovsky, as a typical 
representative of emigre authors sees (despite utilizing the same 
sources) nothing positive in the Living Church movement.s2 
Generally speaking, the foregoing contradiction could be perceived 
as reflecting the contradiction between studies based on public sources 
and those based on samizdat sources. The positive evaluations based 
on public sources have often attempted to detect the real motivations 
MacMillan. 1975. London. See also certain studies dedicated to theological 
purposes and written by emigre authors. An exceptionally fine volume concerning 
the history of the ROC written by Anatoly Levitin & Vadim Shavrov: O':epxu 
no ucropuu pyccxoü ttepxoeuoü cMyrbr (Essays on the History of Russian 
Ecclesiastical Disturbances). B 3 rollax. Institut Glaube in Der 2. Welt. CH-8700 
Küsnacht. 1978. Schweiz. Constantin de Grunwald: God and The Soviets. 
Translated by G.J. Robinson-Paskevsky. Hutchinson Co. Ltd. London. 1961. Lev 
Regelson: TpareuHA Pyccxoli UepKBH 1917-1945 (The Tragedy of the Russian . 
Church 1917-1945). 1977. Paris. See also Nikita Struve: Christians in 
Contemporary Russia. Translated by Lancelot Sheppard and A. Manson. Harvill 
Press. 1967. London and especially Dimitry V. Pospielovsky: The Russian Church 
Under The Soviet Regime 1917-1982. Vol. I. St. Vladimir's Seminary Press. 1984. 
See also Marite Sapiets: Anti-Religious Propaganda and Education. — Candle in 
the Wind: Religion in the Soviet Union. Edited by Eugene B. Shirley, Jr. and 
Michael Rowe. Foreword by Richard Schifter. Ethics and Public Policy Centre. 
1989. Washington D.C., Crestwood, New York. See also Harwey Fireside: Icon 
and Swastika. The Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet Control. 
Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 1971. Some of these authors 
have even tried to "rehabilitate" their earlier contributions with new archive 
studies. Interestingly enough, primary archives have often only "verified" earlier 
findings and paradigmas. Compare Dimitry V. Pospielovsky's trilogy "A History 
of Atheism in Theory and Practise, and the Believer 1—Ii1". MacMillan, New York: 
St. Martin's 1987-1988. and his Pyccxas npaeocsaenas uepxoeb e XX sere. 
I43uaTenbcrBo "Pecny6nHKa". 1995. Mocxsa. According to Pospielovsky 
"...3anauHble asropbl. onyOnHKOBaBmxe HecxonbKo ueCATKOB pa6oT Ha 
axrJlHticxoM. HeMeuxoM H upyrux 513blxax no HHrepecyplueMy Hac Bonpocy. 
uenATCA Ha rise rpynnbC aKTHBHCTOB Pa3HbIX XpHCTHBHCKHX rpynn H 
opraiiu3auHli no pacnpoc paHeHHK) CAOBa BOAberO B Tor{'iamHHX cTpaHax 
BocT09Horo 6JIOKa H Cepbe3HbIX y9eHbIX — HCTOPHKOB. COUHOJOrOB. 
nonnronoroB. 6orocnosos." Pospielovsky 1995, 5. Mr. Pospielovsky obviously 
places himself in the second category, although some of the scholars in this field 
have criticized him for neglecting primary sources. See how Professor Roy R. 
Robson actually charges D.V. Pospielovsky with altering the solid principle of 
historiography — ad fontes to the principle of adios fontes. See Robson 1995, 253. 
52 Roslof 1994, 8. See also Luukkanen 1995, 186-188. 
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and objectives of the Soviet regime, treating the communist system 
with Westernlike rationality. The negative evaluations, on the other 
hand, have regarded communism as an heir of satanism and the 
Bolshevik regime as a band of ordinary gangsters.53 For these people, 
the history of the ROC and other religious organizations consisted of 
nothing but constant purges and bloodbaths right from the beginning 
of Soviet power. It is quite obvious that when investigating the 
methods of Bolshevik religious policy we may end up concluding that 
this problem could be dealt with better by criminological methods (or 
by discussing with theologians versed in demonology). In many cases, 
the Communist oligarchy did not differ from a well organized band 
of gangsters; Stalin himself earned his initial reputation as an organizer 
of bank robberies, etc. However, if we were to write only the history 
of morally distinguished people, we would certainly be left with very 
few opportunities for historical research. Moreover, when discussing 
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	 the history of the Soviet era, one can not always avoid making moral 
judgements. 
However, the quest for heroes and villains — or introducing idols 
and scapegoats on the scene of history — is not, at least in the opinion 
of the author of the present study, the basic mission of historiography. 
The primary goal of historians is not to establish "eternal truth" or 
argue for moral values or eulogize the winners of history and curse 
the losers. As Chris Ward has pointed out: 
..."historians should try to see all round a problem; to understand 
and make comprehensible old policies, old factions and past lives. 
And understanding — that effort to suspend disbelief and enter into 
a world of men and women for whom we may now have no 
particular sympathy — requires more than a modicum of 
empathy...understanding the oppressors, however, — the NKVD 
operative, the Mississippi slaveowner, the money-grabbing 
Lancashire capitalist, the Roman patriarch or the interrogators of 
the Holy Inquisition — is probably an unattractive proposition, even 
though we are not required to share their view of the world. We 
are obliged, however, to realize that it was their view of their 
world..."54 
53 	 See Berdyaev 1994(1933), 411-412. 
54 	 Ward 1993, 228-229. 
However, the critical discussion that has been presented against the 
"fellow-travellers" or those presenting a more positive picture of the 
Communist regime has been most valuable. The generation of Edward 
Hallett Carr and Isaac Deutscher was, no doubt, mesmerized by the 
colossal achievements they thought that the Soviet power had 
achieved. Their hypotheses and basic assumptions were clear: the 
Soviet system, despite its failures and excesses, was a positive 
phenomenon and the foundations of the Soviet system were stable!' 
b. "Post-archival" studies 
The "post-archival" studies and articles that seek to investigate 
church-state relations and the formation of Soviet religious policy 
involve both Russian and Western researchers. With respect to 
Western studies, mention might be made of John Anderson's The 
Council for Religious Affairs and the Shaping of Soviet Religious 
Policy56, which analyzes the formal structures of Soviet religious 
political organs. Otto Luchterhand, in his article The Council for 
Religious Affairs, has also made a valuable contribution with this 
55 	 See Edward Hallett Carr: 1917: Before and After. MacMillan. London. 1969. For 
an "apologetic" monograph on Stalin, see Isaac Deutscher: Stalin: A Political 
Biography. Second Edition. Oxford University Press. 1967. London. And also for 
his somewhat "positive evaluations" on post-Stalinist Russia, Russia after Stalin. 
Hamish Hamilton. Ltd. 1953. As examples of these Western scholars of a 
pro-Marxist persuasion, see Schlesinger 1965, 84-87; Braverman 1967, 22-28; 
Huberman & Sweezy 1967 9-21. 
56 	 See John Anderson: The Council for Religious Affairs and the Shaping of Soviet 
Religious Policy. Soviet Studies. A Journal on the USSR and Eastern Europe. 
Vol. 43. No. 4. Glasgow University Press. 1991. Glasgow. Some of these 
"post-archival" authors have specialized in questions such as the conflict between 
the Renovationist Orthodox Church and the ROC in the 1920s. See Philip Walters: 
The Renovationist Coup: Personalities and Programmes. - Church, Nation and 
State in Russia and Ukraine. Edited by Geoffrey A. Hosking. MacMillan in 
Association with the SSEES, University of London. MacMillan. 1991. London. 
See also his article A Survey of Soviet Religious Policy - Religious Policy in The 
Soviet Union. Edited by Sabrina Petra Ramet. Cambridge University Press. 1993. 
Cambridge. See also Catherine Gousseff's article with some accounts from the 
Soviet archives: Le schisme renovateur: un mouvement pro-communiste dans 
1'eglise russe - Revue d'etudes comparatives Est-Ouest. 3-4 (septembre-
decembre). 1993. Paris. On educational matters and Soviet power, see Larry E. 
Holmes: Fear No Evil: Schools and Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917-1941. 
Religious Policy in the Soviet Union. Edited by Sabrina Petra Ramet. Cambridge 
University Press. 1993. Cambridge. 
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theme.57 
Growing numbers of Western authors have been able to work with 
primary sources and are spreading their archival activity from central 
to local archives. As a result of this massive archival work, a number 
of excellent pieces of scholarly research have appeared, such as Daniel 
Peris's article The 1929 Congress of the Godless, in which he outlines 
the 1929 Congress of the Godless-movement.58 His more recent article, 
Commissars in Red Cassocks: Former Priests in the League of the 
Militant Godless, deals with those priests who changed their loyalty 
and turned to atheism.59 Also, a fine article by Gregory Freeze on the 
fate of the Renovationists on the parish level is in a league of its 
own.
60 
Works by Soviet historians on the question of Soviet religious 
policy are usually little worth. Although, after Stalin's death, slight 
changes occurred in the dogmatic treatment of history, ideological 
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	 premises nonetheless dictated Soviet history writing. As a rule, these 
works reflect the ideological stiffness of the Soviet oligarchy and 
contain very little primary information.61 Emigre authors such as 
57 	 See Otto Luchterhand: The Council for Religious Affairs. — Religious Policy in 
The Soviet Union. Edited by Sabrina Petra Ramet. Cambridge University Press. 
1993. Cambridge. 
58 	 Daniel Penis. The 1929 Congress of the Godless. Soviet Studies. A Journal on 
the USSR and Eastern Europe. Vol. 43. No. 4. 1991. Glasgow. 
59 	 Daniel Penis. Commissars in Red Cassocks: Former Priests in the League of the 
Militant Godless. Slavic Review. American Quarterly of Russian, Eurasian and 
East European Studies Vol. 54, No. 2 (Summer). 1995. 
60 See Gregory Freeze: Counter-reformation in Russian Orthodoxy: Popular 
Response to Religious Innovation, 1922-1925. — Slavic Review. American 
Quarterly of Russian, Eurasian and East European Studies Vol. 54, No. 2 
(Summer). 1995. There are also a few unpublished dissertations on the relations 
between Renovationists and Tikhonites, see: Edward Eldon Roslof: The 
Renovationist Movement in The Russian Orthodox Church, 1922-1946. 1994. 
University of North Carolina. Daniel Penis: Storming of Heavens: The Soviet 
League of the Godless and Bolshevik Political Culture in the 1920s and 1930s. 
1994. University of Illinois. 1994. For a fine dissertation on peasants and their 
religion, see Glennys Jeanne Young, Rural Religion and Soviet Power, 1921-1932. 
Diss. University of California. 1989. Berkeley, California. See also the published 
dissertation of the author of this work, Arto Luukkanen: The Party of Unbelief. 
The Religious Policy of the Bolshevik Party, 1917-1929. Studia Historica 48. 
Societas Historica Finlandiae. 1994. Helsinki. See also Roslof's article: The 
Heresy of "Bolshevik" Christianity: Orthodox Rejection of Religious Reform 
during NEP in Slavic Review. See also the only published short article concerning 
the history of the CSCRQ. Terry D. Martin: Cults Commission — The Modern 
Encyclopedia of Religions in Russia and The Soviet Union. Vol. 6. 1995. 
Academic International Press. 
Mikhail Geller, Aleksandr Nekrich and Andrei Sinyaysky are much 
more informative in their essays and books when evaluating Soviet 
religious history.62 However, the introduction of perestroika changed 
everything. Despite some restrictions,63 Soviet newspapers such as 
Argumenty i Fakty, Ogonek, Moskovskie Novosti, etc., gradually began 
their critical evaluations of the history of the USSR and church-state 
interactions. Later, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian 
authors embarked upon more scholarly investigations and archival 
studies. Moreover, Russian authors gained access to the archives 
earlier than did their Western colleagues having, in many cases, what 
amounts to ius primae noctis for the declassified archival material 
released by officials. Many of them are now starting to reclaim their 
own history. For example, Valery Alekseev, in his HR.vo3uu u dozMbl 
(Illusions and dogmas), has been able to deal with an impressive bulk 
of archival material on the religious policy of the Soviet Union.64 
Moreover, Sergei Savelev and Olga Vasileva could be mentioned as 	 45 
Russian scholars who have written critical evaluations on the history 
61 	 For example, see N. P. Nikitin: Eopb6a K17CC sa nuKeudauu,o chaxruvecrcozo 
uepaeencrea napodoe CCCP. Ha npumepe aerotro uubrx pecny6nurc 17oeonScba 
u 17puypanbs (1917-1937. rr.). 1979. MocKBa. See also I. Y. Trifonov's: O'eprcu 
ucropuu Knaccoeoü 6opb6b4 6 CCCP 6 zodu H917A (1921-1937). 1960. MocKBa 
and from the same author: Jluieudauus srccnnyararopcxux KJOCCO6 e CCCP. 
1975. MOCKBa. During the period of perestroika, certain Soviet authors attempted 
to publish monographs using more detailed and interesting methods. See N.P. 
Krasikov: CottHanbxo-sTHYecKHe BO33peHHs< pyccxoro npasocnauns B XX 
sexe. NsltaTenbcTBo Bbrcwasr wKona. MocKsa. 1988. For Western evaluations, 
see Kerst 1977, 17-32. 
62 	 For a classical emigre evaluation of the formation of the Soviet man and his 
ethics, see Mikhail Geller: MawHHa H BHHTHKH. I'ICTOpH51 tpopMHpoBaHHst 
coBeTcxoro YenoBeKa. Overseas Publication Interchange Ltd. 1985. London. For 
a more systematic approach to the history of the USSR, see Mikhail Geller & 
Aleksandr Nekrich: Yronus y enacru. Hcropus Coeercxozo Corosa c 1917 soda 
do natuux dneü. ToM.I. Overseas Publication Interchange Ltd. 1982. Frankfurt 
am Main. See also Andrei Sinyaysky's book on Soviet cultural history, Soviet 
Civilization: A Cultural History. Translated from Russian by Joanne Turnbull with 
the assistance of Nikolai Formozov, 1990, Arcade Publishing, Inc. New York. 
See also the well-known estimation on Stalinist state terror by Aleksandr 
Solzhenitsyn: Vankileirien saaristo (Arkhipelag Gulag) 1918-1956: Taiteellinen 
tutkimuksen kokeilu. Translated from the Russian by Esa Adrian. 1974. 
Wahlström & Widstrand. Tukholma. During the 1970s, the topic of this book was 
so sensitive in Finland that it had to be published in Stockholm, Sweden, and to 
be imported into Finland. 
63 	 Spring 1987, 27. 
64 	 See V. A. Alekseev: 111111103614 u dozmu. (Illusions and dogmas) i33aaTenbcrso 
nonHTHYecxoi nHTepaTypbl. 1991. MOCKBa. 
of the CAP.65 There are also some fine articles made by a new 
generation of Russian scholars such as Mikhail V. Shkarovsky's 
impressive "The Russian Orthodox Church versus the State: The 
Josephite Movement, 1917-1940."66 
c. Basic concepts 
One of the basic terms in this study, the leadership of the Bolshevik 
party, could be here understood as the closed circle of the Politburo; 
the Gensec — Stalin and his closest allies, such as V.M. Molotov 
(Skryabin, 1890-1986), L.M. Kaganovich (1893-1991) or A.A. 
Zhdanov (1896-1948), etc. This circle of men constituted a 
"minigovernment" of the Soviet Union. The most important political 
matters were usually discussed among this elite in private discussions 
without any protocols — via telephone or via special telegraphs or 
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	 letters. Stalin was, it goes without saying, the absolute authority among 
this group and the role of the closed circle around the great Vozhd 
was to implement his ideas. Together with this inner circle there was 
an official political government of the country, the Politburo, which 
in the name of the party's Central Committee was in charge of all 
political matters in the Soviet Union. This organ included the first 
echelon of the party and the main state/party functionaries. The 
leading organ of the Russian Communist Party (bolsheviks) was the 
party congress, but it convened seldom and it delegated its powers to 
the Central Committee of the party when it was not convened. 
The political initiatives taken by the party leadership or the duties 
involved in the running of the everyday political agenda were given 
to the party secretariat or to different state organs such as the VTsIK. 
It was usually in the interest of these apparatchiki to maintain the 
functions of the state organs and economic functions of the Soviet 
65 	 See S. N. Savelev: Boo u KoMuccapw (K ucTOpnu KOMGCcuu no npoae8enulo 
ordenexus üepxeu OT zocyöaperea npu llK BKl1 (G) -anrupenu2uo36oü 
KOMUCCuu) — PeIlNrNA N JjeMOKpaTNa Ha HyTH K CBO6oy7,e COBeCTH II. 1993. 
MOCKBa. See also: 0. Yu. Vasileva: PyccKaa npaeocnaenas LjepKoeb u 
CoeeTCKOs eROCTb 6 1917-1927 zoöax. — Bonpocbl HcTopnH. Vol. 8. 1993. 
Moscow. See also: O. Yu. Vasileva, & P.N. Knyshevsky: Kpacuble 
KonKucroöopbr. "CoparnuK." 1994. MOCKBa. See also G.A. Trukan: !inn, K 
TOTannTop113MJ 1917-1929 z.z. P000NN}iCKaA AKaiI,eMNA HayK. HHCTHTyT 
POCCHNCKON HCTopxH. "Hayxa". 1994. MOCKBa. 
66 	 Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Summer 1995). 
state. In this peculiar system of party and state organs, the party organs 
were always in the dominant position. However, as time went by, 
most of the state officials were also members of the party. The Soviet 
system was based on a principle that the state was subordinated to 
the Communist Party and that these two were actually fused together. 
Yet, there is a particular distinction between the party and the state. 
It was the Bolshevik party that originally dominated the Soviet state 
and mobilized the state organs in order to conduct the "right" 
communist policy. The history of this dual system of power originates 
from the annals of the October Revolution from the time when the 
Bolsheviks conquered the old state bureacracy. As a rule, the party 
functionaries always dictated the decisions made by state organs. In 
this "party-state" fusion, the communist oligarchy exercised its will 
by means of a new tool, the state. However, this system worked well 
when the state officials were mostly non-Bolsheviks. Gradually, in 
the 1920s the number of communist state officials was increasing and 
the difference between the mobilizing party and the executing state 
organs was becoming more and more hypothetical. Especially, after 
the emergence of Stalinism the role of the party was diminishing; the 
real source of power was then the Stalinist administration.67 
The second echelon of the party, the party apparatchiki and 
ideologists, had a duty to comply with the orders and directives 
coming from the top. The party ideologists were dutybound to explain 
and clarify the given political line to the Soviet people. On some 
special occasions, they were summoned to Moscow to have a meeting 
in order to examine some special questions or simply to take care that 
the "general line" of the party was understood properly. Moreover, 
this study will also utilize the special term "local officials." We could 
interpret this term as a complex of communist "lower-middle strata" 
party and state functionaries working on state and party matters inside 
the Soviet administration, economy and culture.68 
One of the problematic concepts of this study is the term "religious 
policy" (penHrHo3Hax nonHTHKa, uepxoBHaa noJIwrHxa). Here this 
term is understood as meaning the policy of the ruling body in its 
relations to existing churches and religious organizations.69 Moreover, 
67 Service 1979, 221-222; Rigby 1979, 176-179; Pipes 1980, 243-246; Little 1989, 
91, 129-130. 
68 See Bonell 1989, 131-132; Orlovsky 1989, 180-182; Suny 1989, 232-235. 
69 	 For the Soviet interpretation of church-state relations, see BSE 1934, 186-188. 
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the ruling communist regime itself used this term to describe its 
tactical and strategic objectives in its relations to different religious 
organizations.70 
Another term, that of "ideology", is also introduced in the present 
study in relation to party ideologists, i.e. the apparatchiki responsible 
for explaining the initiatives of the party leadership to the Soviet 
public. The term "ideology" was first used by A.L.C. Destutt de Tracy 
(1754-1836) in the French Revolution to describe the official 
Republican doctrine of education, which was to rationalize all citizens 
and free them from prejudices and superstitions. The Russian 
Bolshevik regime saw its own ideology in the same way; as a body 
of political program on the way to happiness and a terrestrial Paradise 
Lost. Moreover, all political questions were interpreted and discussed 
in ideological terms. For the communist regime, ideology was a 
method for the analysis of social questions and a tool of policy-making 
48 	 inside the Soviet leadership.71  
The wisdom of Soviet political thought was interpreted by the 
leadership of the party, and its greatest interpreter was the great 
Gensec himself. Under his guidance, there existed an army of party 
ideologists who worked out the exegesis of the great leader and served 
as mouthpieces for these party-line interpretations. These ideologists 
quoted from the texts of Lenin and Stalin as a font of Soviet Bolshevik 
wisdom just as religious fundamentalists utilize Biblical verses in their 
sermons.72 The prevailing truth on all matters, such as e.g., Soviet 
See also Anderson 1991, 700-701. 
70 	 See RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 318. 
71 	 Gill 1990, 107. The ingredients of the Bolshevik ideology derive, to some extent, 
from Russian religious thinking. Especially the ideas of millenianism and chiliasm, 
together with Russian religious and revolutionary messianism, are present here. 
In the Bolshevik ideology, the expectation of an immediate millenium could offer 
an absolute solution to earthly problems. According to Vatro Murvar, the religious 
roots of the Bolshevik ideology can be seen in "the twain cosmogony" that divides 
humanity into "children of light and darkness." Murvar 1971, 283. Murvar, as do 
many other observers, distinguishes the eschatological feature of the Bolshevik 
ideology. According to Murvar, "by means of this eschatological vision", the 
Bolshevik regime was supposed to establish a perfect social order on Earth. 
Murvar 1971, 306-307. 
72 	 Sabine 1966, 806-808; Penis 1991, 718. According to Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, 
Soviet Communism was indeed a form of secular religion "...bearing many 
institutional and doctrinal similarities to Christianity...." This attitude, despite its 
extremely correct interpretations of and insight into this movement, sees Soviet 
Communism as a heretic, erroneous and perverted form of Christianity — as a 
kind of prodigal son of true religion. However, this kind of approach is problematic 
religious policy, was then proclaimed by the party newspapers as the 
word of infallible truth. The principle of this peculiar system was 
clear; ideological wisdom was always concentrated in the higher 
leadership of the party and the lower organs always had the role of 
adopting the existing truth. However, this and the accumulation of 
power led to extreme stiffness and dogmatism in Soviet ideology. As 
Frederick Copleston has remarked in his majestic "A History of 
Philosophy..." 
"...It is therefore appropriate to point out that the transformation of 
this philosophy into dogmatic creed of a powerful Party has arrested 
the natural development of the different lines of thought to which 
its diverse aspects might be expected to have given rise."73  
The afore-mentioned dogmatic preception of the ruling ideology was 
perhaps one cause that gave rise to many problems when the central 
leading communist institutions were facing the "otherness" of tricky 
ideological enemies, such as religion. It was also perhaps one reason 
for the inconsistency of the religious policy of the Cult Commission. 
The rigid and dogmatic ideology of the party could not offer any clear 
solution and the members of this commission had to read the lips of 
the "great" Gensec when they wanted to follow the "true" ideology 
in Soviet religious policy. As we shall see, depending on the changing 
political situations, the CSCRQ in Moscow was obliged to be the 
öthf3oXoq and the guardian angel of the religious organizations; to 
be a commission for looting and protection almost simultaneously.74 
to historians. See Arthur Jay Klinghoffer: Red Apocalypse. The Religious 
Evolution of Soviet Communism. University of America, Inc. Lanham. New York. 
1996. 
73 	 Copleston 1985, 333. 
74 See also Besancon 1981, 2-5; Lane 1981, 40-41; Bercken 1989, 16-21. 
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II The great leap and 
hasty retreat — the years 
of the formation and early 
activities of the CSCRQ 
(1929-1932) 
1. General background and the formal 
structure of the CSCRQ 
Soviet religious policy during the early 1930s might be characterized 
as a period of a "frontal attack."' The semiofficial tolerance between 
religious organizations and the Soviet regime, which flourished during 
the high NEP, was nearing its end in 1928. The party's slogan "face 
to the countryside" was replaced by a new policy, which became 
known as "face to collectivization." Consequently, the relatively 
moderate stance in religious policy from 1923 to 1927 was now 
revised under the slogan of "the Storming of Heaven." The 
commencement of this post-NEP assault against religion and other 
enemies of socialism, such as e.g., nationalism, goes back to the 15th 
party congress in December 1927. During this congress, the Soviet 
leadership seemed to act unanimously within the constraint of the NEP 
policy. However, in 1928 Stalin was already moving against his 
former allies (Bukharin, etc.) and the more conciliatory policy they 
represented. The first battlefield was the Russian countryside in 
Autumn 1928 where the Stalinist volunteers and apparatchiks began 
I 	 Fainsod 1958, 434. 
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their first strikes against the fragile civil peace of the NEP. After this 
prologue, the destruction of the traditional Russian peasant society 
was gradually implemented in two stages, the first stage (Autumn 
1928 - February 1930) having started with the de-kulakization of the 
Russian countryside. During this phase, the Soviet regime attempted 
to root out the resistance of the peasantry by persecuting the kulaks, 
along with their "hirelings", i.e. priests, mullahs, etc. After the second 
stage (summer 1930-1932), the fate of the peasantry was finally sealed 
and the independent farmers were turned into a mass of kolkhozniki 2 
The "original sin" of the traditional local village priest or mullah 
was that they constituted a possible threat as potential organizers of 
peasant resistance against the Stalinist regime.' The security apparatus 
was seeking out potential enemies of the communist state and the 
servants of religious cults were much too suitable victims to be 
overlooked. It was not surprising, that at the same time as the famous 
show trial against technical experts in May-July 1928 was taking place 	 51 
(the so-called Shakhty case) the GPU was also "discovering" 
numerous religious or "ecclesiastical-royalist" centres in Vyatka, 
Smolensk, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Astrakhan, Leningrad, etc. Later, 
these "centres" were revealed to the Soviet public in the party 
newspapers, understandably enough, in order to increase mass hysteria 
among the population.4 
The reason for this paranoid witch hunt was the Stalinist concept 
2 	 Concerning the pace and the various stages of collectivization, see Davies 1980, 
93, 96, 234-236, 404-412; Ward 1993, 40-44. See also Curtiss 1953, 196, 
235-237; Conquest 1986, 20-24, 71-72, 83, 101, 112-113; Slatter 1990, 274-275. 
See also the latest evaluations of the relations between religion, the Russian 
peasantry and the Bolshevik Revolution, Figes 1996, 745. 
3 	 Lewin 1985, 107. 
4 	 For some of these "revelations", see Pravda, 12 September 1929, No. 210 (4344) 
"BbInasKH Knaccosoro spara": Pravda, 15 September 1929, No. 213 (4347) 
"SIHKBHjZauHA KOHTppeBonlouHOHHOri opraHH3auMH"; Pravda, 2 October 1929, 
No. 227 (4361) "IIIalixa cBAuteHHHKos-Koxrppesomouxoxepos": Pravda, 8 
October 1929, No. 232 (4366) "Pacxpbrra KOHTppesomouHOHHas opraHH3auHA 
uepxoBHHKos": Pravda, 13 October 1929, No. 237 (4371) "PacKpM ra 
opraHH3auHA uepxosHHxos-MoHapxxcros"; Pravda, 25 October 1929, No. 247 
(4381) "Ha Ces. Kasxaae nHKSHp,HposaHa MOHapxwiecKaB opraHH3auHA": 
Pravda, 27 October 1929, No. 249 (4383) ",ILeno o nonoscKo-KynauKoM 
BbtcrynneHHH"; Izvestiya, 24 November 1929, No. 274(3810) "YcxnMM 6opbby 
Ha aHTHpenHfMO3HOM cppoHTe." See also Vihavainen 1980, 151-152. On the 
Shakhty case, see RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, d.677 (Pp 15, 15/3-28); SS 11, 35, 
53-63. "O pa6orax anpenbcxoro o6be.aHHeHHoro nneHyMa L[K H UKK." See 
also Avtorkhanov 1959, 28-30. 
of class war, which required imaginary "enemies" in order to justify 
the harsh methods employed during collectivization. Robert Tucker's 
interpretation would seem to be pertinent here: Stalin also had his 
psychological motivations to exercise "merciless Leninist politics" 
against supposed class enemies. As Tucker has remarked, Stalin, in 
his attempt to demonstrate that he was a new Lenin, tried to imitate 
the "harsh" Leninist technique of policy-making.' 
According to this psychological motivation, kulaks, priests or 
mullahs were suitable scapegoats during the raids of the local Soviet 
volunteers who introduced collectivization in the Russian countryside. 
Moreover, a new fierce antireligious demagogy was also needed to 
motivate the masses. Imaginary enemies, such as the "conspiring 
kulak" and his "ideological ally" — priest or mullah, were frequently 
utilized in Soviet newspapers as archetypal enemies. The lists of 
enemies were lengthy: foes such as "H3nMaH, BpeAHTenb, 6lopoxpaT, 
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	 Mpaxodec, aHTHcoBeTcx}H 3.neMewr"6 were lurking everywhere. 
Initially these images were cultivated by "leftist" party cadres such as 
L.S. Sosnovsky (1886-1937) and K.B. Radek (Sobelson, 1885-1939), 
who in 1927-1928 had demonstrated their dissatisfaction over the civil 
peace of NEP.' Later, the Stalinist propaganda machine adopted such 
slogans and utilized them skilfully for its own purposes. According 
to this propaganda, the priest was, together with the kulak, a leading 
obstacle to the advancement of socialism in the Soviet Union. The 
5 	 Tucker 1990, 44-45, 70-72, 162-166, 221. 
6 	 Shinkarchuk 1995, 49. 
7 	 On Leftist writings, see AT II, 54-55. The intraparty struggle was connected with 
antireligious activity in many ways. Those who were out of favor usually had to 
face charges that they had been supporting religion or religious organizations. For 
some examples, see Pravda, 3 September 1929, No. 202 (4336) "CyMepKH 6oros 
H ...onnopryxacros." Before the elections of the soviets, the Central Committee 
warned party officials concerning the assumed alliance of the kulaks, sectarians 
and "ecclesiasticals", who were actually helping "illegal Trotskyite groups" and 
"counter-revolutionary organizations of the Menshevik-type." Pravda, 1 January 
1929, No. 1 (4135) "O nepesbl6opax coBeTOB. BceM UK HauKOMnapTHIi, 
KpaifKoMaM, o6xoMaM, ry6xoMaM." However, according to usual allegations, the 
kulaks were allied with priests and "ecclesiasticals." "..xynavecrso Bbicrynaer 
eallHbIM cppOHTOM C n0naMH, uepxoBHHKaMH. 6anTHCTaMH, CO BCOMH 
06510MKaMH pas6HToro OKTadpbCKON pesomouHex KanHTanH3Ma." Pravda, I 
January 1929, No. 1 (4135). "HponerapcxHh ropou Ha noMOWb aepeaHe." See 
also Pravda, 8 January 1929, No. 6 (4140) "Ho.gxynaMHHxH npo6panxcb B 
coserbt." For an article dedicated to the struggle against the alliance of kulak and 
priest, see Pravda, 11 January 1929, No. 9, (4143). "Kpenve y,tapHM no xynaxy 
H uepxosxxxy". "LlepxoBHHKH — axrHBHble HOMOH[HHKH xynaxa." 
"Against ecclesiasticals — agents of world bourgeoisie.° 'A spontaneous" meeting of Soviet 
workers in 1930 protesting against believers and their supporters. Source: KN 1930, No. 10. 
Soviet newspapers again and again "realized" that religion, churches 
or sectarians were disturbing the Soviet push for a new socialist 
society. Summa summarum, class enemies, such as religious 
organizations and their servants were to be blamed for the difficulties 
that arose during Stalin's war against his own people. 
At the beginning of these aggressive antireligious attacks, the Soviet 
regime suddenly re-organized its religious policy. The earlier 
antireligious commission of the ruling party, the CAP, was reshaped 
on 13 July 1928 and eventually dissolved in November 19298, and 
the following year the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee of Soviets (VTsIK) on 8 April 1929 (in addition to 
adopting new legislation concerning religious organizations) decided 
to create a new permanent commission (CSCRQ), which would deal 
with questions concerning the religious cults.9 
8 	 In 1922-1928 it was officially known as "KoMxccnsi no npoBertemno orteneHna 
uepxBK OT rocy,aapersa rip LI;K PKII (6)" and on 13 July 1928, it was renamed 
"Anr14penuruo3Hasi KOMnccHn npu flonnr6ropo LIK BKII (6)." 
9 	 GARF f. 1235, op. 43, d. 67,1. 311-313. See also Savelev 1993, 164. The adoption 
of this new legislation on 8 April 1929 and the birth of the Cult Commission was 
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One might say that with this resolution, the Soviet regime made a 
"giant leap" in its religious policy. In an official sense, this could be 
understood as a way of normalizing religious political decision-making 
in the Soviet Union; it was no longer the party but the "neutral" state 
that exercised control in Soviet religious policy. Various explanations 
for this change have been put forward by several scholars. Some 
Western studies have commented on this reorganization of the 
religious policy in the context of the general development in Soviet 
policy-making. According to Anderson, the supervision of religious 
life was "afterwards" put in to the hands of the 8th Department of the 
Justice Commissariat. Furthermore, he mentions that this Department 
was later liquidated, its functions being transferred to a Secretariat for 
Religious Affairs attached to the Central Executive Committee, 
VTsIK. He also mentions that in 1930 this organ was renamed as the 
Permanent Commission for Religious Affairs under the auspices of 
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	 Sovnarkom. Anderson believes that this was part of the general 
transfer of power inside Soviet society. It was a "symbolic reflection 
of the general shift of power from the legislative to the executive 
branch of government."i0 On the other hand, Luchterhand comments 
that the permanent commission was elevated to a collegially composed 
"Central Standing Commission" in 1931 under the leadership of 
Smidovich. According to Luchterhand, this organ was united in 1934 
with the OGPU.11 
These "pre-archival" interpretations are more or less correct in the 
not a coincidence. The same people who had been responsible for planning the 
new legislation on religious organizations were later to be members of the 
CSCRQ. Among those people there were antireligious experts such as Krasikov 
and Smidovich. As an interesting detail, M.V. Galkin (Gorey) was not included 
on the new commission, although he had been planning the new legislation. 
Perhaps his earlier close cooperation with Trotsky had discredited him in the eyes 
of the Stalinist leadership. Moreover, it seems that among these creators of the 
new more aggressive legislation, there prevailed a strong conviction that religion 
could be exterminated once and for all by legislative means. See GARF f. 1235, 
op. 73, d. 1649, ro1.1, 1. 3-4. See also how these architects of the new legislation 
rejected the idea that the Soviet population should possess any "religious needs." 
See GARF f. 1235, op. 73, d. 1649, rol. 2, n. 79. "Ilporoxon 3ace.naHHs, 
KOMHCCHH, 06pa30BaHHOti nocTaHOBneHHeM Ilpe3HanyMa BITIK 25 Mapra 
1929 r. AAA OTpegaKTHpoaanun npoeKTa nOCTaHOBnenna 0 penHTHO3HbLX 
O6beJHHeHHAX 30 MapTa 1929 rona. 3aMe'taHHA K HpOeKTy nOCTaHOBneHHA 
O penH11H03HbIX 06beJHHeHHAx. 
10 	 Anderson 1991, 690. 
11 	 Luchterhand 1993, 56-57. 
sense that the role of the party was actually diminishing in the 1930s. 
According to the conventional explanation usually put forward in 
Soviet studies, the burden of policy-making was shifting in the early 
1930s to the administrative hands of the Soviet regime. The main 
reason for this change was, of course, related to the stabilization of 
the power struggle inside the party. By 1929, the intraparty struggle 
was nearly over. Stalin accomplished his political victory by shifting 
the power from the Bolshevik party to his own administration. The 
so-called "party-state" structure really only began to materialize in the 
Soviet Union at this time. After the fusion of the leading Bolshevik 
elite and the bureaucracy, more and more matters began to be 
concentrated in the hands of the Stalinist inner-circles. As mentioned 
already, the General Secretary was the mastermind behind this 
development; instead of hot-headed theorizers, Stalin favoured men 
with administrative skills. This move to administrative methods also 
took place in Soviet religious policy; the leadership of the Soviet 	 55 
religious policy was put under state supervision, under obedient 
Stalinist nomenklatura.' 2  
However, if one examines in greater detail the explanations for the 
emergence of this new commission, one comes to the conclusion that 
this rapid switch of responsibilities in the Soviet religious policy 
reflected a fundamental change in the strategy of "class struggle." As 
Stalin and his apparatus had chosen to ruin the smychka, there was 
no room for a civil peace with the peasantry and its traditional values. 
In this new situation, religious associations were suitable scapegoats 
in this new "civil war" and victims of Stalinist terror. Consequently, 
there was no need to conduct any real discussions inside the party, in 
contrast to the NEP period. In fact, the contradiction between the NEP 
period and the Cultural Revolution is quite striking; at the height of 
the "high NEP", the Soviet regime even organized a secret meeting 
in 1927 in order to discuss religious political matters.13 Moreover, the 
CAP had even stuck to democratic principles; e.g., during its meetings 
it allowed voting. The party officials inside the commission could be 
characterized as being divided between hardliners and moderates — 
between "culturalists" and "interventionists." 
After 1929, Soviet religious policy was conducted in a different 
12 	 Rupnik 1988, 132. See also Rigby 1979, 176-179. 
13 	 See the protocols of this meeting: RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op, 60, d. 791-792. Also 
see Luukkanen 1994, 200-202. 
style. As a certain Russian commentator, S.N. Savelev, emphasized 
in an article "God and Commissars ", there was no need to support 
any "democratic" commission when the Politburo in its extraordinary 
meeting on 19 November 1929 decided to consider all religions as 
"legally functioning counter-revolutionary forces" inside the USSR.14 
Consequently, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, the ruling party 
did not want to pursue any kind of "normal" religious policy; at the 
beginning of the 1930s, the general attitude towards religion was, now 
or never. 
However, the actual declaration of war against all religious 
organizations inside the USSR took place on 30 January 1930 during 
a special meeting of the Politburo. At this meeting, the Politburo 
approved instructions for extraordinary measures to be taken to 
liquidate the kulaks, i.e., rich peasants as a class. According to the 
above decision, the wealthy Russian peasant population should be 
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	 divided into 3 categories. The people in the first two categories were 
supposed to be dealt with by the NKVD; the first category of 60 000 
people should be expelled to concentration camps as "counter-
revolutionary kulak activists." The second category of the wealthy 
peasantry comprising some 150 000 people should be forced to move 
14 	 Savelev 1993, 177-178. Although the author of the present monograph has 
examined the protocols of the Politburo and even the so-called "special sheets" 
of the protocols, no such decision extant dated 19 November, 1929 has turned 
up. See RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 765. However, there seems to be no reason 
to doubt the information given by Savelev; actually, there is a strange gap in the 
information in these protocols suggesting that these protocols were fixed later. 
However, according to IRPTs this decision was done in the beginning of 1929, 
see IRPTs, 91. Nevertheless, during 1929, the Politburo was busy accepting new 
regulations governing antireligious activity. For example, the Politburo had 
accepted the texts used in the parades on the 12th anniversary of the October 
Revolution in 1929. Among them were also antireligious slogans such as: "3a 
pRCOH CKpbIBaeTC$t KnaCCOBbai spar. LIepKOBHHKH H CeKTBHTbI — areHTbl 
K ynaxoa H HanMaHOB. ITOAMMeM Macebl Ha 6opb6y C penHfH03Hb1M 06MaHOM." 
RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 765, 1. 24 (Pp 106, 5/11-29). As early as January 
1929, the Politburo had accepted the program for strengthening antireligious work. 
According to the Politburo, religious organizations were taking advantage of the 
internal difficulties in constructing a socialist society. RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.3, 
d.723 (Pp 61, 24/1-29); RTsKhIDNI f. 89, op. 4, d. 122 "HocTaHoaneHHe 
IIonHTdiopo UK BKII (6). lIpoexr.'; 89/4/27 "CTaTbR "IIpaBHnbHo 
OpraHH30BaTb 6opb6y c penxraeh" (Ha AoKna,ta Ha COKOnbHH9eCKON 
pa inapTxollcpepexuHH B Mocxae). MamHHonHCHblh TeKCT c npaBKaMH 
neHasecTHoro." See also GARF f.5407, op.l, d.17 (Ha9HHas c nHCTa 263). 
"AxuHoneplioMy H3AaTenbCKOMy odmecTBy Be36oxuiHKOB. II/VI/1928 g." See 
also Lewin 1985, 97-100; Penis 1991, 772. 
to distant areas inside the Soviet Union. This notorious document also 
reveals that the Soviet rulers were extremely cautious concerning the 
possible consequences of this action; in its orders, the Politburo 
stressed that in case of any resistance the Soviet security forces should 
mete out punishment by "npHMeHeHHeM Bblctuefi Mepb1 penpecciM" 
- "the highest measure of repression" (a Soviet euphemism for capital 
punishment). In its decision, the Politburo demonstrated its concern 
over the fact that the religious organizations, religious soviets or 
sectarian organizations could become bastions of kulak or lishentsy 
resistance. Therefore this Politburo decision recommended that the 
Orgburo should organize a massive closure of churches and a fight 
against religion inside the Soviet governmental apparatus.15 
The actual strategic planning in this "war" against the religious 
organizations was carried-out by the Politburo itself, but it needed 
other organs, such as the newly created CSCRQ to implement its 
strategic objectives in religious policy. However, bearing in mind the 	 57 
Stalinist methods of policy-making, it is obvious that the actual role 
of the CSCRQ was to be a mere auxiliary organ (like the 
Bezbozhnik-organization) striving for the official "Great Goal" of a 
totally atheist Soviet society.16 
Actually, the paradox of the religious policy of the 1930s lay in 
the fact that although the Soviet regime had declared its animosity 
towards all religious organizations, it was nonetheless obliged to 
15 	 "..Cpo`IHo nepecMOTperb 3axoxollaTenbcTBO 0 penurtto3Hbix 06be,tHHeHHAx B 
tyxe nonHOro HCKJ109 HHA KaKOft 6b1 TO HH 6b1n0 BO3MO)KHOCTH 
npespauteHHA pyKOBOgCTBa opraHoa 3THX 061eiHHeHHN (uepxoBHble coBerbl, 
ceKTaHCKHe 061IIHHbI, H np.) B onopHbte nyHKTbI KynavecTBa, nHmeHvecrBa 
H Boo6ute aHTHCOBeTCKHx BneMeHTOB. IlOpyMHTb Opr61opo BK garb 
gHpeKTHBy 110 BOnpOCy O 3aKpbITHH uepKBefi, MOnHTBeHHI,IX tOMOB CeKTaHTOB 
H npOv. H 0 6opb6e C penHrHO3HbIM H CeKTaHTCKHM gBH)KeHHeM B uenAx 
ycTpaHeHHA TOpMO30B B coBannapaTe, MemaloluHx nposenenHlo B ACH3Hb 
npHHATMX nogasnAlonleh Maccoil KpeCTbACTBa pemenaft 0 3aKpbMTHH 
uepxaefl, MOnHTBeHHbIx tOMOB CeKTaHTOB H T.n.. B 3TO14 gHpeKTHBe yKa3aTb 
TaK)Ke Ha He06xoaHMOCTb 00060 OCTOpOJKHOrO npoBegeHHA 3THX 
MeponpHATHfl B OTCTaJIbIX HaItHOHanbHbIX paitoxax..." RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 
162, d. 8 "PemeHHA IIonHT61opo OT 30.1. 30r. Oco6aA nanxa. 0 MeponpxarHAx 
nO JIHKBHJtaUHHH xynauKHx X03$1iCTB B palioHax cnnomHOI 
KonneKTHBH3auHH. YTBep)KgeHO IIonHT6lopo UK BKII 6) 30.1.30r. Crporo 
cexperxo." See also Radzinsky 1997, 263-264. 
16 	 One striking example concerning the rooting out of the old relics and history was 
the piece of Soviet legislation which changed the name of the town "Bogorodsk" 
(Theotokos) to "Noginsk" (after a certain Bolshevik leader — V.P. Nogin). See 
SZR, No. 18, 31 March, 1930. 
acknowledge the persistence of religion. We may put forward three 
different explanations for this puzzle. First, although the 
"interventionists" had gained the upper hand during the Cultural 
Revolution, the Stalinist regime gradually started to distance itself 
from the demands of the most ardent "interventionists." From the 
beginning of the 1930s, the most notable radicals and ardent 
enthusiasts soon realized that they were out of favour. Stalin did not 
need them any more to stabilize Soviet society. Instead, he resorted 
to the Russian past and its autocratic traditions. This change was part 
of Stalin's own policy of advocating Russian national roots and the 
Great-Russian tradition, including the ROC. But it must be stressed 
that this new modification was, of course, realized strictly under 
Stalinist conditions. Atheism consistently remained a part of official 
Soviet dogma and all religions were relegated to the margins of Soviet 
society. Moreover, the ROC or any other religious organizations for 
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	 that matter, had no guarantees against the Stalinist terror or other 
coercive methods of the administration. 
The second reason for the gradual stabilization of relations between 
the state and the ROC was, paradoxically enough, Moscow's desire 
to follow a coordinated and disciplined religious policy. Nevertheless, 
this does not mean that the Stalinist leadership ever lost its ideological 
grip or was pursuing any kind of "concordia" with the ROC. The 
simple explanation for this was a fear of anarchy and a desire to create 
a unified model for the Soviet religious policy. 
Why then was the Soviet state apparatus so anxious to take 
command of Soviet religious policy? The most likely explanation was 
its desire to restrict the excessive "revolutionary" moods of local 
apparatchiks. From the corridors of the Kremlin, these independent 
atheistic campaigns seemed to be a suspicious phenomenon containing 
uncontrollable elements of anarchy — a spontaneous "stikhiinost" of 
the masses. 
These hypotheses can also be verified from archival sources: 
according to the protocols of the CSCRQ, this commission had hardly 
any control over the situation in the periphery of the country, 
especially at the beginning of the 1930s.17 The wave of petitions, 
17 	 For example, in 1929-1931 officials in Leningrad received only a few formal 
instructions from the center. See these instructions: TsGA SPb f. 1000, op. 49, 
d. 33 11. 94-95 ueHTpaJIbubIM HCnOJIHHTenbHbIM KOMHTeTaM aBTOHOMHbMX 
pecnyÖJIHK, KpaeBbIM H OÖJIaCTHbIM ncnoJIHNTeJIbHbiM KOMHTeTaM"; TsGA SPb 
Table II.1. Statistical documentation on petitions and complaints on 
questions related to religious cults during 1924-1934 
GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 43. 
1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 
xca.no6 1506 1248 2840 2043 2861 5242 
cAenaxo 3a11pocoB 753 625 1420 1727 2245 5473 
x0,A0KOB 500 800 616 525 946 1800 
1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 
xca.no6 17637 12350 6355 4808 8229 
c,uenaxo 3anpocoB 14110 6387 3846 3114 3645 
x0,1:10KOB 6029 3219 1719 1094 1601 
appeals and protests to the VTsIK presidium and to Kalinin himself 
during the 1930s is the best evidence of this "anarchy." Observing the 
number of petitions to the higher Soviet organs (see Table II.1), we 
see that in 1924 Soviet officials received 1506 complaints and 
considered 753 of them. The following year, during the height of the 
NEP, the total number of complaints decreased to 1248. During the 
peaceful period of the NEP, the total amount of complaints delivered 
to the central organs remained relatively small, up until 1929. The 
peak in the number of complaints coincided with the height of 
collectivization in 1930 and then gradually decreased in 1931-1933. 
The next peak occured in 1934, when the VTsIK received 8229 
complaints.'8 
Moreover, only after the formative years of 1929-33 did the Cult 
Commission succeed in establishing more stable links with the 
provinces. Only after the Cultural Revolution was this commission 
able to resume its official duties; and even then it could only 
f. 1000, op. 48, d. 77, II. 194 "BbmHcxa 113 npoToxona No. 9 BI113K OT 30/V 
-1931 r." 
18 
	
	
See GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 43. "L1M43posble caeaeHHx o Hcano6ax H nepenecKe. 
nOCTynHBIlleR 110 BonpoCaM, CB5130HHbIM C KynbTaMH 3a 1924-1934 rr.". 
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concentrate its main energy on counseling local officials who were 
guilty of excesses. The one significant explanation for this "weakness" 
was the commission's lack of actual power; in the midst of the Soviet 
Cultural Revolution, it had very few means to exercise its extensive 
powers. As a matter of fact, there was a striking contradiction between 
the official extensive responsibilities of the new commission and the 
modest role it exercised in practice. 
Finally, the third reason was that the Soviet regime was highly 
interested in preserving the façades of a "neutral religious policy" 
being conducted in the country. In the foreign press it always denied 
charges of religious persecution. Although in general the Soviet state 
appeared to be quite invulnerable when facing international pressure, 
nonetheless on a few occasions, as we may see later, foreign pressure 
actually had a clear impact on Soviet religious-political practices. 
2. The contradiction between mandate 
and practice 
According to its original mandate, the Cult Commission was meant 
to be the highest organ of Soviet religious policy. It was supposed to 
dictate and control the life of the religious cults by legislative norms.19 
The leadership of this commission was confirmed on the highest level. 
Moreover, it was put under the personal chairmanship of one of the 
members of the Presidium of the VTsIK. According to the official 
rules, other members of this commission also had formidable positions 
inside the ruling party: the Cult Commission consisted of people from 
various departments of the Central Committee of the Party, a 
representative from the Highest Court of the Soviet Union, a delegate 
from the NKYust of the RSFSR, and one from the Moscow City 
Soviet. Furthermore, the commission was supposed to have extensive 
links to local party and state organs. On paper, everything seemed to 
be in order. According to its mandate, the Cult Commission was 
supposed to organize relations with local state organs such as the 
Commissariats of Justice, Foreign Affairs, Enlightenment, Military 
Affairs, Agriculture, Social Security, Finances, and the Commissariat 
19 	 GARF f. 5263, op.l, d. 11. "IIOIlOJKBHHe HOCTOAHHON AeHTpaAbHOH H MeCTHbIX 
KOMHCCHN no paCCMOTpeHHK) BOnpOCOB KyJIbTa." 
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of Communications (the NKYust, NKID, Narkompros, NKVoenoi, 
NKZem, NKSobez, NKF and NKPut). The position of this 
commission was further consolidated later. The Presidium of the 
VTsIK reinforced the mandate of the Cult Commission by issuing 
more precise directions to guide Soviet religious policy. According to 
these new directives, the committee had a general leadership role to 
play and was supposed to supervise the party's and government's acts 
concerning religious cults in the RSFSR. After afore mentioned 
introduction, the VTsIK gave more precise orders. First, the new Cult 
Commission should resolve all questions which were of a "religious 
character." The remaining paragraphs specified more practical duties, 
such as the right to decide the closure of prayer houses — which later 
proved to be one of the most significant tasks of this commission.20 
Moreover, from the start the actual work of this new commission 
proved an uphill struggle. At the very first meeting of the Cult 
Commission, which took place on 6 June 1929, only 5 people 	 61 
attended; among them were Petr Germogenovich Smidovich 
(1874-1935), from the Commissariat of Justice, (as chairman); 
Bogomolov, V.N. Yakovleva (1884-1941), from the Commissariat of 
Internal Affairs; Ikryanistova, from the Commissariat of Labor; and 
N.P. Orleansky, who acted as secretary. As the protocols of this first 
commission reveal, representatives from the All-Union Central 
Council of Professional Unions (VTsSPS) and the Soviet secret police 
(OGPU) did not even bother to show up.21  
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, this commission had difficulties in 
establishing links with the peripheral areas of the country. The Cult 
Commission in Moscow had to establish its network on four levels 
inside the Soviet administration: in the republics, krais, oblasts and at 
the grass-roots level, i.e., raions (see Table II.2). It is clear that the 
year 1929 represents a watershed with regards to petitions and 
complaints received by the government. The new activity of the 
CSCRQ is also apparent; during 1929 the number of resolved matters 
is higher than the number of complaints reaching Soviet officials. 
20 	 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 11 "flonoNceuxe pOCTOHHHON ueHrpanbtlOii x MecTHb!x 
KOMHCCHIt no paCCMOTpeHHIO BOHpOCOB K ynbTa." 
21 	 GARF f. 5263, op.l, d. 5 (pkvk 1, 4/6 1929). The outcome of the second meeting 
verifies one of the main functions of this new commission; it had the duty of 
supervising the economic activity of the religious organizations. GARF f. 5263, 
op.l, d. 5 (pkvk 2, 24/9 1929). See also GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 5 (pkvk 3, 31/12 
1929). 
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Table I1.2 The organizational structure of the Cult Commission, 
CSCRQ 
The Presidium of VTsIK 
1 
The CSCRQ, Commission of Cults in Moscow 
1 	 
The CSCRQ — in republics 
1 	 
The CSCRQ — in krais 
1 
The CSCRQ — in oblast 
1 
The CSCRQ — in raions (urban areas) 
Moreover, the years 1932-33 represent an obvious sign of the "good 
years" of the 1930s. 
The basic units of the local CSCRQ commissions worked under a 
local ispolkom and were chaired by member of its presidium. The 
practical implementation was usually, as M. Shkarovsky reveals, 
rather confusing?' For example, the local CSCRQ commisson in the 
Leningrad oblast started its work as late as 17 October 1930 under 
the formal guidance of the local oblast ispolkom — Lenoblispolkom. 
This commission was chaired by its secretary, a certain Lomtev, who 
22 Shkarovsky 1995, 148-149. 
actually worked there as its nominal leader. The actual leader of this 
commission was a party secretary whose primary position was in the 
city's administrative unit (Admnadzor). This grass-roots commission 
also had other members, such as a representative from the oblast 
procuracy, from the local Trade-Union (Obiprofsovet), the local 
Committee of the Oblast (the Obkom VKP(b), from the local 
Narkompros, and from the OGPU.23 
As the Leningrad case indicates, the grass-roots work of this 
commission was done within the framework of the individual raions 
with special "inspectors of cults" responsibile for obtaining 
information and purposes of surveillance. Apart from the responsibility 
of reporting to their superiors, these inspectors were expected to act 
as messengers between the local Cult Commissions and parishes, 
dvadtsatki. In many cases, this strange relationship was to end with 
the liquidation of the individual parish under the leadership of the 
local cult-inspector. However, it was not surprising that there were 
many pitfalls and problems. As one of the routine reports from the 
Leningrad area reveals, the inspectors seldom had any special training 
whatsoever for their work and often had another full-time job in some 
other area of the Soviet administration.24 As we may read between 
the lines of the report of a certain inspector, Filippova, these inspectors 
were in danger of developing a strange "affectionate" relationship with 
the parishes they were supervising. Moreover, in this report, Filippova 
complained to colleagues that she had received very little actual help 
from the local raisovet's presidium and on many occasions was 
compelled to follow contradictory instructions when dealing with 
religious organizations.' 
The real work of the central commission of the Cult Commission 
in Moscow did not start until 1930, simultaneously with the first 
efforts at collectivization and the systematic assault against religious 
organizations by the Soviet state. While earlier antireligious 
campaigns during the NEP seemed to be rather sporadic and were 
23 TsGA SPb f. 1000, op. 48, d. 77, 11. 194-195. According to Shkarovsky, the 
influence of the GPU's ecclesiastical subsection was increasing with this new 
reshaping of the Soviet religious policy administration and the purpose of these 
new organs was to liquidate religion in the Soviet Union. Shkarovsky 1995, 149. 
24 See TsGA SPb f. 1000, op.48, d.77, 11. 188-189 "IIporoxon No. 4. CoaemaHHst 
HHcnexropos xynbros F. JIeHHHrpaJia OT 27/XI-31 g." 
25 
	
	 TsGA SPb f. 1000, op. 48, d. 77, I. 115 "IIporoxon coseuraaax C HHcnexropaMH 
r. JIeHHHrpazta or 15/VII -32 r.". 
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limited to some practical goal (such as the confiscation of valuable 
items from churches in the years 1921-1922), this offensive proved 
to be more serious. This change of course in the early 1930s, with its 
extreme ideological fervour, was an outcome of the Cultural 
Revolution. The frontal attack against religion reflected the hostile 
mood of "interventionist" propaganda presented by the II Congress.of 
the Godless movement in June 1929. This Congress resulted in neither 
the "interventionists" nor the "culturalists" gaining the upper hand. 
However, for a short time, the "interventionists" appeared to be 
victorious.26 
At that time the Soviet atheist movement played a crucial role as 
the mouthpiece of the militant antireligiozniki. This society was one 
of the willing auxiliary organs working for the Stalinist Cultural 
Revolution. At the peak of the Cultural Revolution, it held a powerful 
position in Soviet society. In its official programmes and newspapers, 
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	 it openly circulated propaganda for supporting Stalinist political 
objectives, such as collectivization, and was eager to assist in 
achieving those goals.27 Moreover, the League was the first to 
introduce practical measures in the antireligious fight. 
First, the SVB was actively canvassing for the closure of churches 
on a massive scale. Second, the League was eager to organize ex 
26 	 VIII, 558-559. "rlpHMe9aHHA." 
27 GARF f.5407, op.1, d.41. "06 y9acrHH OpraHH3auHH CBS B BeCeHHeN 
np0H3B0ACTBeHHON H CenbCKO-X035111CTBeHHON KaMnaHHH. COB.CeKpeTHO": 
"I'IHCTpyKUHA no opraHm3auHH H pa6ore CenbCKON 519eitK14 c0103a 
BOHHCTByKHUHX 6e360NCH4KOB": "COBx03ueHTp H UeHTpanbHblN COBeT COK)3a 
BOHHCTBy10111HX 6e36oNCHHKOB B CCCP - BceM COBX03TpeCTaM H 
COBX03aM":"BceM ueHTpaM H COIO3aM c/X KOOnepauHH": "rlpOeKT. Pe3oM0111431 
COBeu1aHHA petaKTOpOs AepeBeHCKHX )xypmanos H rases.. H3Aa10111HXCA B 
MOCKse. cOCTOABBIerocA 18 HoA6pA 1929 rota npH AepeBeHCxoM ortene BC 
CBS. CCCP." See also KPSSvr IV, 321; GARF f.5407, op.i, d.41 "IlpoexT. - 
BceM pecny6nmxaM, xpaeBblM H o6nacTHbIM COBBTM CBS. 06 
anrHpenmrmo3Ho1+ pa6oTe cpetm 6aTpa9ecrea H 6eAHorbl.": "BceM 
pecny6nHKaHCKHM. KpaeBblM. 0651aCTHbIM H ry6epHCKHM COBeTaM CBB. 06 
y9aCTHH A9eeK CBS B npOBeAeHHH npB3AHHKa ~~7,eHb ypoMCasi" 23. Masi 1929." 
On the evaluation of Pravda concerning the Godless-congress of 1929, see 
"BTOpON Cbe3A 6e360MCHHKOB CBOHMH HOCTBHOBneHHAMH H peWeHHAMH Aan 
OCHOBy AAA pa3BeprblBaHHA 6e360NCH011 pa6oTbl UIHpOKHM tppOHTOM H 
HMeHHO B AyXe H HanpaBneHHH. HaMH yKa3aHHOM, T.-e.. 9T0 6opb6a C 
penmrHeli AOn)KHa BeCTHCb Ha OCHOBe CaMOrO 3HeprH9HOr0 H HHHUHBTHBHOrO 
y9acTHsi 6e360NCHb1x OpraHH3auHl'i Ha BCeX y9acTxax coumanHcrm9ecxoro 
CTpOHTenbCTBa, nOAXOAA K KOHKpeTHbIM 3aAa`iaM Ha xa)KAOM H3 HHX nOA 
oco6blM. cneuHcpm9ecxHM yrnoM." See also Pravda, 7 September, 1929, No. 206 
(4340) "3a Maccosylo pa6ory co103a 6e36oACHHKoB." 
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KPECT H TPAKTOP 
"Cross and Tractor." Soviet propaganda for the collectivization of the countryside. Source: 
COBBTCKHR nonxrx9ecKHH rinaxar. 143,garenvcreo "HCCKyccreo". 1962. MOCKBa. 
officio the drop-outs among the clergy, i.e. those priests and monks 
who were willing to give up religion and their ecclesiastical vocation. 
Third, it was among the first institutions to suggest removing and 
confiscating church bells. Finally, it was 100 per cent ready to assist 
in Stalin's policy of collectivization and backed his exhortations to 
refuse former enemies of the people readmission to kolkhozes. The 
League interpreted this as a refusal to admit priests and sectarians into 
kolkhozes (thus making their existence illegal in Soviet society).28 
It is not surprising that the Godless movement was thrilled with 
the new law of 8 April 1929, which delivered a devastating blow to 
religious organizations in the USSR. According to this legislation (§ 
4), before undertaking any activities, religious societies were obliged 
to register officially. Nevertheless, the most important consequence of 
this law was that it forbade religious organizations from undertaking 
any social services (§ 17) and restricted religious activities to the 
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	 confines of church buildings and to church services. Moreover, on 22 
May 1929 the Soviet Constitution was amended by the Congress of 
the XIV All-Russian Congress of Soviets (VTsIK). The existing right 
to conduct religious propaganda was abolished and the amended 
Constitution only acknowledged "liberty of confession" for Soviet 
citizens. The new legislation adopted in 1929 revealed the bull's-eye 
at which the ruling regime was now aiming its policy. When the 
Politburo on the 19th of November 1929 decided that all religions 
were "legally functioning counter-revolutionary forces" inside the 
USSR, it only confirmed the strategic target of the Soviet "hawks" in 
relation to religion. The main goal was to liquidate religion once and 
for all 29 
28 	 GARF f.5407, op.1, d.41."Te3Hcbt AOxna2a "JlHxsltuauHH xyna'tecrsa H 6opb6a 
c pentrxei ." 
29 	 RPTsKG, 250-261; SURb, 474-483; SURe, No. 33, 458; SURc, No. 35, 474-483; 
SURc, No. 5, 733; SURc, No. 18, 261-263. See also GARF f.353, op.10, d.17 
"06I,slCHHTejlbHasl 3anHcKa K npoexTy nocraHosnexnsl BcepoccHtcxoro 
Cbe3Aa COBeTOs 0 BHeCeHHH H3MeHeHH}"t H ,1(OnOMHeHHFi B KOHCTHTYUHIO 
PCDCP: SSR, 400 (."..cso6oua perm-sow-lux HcnoseAaHHN H 
aaTHpesHrao3HOh nponaraiubl npH3Haerest 3a BCeMH rpa)KAaHaMH."): VSS 
XIV (Z13), 45. See also Simon 1974, 64-67; Alexeev, 1979, 29-30; Conquest 
1986, 202-203; Bessmertnyi-Anzimirov 1990, 37-41. See also the comments of 
Mr. Shafarevich on the legislation of 1929, Shafarevich 1973, 10-13, 18-22, 
39-40. According to a Politburo decision concerning the festivals of the 12th 
anniversary of the October Revolution, the demonstrators were obliged to pay 
heed to antireligious slogans such as: "3a pscot'i cxpbisaerca Knaccosblf spar. 
IIepKOBHHKH H C5KTBHTbI — areHTbl KyJIaKOB H H3fMaHOB. IloAMIMeM Maces' 
As mentioned already, the Stalinist concept of decision-making 
required that the new Cult Commission should be not so much a 
discussing board but a department which could assist in putting into 
effect this final solution in the "liquidation of religions." However, en 
route to this atheist society, it had more practical duties. Consequently, 
when examining the primary sources of this organ, we can detect a 
tactical "three-step programme" on the way to the final solution. First, 
as the decisions of the Cult Commission show, the ruling regime 
wanted to exploit the religious organizations financially. Along with 
extensive taxation and burdensome insurance fees imposed on 
churches and servants of cults, the Communist power also wanted to 
expropriate from the churches and religious premises everything of 
any value, i.e., the metal of church bells, crosses, icons, etc. Second, 
after stripping the religious organizations of all possible resources, the 
communist regime introduced the systematic liquidation of churches. 
Third, the commission introduced a wave of systematic persecution 	 67 
aimed against all the servants of cults. This can easily be seen from 
the issues the Cult Commission was dealing with during the peak of 
the Cultural Revolution. The practical duties of this new "consistory 
of unbelief' fell into three main categories. First, the confiscation of 
economic resources; second, the liquidation of parishes, and third, the 
deportation of the servants of cults to the Gulag!' 
Nevertheless, the seemingly prestigious position of the Cult 
Commission was only a façade. Actual decisions on the outlines of 
Soviet religious policy were made by the Stalinist leadership, while 
the commission was merely obliged to comply with the dictates 
handed down from above. This is also obvious from the composition 
of this board: the members of the Cult Commission did not belong 
Ha 6opb6y c peJHrHo3HbIM o6MaHoM!" RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 765 (Pp 105, 
5/11-29). 
30 	 The execution of this unofficial three-step plan has been confirmed also by Merle 
Fainsod, who has done research in the Smolensk Archives. For example, the 
closure of the church in the Vyazma okrug, Bukharin raion, was initially pursued 
by overtaxing; then a "check" on church property was launched and an inspection 
was made "whether the existence of the parish was legal." Fainsod 1958, 435. 
Even I.S. Prokhanov, the famous leader of the Evangelical Christians observed 
that during the Cultural Revolution the ruling regime implemented a "three-step 
program." According to Prokhanov, the Bolshevik party firstly closed down the 
churches, "aaxpblTHe Mecr Ann 6orocnyxceHHä+", eliminating the religious leaders 
"ycrpaxeuHe penerno3ii x pyKoaoJHrenefl", and depriving them of 
nourishment "nHmeHHe nHraHHn." Prokhanov 1992, 247-248. 
to the "first echelons" of the party, but were people of secondary 
importance. Briefly, the commission could only handle technical 
matters and minor issues. What it definitely could not do was to decide 
about the general lines of Soviet religious policy. The task of the 
commission dealt with the technical execution of policy, not with its 
formulation, despite the fact that the commission had officially 
obtained a prestigious mandate from the VTsIK. 
During the years 1929-1935, the chairman of this commission was 
P.G. Smidovich. He was an apparatchik who had been a member of 
the party's special commission working with sects (Orgkomsekt) in 
the early 1920s, and after the dissolution of the APO's antireligious 
commission, he was nominated as a member of the special party's 
religious-political commission, CAP. Another formidable member of 
the commission was Petr Ananevich Krasikov (Andreevich, 1870-
1939), who had worked in the APO's antireligious commission 
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	 together with Ivan Ivanovich Skvortsov-Stepanov (1870-1928), and 
also later in the CAP. After the death of Smidovich, the chairmanship 
of the CSCRQ was transferred to Krasikov, who remained the leader 
of this organ up until its "liquidation" in 1938. The third significant 
member of this commission was, the "least" famous of these men, a 
chekist, Evgeny Aleksandrovich Tuchkov (1892-1957).31  
Moreover, other prominent members of the party were formal 
members of this commission. As a svodka from 1936 testifies, the 
Cult Commission included official members such as Commissaar of 
Health, N.A. Semashko (1874-1949), Yaroslaysky (who actually, 
according to the protocols, never participated in the meetings of this 
commission), B.L. Borisov (representative of the Soviet Federal 
31 	 He was born into a peasant family in the province of Ivanovo. He received four 
years of elementary school education and worked as an unskilled worker in the 
Ivanovo-Voznesensk district until 1910. He was drafted into the Imperial Army 
in 1915 and served as a clerk on the Western front. In 1917, he joined the 
Bolshevik party and from March 1918 to October 1919 led the legal division of 
the provincial Cheka in Ivanovo-Voznesensk. Before his nomination as a leader 
of the 6th "ecclesiastical" section of the Cheka from April 1922 to October 1939, 
he had worked as organizer of the Cheka's "special detachments" and then as 
departmental head of the provincial Cheka in Ufa. He had also worked inside the 
CAP and, as a representative of the security apparatus, was in a powerful position 
when the commission wanted to implement its resolutions or to get information 
from the provinces. He survived the Great Purges to retire in 1947. See RPTsKG, 
290-291. "Xouarasicrso HavanbHHxa C1Io Orny 5I.C. Arpaeona o 
HarpaacneHHH E.A. Tyvxona 1 ceHrsm6psm 1931 r." See also Roslof 1994, 90. 
procuracy), V.J. Timofeev (NKID), N.J. Martemyanov (VTsSPS), D. 
Korkmassov (Sovet Natsionalnostei VTsIK), E.F. Muravev (Institute 
of Philosophy in the Russian Academy of Sciences), and F.N. 
Oleshchuk, a close colleague of Yaroslaysky and one of his leading 
deputies inside the SVB movement. The CSCRQ also had its own 
technical assistants, such as a special "leading secretary", V.S. Ageev, 
an "instructor-consultant", I.N. Uzkov and a typist, R.N. Lekhtman.32 
However, most of these members were "dead souls" as the 
composition of this organ was vague. Membership in this commission 
would thus seem to have been a mere formality with the exception 
of three of its most prominent members, Smidovich, Krasikov, and 
Tuchkov, who were working there, at least to some extent, regularly.33 
The minor importance of the CSCRQ is clear when we compare 
the "battalions" of the VTsIK's personnel — 27 secretaries working in 
the Nationality Section of the VTsIK as against two secretaries 
working in the CSCRQ.34 However, the commission for religious 	 69 
matters was busy not only with trivialities. The real importance of 
this commission lay in the fact that it was a significant religious 
political forum for party officials in Moscow. It represented the will 
32 	 GARF f.5263, op.1, d. 32, rol. 1. 
33 	 The list of the people attending the meetings of the CSCRQ during 1930-1933 
consisted of various "middle" party officials. The only active participants were 
Smidovich, as chairman, Krasikov and Tuchkov. Others, such as J.S. Pronin, 
Nikitina, Iskryanistova (NKTrud), Matveev, Vishnyakov (NKYust), Iznekov, 
Podchufareva (Mosoblispolkom), Vladimirova (NKVD), Polyansky, Khromov, 
Antonov (NKID), Stepanov, Bogomolov (NKYust), V.N. Yakovleva (1884-1941), 
V.J. Timofeev, N.I. Martemyanov, E.F. Muravev, D. Korkmassov, Y.A. Yakovlev 
(1896-1938), Fedotov, Bodreev, I.E. Lyubimov (1882-1939), Boldyrev, N.A. 
Semashko (1874-1949), Korkin, Kandybin and Koltsarin attended less regurlarly. 
Also technical experts such as Svirshevsky (Rosstakh), Orlov (Gosstrakh), 
Gorbunov (Glaysotsstrakh), Bystrivsky (Lesohim), Antonov (NKVD), Oleshchuk 
(SVB), Arkhipov (NKTrud RSFSR), Lirtsman (Trudstrakh), Nosov 
(Glaysotstrakh), Davidov (NKF), Podpashensky (Rudmetalltorg), P.I. Lebedev 
(Polyansky, Valerian, 1881-1948) (Mospo), Shiryaev (Mosobispolkom), 
Shtemberg (Mosobispolkom), Kuznetsov, Lidzhdan (NKF) and Korovin (NKF) 
attended occasionally. The institutions these people represented (insurance, 
lumbering, scrap-metal etc.) clearly shows that the Soviet regime was interested 
in capitalizing on believers economically. The Cult Commission was also assisted 
by two technical "consultants" and secretaries (from the VTsIK) such as Semen 
Mikhailovich Vorobev, Nikolai Pavlovich Orleansky, together with their own 
secretary, Olga Zakharovna Babicheva. 
34 	 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 31 (pkvk 2, 3/9 -33) " CoBeuia mist no paccMorpeHH10 
H yrsepxcaeHHto utraroB no oraenaM BIJIHK Ha 1934 roa." Figures are from 
1934. 
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of Moscow and reflected the attitudes of Soviet civil servants. The 
documents of the Cult Commission reflect a wide range of different 
opinions inside the monolithic ruling regime during 1929-1938. 
Moreover, in the relations between the commission and local organs, 
we may catch a good glimpse of everyday Soviet administrative 
practices. This commission was also an advocate in favour of 
achieving a unified and coordinated religious policy in the Soviet 
Union. Although this organ could not conduct any real discussions, 
officials inside the CSCRQ were able to write memos and reports for 
higher institutions. In addition, it also worked as an "appeals court" 
with regard to the closure of churches. 
3. Step one: financial exploitation 
At the very beginning of its rule, the Bolshevik regime seemed to be 
oversensitive in the matter of church bells. The origin of Communist 
hostility towards church bells can be traced to the battles of the Civil 
War (1918-1921) when, occasionally, the sounding of summoning 
bells warned peasants of approaching Communist raids, thus attracting 
the hostile attention of atheist officials. Church bells, no doubt, 
symbolized the uncontrollable spirit of the Russian peasantry, the 
sounding of summoning bells always being a reminder of their 
independence of the ruling regime. One may even note a historical 
resemblance between the confiscating of the church bells of the 
peasantry and an incident during the reign of Ivan III (1440-1505) 
when the veche-bell of independent-minded Novgorod was shipped to 
Moscow on Ivans orders. In both cases, the autocratic regime could 
not tolerate an independent opposition.35 
In its propaganda the Soviet regime offered various pretexts for the 
silencing of the church bells. As Tuchkov mentioned in a certain letter 
to the NKVD, the "legalistic" argument for repressive actions was the 
contention that the sound of ecclesiastical bells "contradicted the 
principle of the separation of church and state." Another "explanation" 
was of a more practical nature; according to Tuchkov, the sound of 
35 	 Martin 1995b, 254. Concerning the incident in the Aleksandr Nevsky monastery, 
Petrograd, in 1918 (the victim — Father P. Skipetrov, the first martyr, being killed 
by Kronstadt sailors). ASPT 1994, 88. See also Clements 1980, 131-133; 
Farnsworth 1980, 100-101; Ward 1993, 45. 
bells also had harmful social effects. Especially in urban areas "it 
disturbed" both the work and the rest of working people. 
Consequently, it was necessary to restrict and forbid summoning by 
means of church bells. Tuchkov concluded his explanations by stating 
that local officials had the practical duty of executing the plan to 
restrict the tolling of church bells 36 
It is difficult to assess how sincere this worry was about the effects 
the ringing of church bells had on the daily lives of workers. Perhaps 
it is easier to find primary sources which clearly demonstrate that the 
outlawing of the tolling of bells and, later, initiatives to confiscate 
them by the state were carried out mainly for economic reasons - 
owing to a chronic lack of foreign currency in the Soviet Union. 
In 1930, Soviet society was in the throes of an industrialization 
fever. To surpass the five-year plan was the strategic target of the 
Kremlin in 1930-1933, and the requirements of over-fulfilling the plan 
were dictating the decisions of Soviet officials at that time. In public 	 71 
life, the demand for raw materials together with categorical orders 
from above emerged to eliminate with bottlenecks in Soviet industry. 
In this sense, it was the first pyatiletka and its grandiose targets that 
provoked the policy of confiscating church bells. Among other things, 
the Soviet state lacked non-ferrous metals for industrial needs, e.g., 
36 	 GARF f. 5263, op.l, d.2 "KonOKOnbHbIN 3BOH, npOH3BOJ(HMMt Ha BOO p,aHHyt0 
oxpyry UepKOBHHKaMH, pe3KHM 06pa30M npoTHBope9HT npHHUHny 
OTj[eneHHA UepKBH OT rocy2tapcTBa, H60 110 6bITOBbIM yCJIOBHAM H npaBaM 
IIIHpOKHX 6e3pennrno3HbIx mace, oco6eHHO ropoaa. OH MeulaeT Tpy)ty H 
HCH0nb3OBaHHIO Tpyjl$IU1HMCA HacenenxeM ero oTAblxa...npH Bcex 3THX 
yCAOBHAx H npH HaJIH1HH COOTBeTCTByI0111HX Tpe60BaHHH , H2yWHx CO 
CTOpOHbI KynbTypHO Bb1pOCIHHX IJHpOKHX Tpyj[OBb1X Macc, Heo6Xo2HMo 
HauIHM npaBHTeJ1bCTBeHHbIM opraHaM BCTaTb Ha nyTb npHMeHeHHA B 
OTHOIHeHHH K UepKOBHOMy KOJIOKOnbHOMy 3BOHy crporo OrpaHHHHTenbHbIX 
H 2ta)Ke 3anpeTHTenbHNX Mep...npn npOBeueHHH 3THX MeponpHATHH MecTHbre 
06utecTBeHHble Opramumu H 06513aHb1 npe2BapHTenbHo HpOBeCTH HIHpOKyio 
nourOTOBHTenbHyIO KaMn5HH1O...." See comments on Tuchkov's lecture from 
Vasileva & Knyshevsky 1994, 228-229. The theme that the church bells were 
"disturbing" the Soviet cultural work of the masses was repeated quite often in 
public demands for closing the churches and in newspapers. See TsGA SPb f. 
7383, op.l, d. 70, (rapaxc No.2.) "BMIIHCKH H3 11 OTOKonOB OrIeTHbIX co6paHHii 
coBeTa lj.F.P. c HaKa3aMH 0 CHATHH xonoxonOB." These different Soviet 
explanations and pretexts had usually one common cause: the good of the people. 
Whether the churches were located "too near" kolkhozes or churches existed 
"somewhere near" factories or kolkhozes "confused" the Soviet cultural life or 
were harmful "in socialist education of the proletarian masses." See for example, 
TsGA SPb f. 1000, op.48, d.37, 1. 185 "B npe3HJtHyMe THxoacxoro 
palIHCIIonKOMa 1931." 
electrification. Furthermore, the Soviet economy had earlier obtained 
its non-ferrous metals from foreign markets. According to this logic, 
church bells turned out to be a huge reservoir of coloured metals, i.e. 
money for the Soviet regime. 
There is a notable historical resemblance between the campaign of 
1921-22 and the situation at the beginning of the 1930s. In 
1921-1922, the ROC had been ransacked by the Soviet authorities 
for "the good of the hungry in the Volga area." Later, in the 1930s 
it seemed that the ROC was forced to hand over all that remained as 
a new secular hostia in order to meet the unrealistic targets of 
over-industrialization. Moreover, the Bolshevik regime seemed to act 
according to the example set by Peter the Great, who in his effort to 
strengthen Russia militarily confiscated church bells in order to turn 
them into cannons. 
The preparations for. looting churches of their bells began as early 
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	 as 1929, accompanied by a newspaper campaign expressing the 
government's worry that the "noise" of ecclesiastical bells was 
disturbing workers. First, the attention of the Soviet public was raised 
by newspapers which underlined Soviet ecomony's desperate shortage 
of coloured metals. These tones could be detected, for example, in 
Izvestiya of 5 January, 1929. This article, "To fight against the deficit 
of coloured metals", stated dispassionately that the Soviet Union 
wanted to avoid dependency on foreign markets.37 
This initiative was quickly seized up various Soviet organsations 
and it seems there were eager zealots of the Cultural Revolution who, 
for example, in the Moscow area were quick to forbid the tolling of 
bells on the local ispolkom level. These "masses" of Communist 
vigilantes turned this matter into a burning political question. As the 
protocols of the CSCRQ mention, the demand to confiscate bells for 
37 	 ."..CTpaxa Hama HAer no nyrH K OCBo60)KHeHHIO OT HHOCTpaHHbIX pbIHKOB 
useTHoro McTaJIJIocblpbst...MaKCHManbHo HpH6JIH3HTb MOMeHT nojmoi 
3MaHCHnauHH OT 3arpantmituX pbIHKOB, a AO Tex nop ocna6HTb 3Ty 
3aBHCHMOCTb — 3azta'Ia HeoTJlONCHasL." Izvestiya, 5 January 1929, No. 4. "Ha 
6opb6y c j[ecpHUHTOM uBeTHbtx Merannos." According to Vasileva and 
Knyshevsky, the demand to confiscate church bells for the benefit of 
industrialization was clearly articulated for the first time by the "Red Soviet 
Professor" P.V. Gidulyanov. In his book "Church bells in the Service of Magic 
and Czarism" he stressed how Soviet industry could easily acquire metals by 
melting down church bells. The main emphasis in this justification lies in the 
phrase "without bother"; the Soviet power could receive those "deficit metals" 
without expending too much effort. Vasileva & Knyshevsky 1994, 226. 
the benefit of industrialization was initially articulated on 15 
December 1929 by the secretariat of the VTsIK and later on 20 
December 1929 "with Bolshevik-tempo" by the "Fraction of the 
RKP(b)." Subsequently, this initiative was passed on to the Cult 
Commission which discussed it for the first time on 31 December 
1929. At this meeting, the Cult Commission went so far as to introduce 
the "NEP style" into the debate process. The debate actually started 
with the issue of the confiscating of church bells and was extended 
to other topics such as earlier antireligious activities in the Soviet 
Union. During this discussion one of the members of the new 
commission (Nikitina) showed her dissatisfaction with Soviet religious 
policy and declared that there seemed to be no order in the closure 
of churches and the confiscation of church bells. Her accusations of 
anarchy (cTHxHHHocTb) and disorder could be interpreted as serious 
charges; in the middle of the Cultural Revolution these kinds of 
accusations were usually directed at those who were out of favour. 
Understandably enough, another member of this commission, (Pronin) 
fiercely protested against these charges and argued that Soviet 
antireligious work was devoid of anarchy. This quarrel was not settled 
until 6 February 1930, when the chairman of this commission, 
Smidovich, made a mediation effort concerning the confiscation of 
church bells and melting them down.38 
Later, on 10 April 1930, this initiative was issued as a decree. 
According to the special amendment introduced by the Prime Minister 
Aleksei Ivanovich Rykov (1881-1938) on 8 August 1930, the right to 
"limit" summoning by church bells was given to the local authorities. 
As Vasileva and Knyshevsky have stressed, the central authorities 
38 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 5. (pkvk 3, 31/12 1929); GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 1. 
(pkvk 7, 6/2 1930). According to many accounts, local officials acted 
independently and with hast. The hotheads of the Cultural Revolution started to 
restrict summoning by church bells earlier than officials demanded and without 
any order from above. The Soviet regime did not oppose this. As Pravda later 
explained, this spontaneous activity led to the decision to prohibit the summoning 
by bells and was done as a result of the "demands of social and workers 
organizations" (oOutecTBeHHbIx H pa6o'Hx opranu3aus i). Pravda, 30 January 
1930, No. 29 (4474). "XpoHHxa." These initiatives to use churches for the benefit 
of Soviet industry turned into a massive popular campaign sponsored by the Soviet 
newspapers. See, Izvestiya, 6 January, 1930, No. 6(3853) "5e3 6o)KbHx nyT - Ha 
HOBbIN nyTb." The slogan of these communist vigilantes seemed to be: "KTO 
cKAOHen Me4TaTb. TOT He CHOCO6eH 6opoTbcsi. See also Izvestiya, 30 January, 
1930, No. 29(3876) "KonoxonbHblh 3BOH B MOCKBe 3anpeuteu." 
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The loot and the looters. Source: KN 1930, No. 5. 
could count on the local officials understanding of this directive 
"correctly." This quasi-democratic promise of local "support", which 
local officials should secure from populace before confiscating, of 
course represented a discreet call to confiscate as many church bells 
as possible.39 This principle of local decision-making was also duly 
emphasized in the additional instructions which the secretariat of the 
VTsIK sent to the Moscow district procurator, when he asked for 
more details concerning the confiscating of church bells. According 
to these instructions, the individual city ispolkom or the raion's 
ispolkom had the last word in this process, thus giving the impression 
39 	 Vasileva & Knyshevsky 1994, 227-228. According to the general plan articulated 
by Rykov, looted church bells were to be handed to state organs such as 
Rudmetaltorg or Metallom. (GARF f.5263, op.l, d.2 "C.C.C.P. Cosec Tpyp,a e 
o6opoxbr 13-ro,ttexa6px 1939 r.": GARF f. 5263, op.1, d. 1 (pkvk 8, 26/2 1930). 
According to reports forwarded the Cult Commission, local authorities such as 
ispolkoms did not object to the looting of church bells because they were 
considered "state property." GARF f. 5263, op.l, d. 1. (pkvk 10, 26/3 1930). 
that the Soviet people were in favour of closing down churches. ° 
According to the original plan which the CSCRQ received from 
the Soviet Prime Minister Rykov, the Soviet government intended to 
confiscate not less than 25 thousand tonnes of metals by January-July 
1931 in the Russian RSFSR. For Uzbekistan, the figure was 
considerably lower — 4 thousand tonnes (understandable enough), and 
from Bashkiriya only one thousand tonnes. The suggested strategy 
was simple: all bells should be confiscated from churches which were 
forbidden to toll them. In other cases, where the ringing of bells was 
not forbidden, Soviet officials should take only "useless church bells" 
(nHUIHHe xonoxona). This broad interpretation opened the way for 
all kinds of local machinations; the actual decision to restrict the 
ringing the bells was made, as mentioned above, by the council of 
the city or the raion's ispolkom4' In accordance with Soviet economic 
plans, these metals were to be utilized for the benefit of 
industrialization.42 But according to one telling remark made by Rykov 	 75 
himself, the real objective was even more banal. The Soviet regime 
was planning to melt the church bells and turn them into coins. As 
Rykov's letter of 23 October 1930 to the leaders of the autonomous 
Sovnarkom's, S.I. Syrtsov (1893-1938) in RSFSR, V.Y. Chubar 
(1891-1939) in Ukraine and N.M. Goloded (1894-1937) in Belo-
russia43 reveals, the whole campaign was actually undertaken in order 
to save money. The main emphasis was not to avoid importing copper 
or bronze from abroad. On the evidence of Rykovs letter, it is clear 
40 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 2. "BbmHcxa H3 npoToxona No. 30 3aceAaHHA 
cexpeTapnaTa BcepoccHilCKoro 1ZeHTpanbHoro HCnonHHTenbHoro KOMHrera 
CoseToB. 15 a.exa6pA 1929 r.". See also NK, 155 "jloxnaAHaA 3anacKa HKBII 
KACCP B KapenbeKHH O6KOM BKII(B) 0 BbInOJIHeHHH AHpeKTHB coseTcxoH 
BnacrH B 06nacrH pe.nnraH. Hloab 1930 r." 
41 	 GARF f. 5263, op. I, d. 2, I. 8 "IIpeunoAceHHA BCHX CCCP o npOBeAeaHH 
H3b5ITHA KOnOKonoB B ropouax H yxa3aHHA npeace,gaTenA CHK CCCP PbIKOBa 
HO 3TOMy Bonpocy npaBHTenbcrsaM cOI03HbIx pecny6nHx." 
42 	 See the order of STO signed by V. Schmidt. GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. I, 1. 37. 
"IIOCraHOBneHHe CoBeTa TpyAa H O6oponbl 8 anpenA 1930 r." The text of this 
order is also published in RPTsKG, 272-273. 
43 	 ...H31351THe H3nHn1HHX KO]IOKOnOB Heo6XOAHMO OCynIeCTBHTb Iio BO3MOJKHOCTH 
6bICTpee (TaK KaK MbI peWHJIH HX HCHO11b3OBBTb B nepBylO ovepeub unA 
9eKaHKH MenKON pa3MeHHON MOHeTbI, KOTopaA po CHX flop 9eKaHHnacb Ha 
HMHOpTHON MeAH) He npH,itaBaA 3TOMy nonHTH9ecKOrO 3Ha9eHHA H HanHnIHeN 
ornacxH... GARF f. 5263, op.l, d. 2, 1. 9. "IIOACHeHHe npeatceuarenA CHK H 
CTO A.H. PbIKOBa K J[HpeKTHBe 06 H31,5ITHH KOnOKOAOB H HX HCH0nb30BaHHH 
B ropoAax COI03HbIX pecny6nHK 23 oxTA6pA 1930 r." See also Vasileva & 
Knyshevsky 1994, 230. 
the entire scheme of confiscating the church bells was initiated 
primarily in order to turn church bells not into cannons, as Peter the 
Great had done, but into coins.44 
As O. Khlevnyuk has stressed, Stalin took very personally matters 
relating to the accumulation of state funds; they involved questions 
of political loyality to himself. He had given a categorical order not 
to use state funds to purchase raw materials or metals from abroad. 
Because Stalin made it impossible to procure non-ferrous metals from 
abroad, Rykov was obliged to confiscate metals wherever he could, 
i.e. churches. a5 
The procedure that the Soviet government adopted in preparing to 
confiscate church bells was also applied to other objects of value in 
the Soviet Union at that time. The needs of industrialization had top 
priority. The Soviet regime was ready to sell anything it could; it even 
sold Russian art treasures from the Hermitage in order to get foreign 
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	 currency. Even the introduction of the GULAG was to some extent 
the offspring of this hunt for hard currency. In accordance with the 
Sovnarkom's orders, the OGPU expanded the system of labor camps 
primarily as a means of earning foreign currency.46  
There are also other examples showing how the 5-year plans 
impacted on Soviet religious policy. For example, in 1930 the CSCRQ 
wanted to introduce a tax for those sectarians who were released from 
military duties on grounds of their pacifist convictions. But the 
commission concluded, the planned tax would hurt those of serednyak 
and bednyak origin. Therefore the commission proposed an 
experiment; groups of young sectarians (comprising over 1000 people) 
should be complelled to do heavy forest work for 24 months. The 
Cult Commission justified this proposal by stating that "political work" 
under these conditions would certainly give good results, i.e., convert 
these young sectarians to Communism. However, the presence of 
representatives from Lesohim and the NKVD expose the true nature 
of this initiative — these sectarians were to serve as slaveworkers, in 
44 	 GARF f.5263, op.l, d.2, 1. 9. 'BbmHcKa 143 HpOTOKOna Ho. 30 cexperapnara 
BCepOcCHNCKOrO 11eHTpanbHOrO HCnOnHHTenbHOrO KOMHTeTa COBeTOB 15 
aexa6pn 1929 r. Cnpasxa. K Bonpocy o6 yperynnpoBaHHn KoxononbHoro 
3B0Ha B uepxsnx." 
45 	 Khlevnyuk 1996, 87-89. 
46 Jakobson 1993, 117-118, 121-122; Bacon 1996, 42-47. See also Vasileva & 
Knyshevsky 1994,232-239. 
a kind of "protogulag" as earners of hard currency 47 
The actual campaign for confiscating church bells took place at the 
height of collectivization, at the same time as officials were closing 
down churches. The speed of this campaign did not, however, satisfy 
state trusts such as "Metallom" and "Rudmetalltorgs" which were 
responsible for procuring metal. In their letters to the CSCRQ, these 
juggernauths of Soviet metal trusts or other representatives of the 
Soviet economy complained that the campaign of stripping metal from 
churches was proceeding too slowly. As a certain deputy of the 
Commissariat of Finances, Karp, declared in one of these letters, the 
question of removing church bells was a most urgent one: the 
confiscating of this metal had a "budget nature." Moreover, the 
confiscated church bells were not the only source of precious metals 
which the Soviet had set its sight on: the Cult Commission even 
evolved a plan to confiscate all metal crosses from ecclesiastical 
graveyards.48 
Nevertheless, it was clear that moral reservations or protests of 
believers did not carry enough weight in the face of the demands of 
the Soviet economy. The higher authorities increasingly put pressure 
for local officials to confiscate more and more church bells. The usual 
justification was, as one circular to the Leningrad oblast states, that 
47 GARF f. 5263, op.1, d. 1 (pkvk 5, 16/1 1930). 
48 
	
	 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 12 rol. 2 "nOCTOAHHON KOMHCCHH no BonpocaM KynbTOB 
nix! flpe3Hjuiyse BUIiK 4. ,geKa6p5 1931"; "B IIeHTpanbHyto HOCTOAHHy10 
KOMHCCHIO no BonpocaM KynbTOB npH LIpe3HaHyMe BLtlK 8.9.1931"; GARF 
f. 5263, op.l, d. 30 "npe ce,taTeJno KynbTOBOt1 KOMHCCHH npH BUNK T. 
CMHjtOBHYy 14.1. 1933." Concerning graveyards: GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 12 
"14HCTpyKuHA HOCTOAHHON KOMHCCHH HpH IIpe3HJuJyMe BLINK HO BOHp0CaM 
KyJIbTOB. 0 nopsunce ycrpohcraa, 3aKpbITHA H AHKBHAaUHH KJIa26HII H 
nopsA.Ke CHOca HaJMOrHJIbHbIX naMATHHKOB." Church bells were needed for 
more grotesque purposes - for the relief and panelling of the facade of the Lenin 
Library. GARF f. 5263, op. I, d. 19, rol. 3 "K Bonpocy o6 H3bATHH KOAOKOAOB 
113 BOCbMH uepKBeh rop. MOCKBbI H HCHOJIb3OBaHHH MX Ha ropeabecpbi Hpn 
OTHeaKe H o6AHuosxe 3JIaHH51 ny6JIHYH011 6H6JIHOTeKH CCCP HMeHH B.H. 
JIeHHHa 22. asrycra 1932 r." See also GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 22 (pvkp 3, 26/5 
1933). The goal of this campaign proved too optimistic as was the case with 
nearly all the economic plans in the 1930s. As archival sources testify, the target 
was to confiscate 130 000 tonnes of bronze for industry. The actual tempo of this 
campaign was, however, quite slow. Statistics from archives show that during 
1929-1930 only 1.1 thousand tonnes were procured by these campaigns. See 
GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 2, II. 4-6. "CnpaBKa o cpaKTHYeCKOM nOCTynneHHH 
KOJIOKOJIbHOIt 6poH3bI Ha MOCKOBCKHIt 3J1eKTpOJIHTHbJt 3aBOJI HMeHH 
IVIOJIOTOsa. 0 miniature ee HOCTynJICHHA 3a fATHJ1eTKy H paCYeTb[ CTOHMOCTH 
ee peaJIH3aunH. 17 oKTA6p51 1930 r." 
77 
78 
The confiscation of church-Bells in full swing. 
these metals were of "great importance to the state." However, as time 
went on, repeated demands for a more energetic looting of church 
bells appeared to be of little avail. For example, at the end of 1933, 
a certain representative of a local organsation in Leningrad explained 
to higher party authorities that most of the church bells had already 
been confiscated in their area. As the local archives from St. 
Petersburg testify, most valuable objects in the possession of religious 
organizations — precious metals and church bells — had been 
expropriated by 1933.49  
49 TsGA SPb f. 1000, op. 51, d. 26, 1. 59. "IlxptcynApxo. llpeAceAaTenro 
JlexxxrpancxoN o6JlacTx 3/VIII-33." 
To sum up the fate of confiscated church bells, we could conclude 
that the perceived needs of the Soviet economy outweighed traditional 
values and the needs of the believers. It appears that these bells were 
melted down and used for various purposes, i.e., coins, machines, etc. 
However, the main benefit went to (together with new coins) the 
Soviet military industry which demanded the lion's share of the loot. 
As a certain document from the STO — Council of Labour and 
Defence, reveals, the military industry was anxious to utilize these 
metals as a part of the Soviet defence budget. The total "take" from 
this questionable campaign was as followes: the Soviet government 
confiscated 385 310 church bells amounting to approximately 37 425 
tonnes of metal.5° 
Moreover, the campaign to confiscate church bells appears to have 
been another kind of success story for the Soviet system. A substantial 
part of the population seemed to be supporting the Soviet regime in 
its quest after the church bells. As Yaroslaysky testified later, 	 79 
communist officials hesitated at the beginning; the decision to limit 
the summoning of the church bells to a minimum was not an 
unanimous one. As he mentioned, there were some "comrades" who 
were opposed to this action.51 But once the legal formalities and rules 
of confiscation had been resolved the campaign was escalated with 
public support. According to Soviet newspapers, after some major 
cities such as Kostroma, Arkhangelsk, Yaroslavl, Bryansk, Samara 
and Smolensk had already confiscated all bells, there was no point in 
continuing with legal preparations.52 
50 Ist, 79-84. "No:l. ,IIoxnaaHan 3anHcxa B K0MHTBT peaepBos npH CTO o6 
HCnonb3oBaHHH KOnOKOnbHON 6poH3bI. KOMHTeTy pe3epaoB npH CTO 
29.X.1933. No:3/7821." 
51 	 "...Si nOMHIO. 'ITO Ha 3aceAaHHH aHTHpenHrH03HOH KOMHCCHH, Aa)Ke npH 
HeKOTOpOM COTIpOTHBAeHHH CO CTOpOHM OTjtenbHbLX pyKOtio)in IHX 
TOBapHIITeti..." YIV, 88. "O nATHJCTHBM nnaHe "pa60Tbi 6e360)KHHKOB". 
Z[oxnau Ha 3aceAaHHH Hcn6iopo LIC CBS CCCP 29.1. 1930 r." See, for example, 
how P. Smidovich in 1929 opposed the principle of over-taxing, because it as 
contradicted proletarian "church policy." However, this represented only a 
temporary pause in this matter. See AGMIR, f. 63, op. 3, d. 197, 11. 14, 15-31. 
52 	 ."..Co6bITHA HOnlnH TOKHM O6pa30M. 'ITO 3TH nnaHbl 61,11111 CMeTeHM CTHXHYIHO 
pa3BHBBIOHIHMCA npoueccoM." YIV, 88 "O EATHneTHeM nnaHe "pa60Tbi 
6e36o}KHHxoB." LIOKnaJI Ha 3aceAaHHH Hcn6iopo BC CBE CCCP 29.1. 1930." 
See also LP 1930, No. 9 "IlpeKpaTHTb KOJIOKonbHblh 3BOH." LP 1930, No. 35. 
"Konoxona — B (poHJI HHttycTpnanH3au1H." See also KN 1931, No. 5. 
"Konoxona." 
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4. Step two: liquidation of churches 
As mentioned above, according to official Soviet propaganda, the 
closing down of the churches was supposed to be executed with strong 
support from the local population. The Soviet regime worked under 
the optimistic assumption that the populace, or at least a majority of 
urban inhabitants supported its antireligious campaigns. The resisting 
part of the population was often described as a "dark mass" under the 
influence of kulaks and priests. In Bolshevik thinking, the phrase 
"uncultured masses" characterized the Soviet countryside which was 
a kingdom of darkness (temnoe tsarstvo) fighting against the 
Communist patrimony of enlightenment (prosveshchenie),53 
Moreover, according to Soviet ideology, women were more prone to 
succumb to religious propaganda than men. In reality, we may assume 
that support for the closure of local parish churches hardly existed on 
the massive scale that the Soviet regime would have us believe. 
The question of supposed popular support for Bolsheviks and for 
antireligious campaigns is a subject of controversy. On the one hand, 
there is extant an impressive amount of letters, for example, received 
by the journal Bezbozhnik from its correspondents in the provinces 
demanding more active measures against local priests and kulaks. This 
wave of letters coming from rural correspondents could have led the 
Soviet regime to believe that the majority of the working people were 
in favour of closing down the churches. Although the reports of these 
peasant correspondents must be studied with considerable reservations, 
it appears, nonetheless, that there existed an amorphous antireligious 
movement among the pro-Soviet part of the population. These 
Bezbozhnik letters reflect the hostility of some communists of peasant 
origin as well as "neutral" people brought about by the increasing 
activity of religious organizations. The genre of these letters is unique: 
in these documents "ordinary" peasants or communist correspondents 
are usually demanding the liquidation of a local church or forbidding 
some local Baptist group from convening. As a source of study, 
however, these letters are quite problematic. First, they are 
hand-written and barely legible, and, second, they often contain 
fantastic "stories" and "accounts" of some unbearable situation in some 
53 	 Joraysky 1985, 93-94. See also KPSSvr IV, 102; SPS, 296, 531. 
particular village or factory.54 
The popular nature of these confiscations is a rather controversial 
issue. For example, in the Leningrad area the local SVB demanded 
that tolling the church bells should cease and that these objects should 
be confiscated for the benefit of Soviet industry. This petition 
contained 3488 signatures!' 
However, even the great amount of signatures or numerous articles 
in Soviet newspapers does not prove that the majority of the 
population was for closing down churches. As S.A. Shinkarchuk, a 
Russian sociologist, who has researched political opinions prevailing 
among the Soviet people during the 1930s, has remarked, it is actually 
impossible to ascertain how much the Soviet regime enoyed genuine 
popularity!' 
The real significance of these letters was perhaps that these lengthy 
lists of signatures constituted a desperately needed sign of popular 
54 Note how the antireligious bravados, headlines and editorials of the Soviet 
newspapers and letters coming to the SVB resemble each other. See some 
examples from GARF f. 5407, op. 2, d. 30 "Haao 3aKpbirb uepKosb!": " IIopa 
6b1 3axpblrb nonoscxyio naeonKy: cpa6pHKa Ilponerapnc." See also other 
examples, GARF f. 5407, op.2, d. 25, 28, 29, 30, 34, 37, 38, 39, 42, 44, 94, 99, 
127. The correspondents stressed how priests were "meddling" in Soviet elections 
in 1928-1929 and were aggressively conducting propaganda against the Soviet 
rule. See also some examples: GARF f. 5407, op. 2, d. 174 "KoppecnoHaexuHsl 
C Mecr 0 pa3o6na'teHHH 110110B xax Mapoaepos H BparoB coBeTCKOH BnaCTH. 
15 amsapa 1929 -10 cpespana 1929 r: FAP> cp. "5407, on. 2. A. 176 "CrarbH. 
BaMerxH H npo'iasi KoppecnoHaeauHs o penHrHo3Hoh nponaranae 
ayXOBeHCTBa H KynaKOB cpeatt HaCeneHHa H HX aHTHCOBeTCKOH 
aesTTenbxocrH" 1929 r.: "GARF f. 5407, op.2, d.185 CTaTbH. 3aMerxn H npovasi 
KoppecnoHaeauaa 0 aearenbHOCTH pa3J1H4HbIX penarMO3Hbix ceKT 
(6anrHcroB. eBaHrenHcroB). nocrynHBIDHe B cpespane 1929." See also Fainsod 
1958, 435; Solomon 1984, 130, 150-153. However, according to Glennys Young 
church councils and active members of the local churches were active in soviet 
elections during the late NEP. As she concludes, ."..Attempting to resist the Party's 
increasing attempts to control — if not eliminate — rural politics, members of church 
councils served as both candidates and campaign managers during elections to 
the village soviets...." Young 1996, 383. Her discoverings seem to verify the fact 
that antireligious movement in 1929 was merely a response causing a retribution 
by the Soviet regime. See also the sullen reaction of émigré observers in the 
1930s concerning the popularity of the regime and religious persecutions, see Put 
1930, No. 23, 81, 94. "IloveMy saKpbmaiorca uepKBH B PoccwH?": SV 1931, 
No. 19. 16. "113 nxcbMa pa6o9ero." 
55 TsGA SPb f.1000, op.48, d. 77a, 1. 14. 
56 As Shinkarchuk emphasizes: "...Toro ceHyac npaxrH'iecKH Heso3MONCHO 
onpeaenHrb. xaxaa 'iacrb HaceneHHa nouaepNCHsana 6onbuteBHKOB. 
6OnbWHHCTBO HnH McHb1HHHCTBO." Shinkarchuk 1995, 32. 
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support for the Soviet regime. One of the attributes of the Soviet 
regime was that they themselves regarded Soviet rule as a "people's 
government" desperate to pay heed to the voice of the people. As 
Chris Ward maintains... 
"Nevertheless, as the search for unity drove elites hither and thither, 
'democratic fantasy'(criticism, verification, the constitution, hints 
of party democratization, Ezhov's radicalism) did produce a kind 
of populist regime; one characterized, not by a democracy but a 
plebiscitary demagogy: tyrannical polity involving chaos, mistrust 
and paranoia which provided lethal valves for the appeasement of 
plebeian anger."57 
It is hard to ascertain if the press campaigns of the years 1928-1929 
had actually given rise to such a massive "plebeian anger"58 in favour 
82 	 of aggressive antireligious measures. Most likely not. However, these 
complaints and "alarming" letters constituted a solid pretext for the 
Soviet regime and if a local official wanted to respect the will of 
Moscow, he needed this "support", whether it was real or artificial.59 
According to the official procedures found in archive documents, 
it was the local administration which was obliged to make a detailed 
scheme of closing down churches (cseJ eHHs x nnaxbl). This "grand 
scheme" of closing the churches was supposed to proceed in three 
stages. First, local officials had to justify their initiative by recourse 
to "social needs"; i.e. claim that they needed a particular church for 
social purposes. These social needs usually involved plans to convert 
57 	 Ward 1993, 146-147. During these congress plenums of the VTsIK, antireligious 
activists showed their dissatisfaction over too slow a pace in the closing down of 
churches. The vigilantes even criticized the high officials, who seemed to be too 
tolerant of religious cults. VSS XIV (Z3), 14; VSS XIV (Z11), 26. See also VSS 
XIV (ZI1) and Fitzpatrick 1992, 119-120. 
58 	 Iconoclasm was, according to Richard Stites, one of the "innovative factors" of 
the Russian Revolution. Stites 1990a, 86. This mood of destruction was evident 
in many cases, when churches were not converted to suit social purposes, but 
simply destroyed. See, for example, KN 1930, 15 February, No. 5. 
59 As an interesting detail, certain German intelligence reports realized this 
"plebiscitary" pattern of the Bolshevik religious policy. According to one of these 
reports the Soviet population during the 1930s was pressured to petition local 
officials to close churches. This allowed Soviet authorities to recognize the 
unanimous wishes of the population and close the churches. This was, according 
to these reports, only a facade; when German troops arrived in 1941 the churches 
were full of people again. DGIR 1977, 36. 
the churches for cultural and social use — schools, clubs, nurseries or 
cinema theatres. Second, since the central government did not finance 
these operations of closing down churches, the local organs had to 
finance such affairs by themselves. Finally, in executing these 
closures, the local officials were obliged to conduct antireligious 
campaigns in newspapers. However, the reality proved rather different 
from these plans. It seems that these official, rather complex 
prodecures, remained as "Potemkin's facades" fabricated by officials 
from the centre. In the middle of collectivization and industrialization 
the local officials acted more autonomously in closing down 
churches.60 It is difficult to assess what actually happened, but it seems 
that the drive against active churches was more aggressive in urban 
areas than in the countryside. As official statistics from the Leningrad 
archives show, the city of Leningrad lost the majority of its churches. 
However, in the countryside the percentage of active churches was 
considerably higher. Before the revolution there were 550 functioning 	 83 
churches in the Leningrad city area, but in 1931 only 160 of these 
were open. In the Leningrad oblast, the number of closed churches 
was considerably lower; only 252 out of 1600 were shut.61  
It seems that local officials did not always work in unison with 
antireligious vigilantes. See for example the decision made by the 
Leningrad oblast Admnadzor in which local officials protested against 
the closure of the one church in Murmansk okrug. The officials 
justified their decision by stressing that the original decision to close 
the church was made without consulting believers, only the 
"HHOBepubI-cputim " had voted for the closing of the church. Finally, 
the local officials stressed that if this church is closed, the believers 
would have no place where they could "satisfy their religious needs."62 
60 	 The reality often proved rather different from the "paper orders" from Moscow. 
The campaigns of 1929 were executed by means of bureaucratic methods. As 
Merle Fainsod realized when investigating the Smolensk Archive, most of the 
incidents involving closing down churches were "administratively inspired". 
Fainsod 1958, 435. See the Soviet provincial accounts on the "dangerous activity" 
of the clergy, Schlesinger 1956, 113, 133, 138, 281. 
61 	 TsGA SPb f. 1000, op. 48, d. 77, II. 154. See also Krasnov-Levitin 1977, 67, 73. 
See the Leningrad area newspapers, see LP 1930, No. 19, "3aso tbl npennaralor 
JleHcosery": LP 1930, No. 20 "Pa6o'1Hh Haxa3 neHHHrpapcxoMy cosery." See 
the situation in Moscow; in 1930 official ROC had 500 churches, two years later 
there were only 87 functionable churches, see IRPTs, 92. See also the situation 
in Soviet Karelia, NK, 335-336. 
62 TsGA SPb f. 7383, op.l, d. 69 "B Ilpe3HuxyM JIeHHHrp. O6micnonxoMa 
The reality of closing down churches was often more banal than 
the ideological desire of the Godless-movement or zealous wishes of 
the "interventionists" (as an agitpunkt of the kulaks and the 
bourgeoisie). As a matter of fact, local officials were usually willing 
to impose over-taxation on churches and to introduce new "insurance 
rates" for buildings in religious use in order to obtain money and only 
subsequently to close down the church. Even in the early stage of the 
Cultural Revolution, the VTsIK tried to restrict punitive taxation 
together with other arbitrary measures. For example, in 1929 
Smidovich resisted suggestions to introduce punitive taxes for 
churches as "contradicting the separation decree"; according to him, 
the proletarian state could not accept a "church policy" which was 
simply punitive in nature. However, general pressure against religious 
organizations grew with the tempo of the Cultural Revolution and the 
question of imposing reasonable taxes became trivial. The question 
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	 of taxation was later passed to the Sovnarkom and later a special 
commission was created to resolve this matter. The outcome was that 
local officials were, as a matter of course, completely free to execute 
their policy of "squeezing and liquidating" churches.63 
As a result, believers reacted to the massive closure of churches 
by sending numerous petitions and complaints to the VTsIK and 
Kalinin. These complaints were then forwarded to the Cult 
Commission, which was obliged to function as an "Court of Appeal" 
in the face of complaints from believers and demands from militant 
atheists. 
Briefly, the Cult Commission in Moscow was split between two 
competing views. On the one hand, officials in Moscow were aware 
that collectivization and Cultural Revolution had instilled strong 
"antireligious feelings" among communist activists and party officials. 
The early 1930s was an era for antireligiozniki; at the beginning of 
the 1930s it was fashionable to be a member of a bezbozhnik cell. 
Moreover, to close a church was one way for local apparatchiks to 
prove their loyalty to Moscow. 
This pressure from the "godless front" is also apparent in the 
27.8.1930." 
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	 AGMIR f. 63, op. 3, d. 197, 11. 14, 15-31. In some cases, Soviet officials tried 
to justify their confiscations of churches with more "artistic reasons". TsGA SPb 
f. 7384, op. 15, d. 230 "Ho BOnpOCy HCfO11b3OBaHHA 3ABHHA CMOJ1bH0ro 
co6opa." 
protocols of the Cult Commission in Moscow. In one particular session 
the commission discussed problems arising from the broad masses 
participating in the closing down of churches. As mentioned already, 
the spontaneity of these zealous activists was an irritating surprise for 
officials in Moscow. The question was whether to merely tolerate such 
occasional "illegal" activity or to actually encourage it. The Soviet 
system was always very wary of any activity it could not control. The 
word "CTHxHRHocTb" itself signified something uncontrollable, a term 
that could be used to describe both "counter-revolutionary" or 
"anti-soviet" activity. Finally, the Cult Commission resolved this 
matter by resorting to a kind of "judgement of Solomon." On 6 
February 1930 the CSCRQ decided that it was necessary to discourage 
some "illegal" acts by certain persons and groups when closing down 
churches. However, at the same time the commission stressed that it 
was necessary to encourage the masses to close down churches. 
Therefore the commission decided to resolve this matter by 	 85 
simplifying the process of closing churches and by drafting of new 
instructions which would assist the locals to execute these operation 
with better ways. A special sub-commission was set up consisting of 
Krasikov, Tuchkov and Ikryanistova, to make proposals on this matter. 
The problem, however, remained the same. When the local officials 
were also the main beneficiaries of these closings, it seemed to be 
impossible enforce the law and order in this issue 64 
5. Step three: liquidation of servants of 
cults 
Along with the campaigns to confiscate church bells and to obliterate 
churches, the Soviet regime was obliged to contemplate the fate of 
the clergy. The first serious post-NEP blow against the clergy was the 
collectivization of the Russian countryside starting in the Autumn of 
1928 with the property of many priests having their property 
confiscated and being deportated to Siberia together with kulaks.65 
64 "...II03TOMy CaMO‘iHHHOe AeFiCTBHe OTAeJIbHbIX JIHn H rpynn He06X0AHM0 
CBoeBpeMeHHO npeCeKaTb, B TO )Ke 'Tema AOJUKHbi ÖbITb npHHBTbI Mepbl K 
pa3B513bIBaHHK) AeHCTBHN CBMHX mace...." GARF f. 5263, op.1, d. I (pkvk 7, 
6/2 1930). 
65 	 According to Ivanitsky, the Soviet security police — OGPU arrested (from I 
However, the dilemma of what to do with these "parasites" 
remained a burning issue for Soviet rulers. According to official Soviet 
legislation, the clergy was an "illegal" part of Soviet society. In reality, 
the village clergy were an inseparable part of the pre-collectivized 
Russian countryside. During the NEP they were allowed to cultivate 
their share of the mir's land as a payment for their ecclesiastical 
services. 
In the midst of the Cultural Revolution this contradiction between 
accepted practice and official Soviet ideology was even more glaring. 
However, at the beginning of the 1930s the Soviet regime was finally 
ready to outlaw the servants of cults and relegate them to the margin 
of Soviet society. As can be seen from the CSCRQ protocols of 6 
January 1929, the Soviet government was extremely anxious to attack 
the "semilegal" position of the clergy and restrict the economic 
influence of the servants of cults. During this meeting, chekist 
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	 Tuchkov strongly underscored in his lecture to the commission that 
the "servants of cults" were forbidden to receive any "illegal" income. 
Moreover, he repeated that clergy was forbidden to use land in any 
way; the same was case when if the clergy was "exploiting the labor." 
Tuchkov wanted to revitalize the Soviet interpretation of the law 
which stated that all servants of cults were to be deprived of all of 
their political rights. Although possibilities for free trade had been 
restricted from 1928, Tuchkov nevertheless maintained that "servants 
of cults" should not be involved in any kind of commercial activities. 
This leader of the security police stressed that officials should take 
care that those who gave up their ecclesiastical duties should be 
entitled to work, including agricultural work. Tuchkov underlined that 
employment of ex-priests should be conducted dicreetly, according to 
secret instructions and these operations should be coordinated by 
labour unions, the Commissariat of Labour, Agriculture, Justice, and 
the Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKTrud, NKZem, NKYust and 
NKVD).66 However, this "favourable" proposition of Tuchkov was 
discussed later, when a "fraction" of the leading Communist party 
decided in its meeting on 30 August 1930 that priests who publicly 
abandoned their ecclesiastical duties could be registered as ordinary 
workers and could apply for a new job. However, these people were 
January to 15 April 1930) 5028 priests and servants of cults. Ivanitsky 1996, 115. 
See also Bazarov 1991, 138-139. 
66 	 GARF f. 5263, op.I, d. 1 (pkvk 4, 6/1 1929). 
not supposed to work in Narkompros or in the military industry.67 
Nevertheless, the logic of the situation ultimately led to the massive 
exploitation of the servants of cults in Soviet labour camps; it seems 
that even at the height of the collectivization, priests were not leaving 
their eccesiastical duties as eagerly as had been hoped. As the Soviet 
economy needed more workers, the system of Gulag was automatically 
applied to all servants of cults, whether they remained in their 
ecclesiastical posts or not. Later the commission approved the proposition 
that the ex-priests should be put to work for the Soviet state 6ß 
As mentioned above, the Stalinist regime considered that all the 
servants of cults constituted a possible threat as potential organizers 
of peasant resistance against the Soviet power. Especially the security 
organs were willing to see Orthodox village priests as organizers of 
peasant mutiny. For example, as is evidenced in a report on a certain 
priest, Konstantin Andreevich Odintsev, the OGPU prosecutor made 
a detailed description of his rebellious acts. According to this account 	 87 
of 31 October 1930 (to the VTsIK Presidium's secretariat), this priest 
had exhorted poor peasants to armed resistance against the Soviet 
power. The report says that this clergyman had in 1929 gathered a 
meeting of peasants around him and declared to them that... 
...nobody has experienced such violence as the peasantry under the 
Soviet power — it has strangled them in all ways, it has taken away 
the land putting it under sovkhozes, imposed back-breaking taxes, 
taken away the last loaves of bread...Now what is waiting for you 
— you poor men! In order to defend yourselves, you must arm 
yourselves and demand freedom...do not give the state your bread 
surpluses...you must organize units and beat these parasites...that 
Soviet power will fall, it is obvious, but if we help this [process], 
the end [of Soviet rule] will come sooner...69 
67 	 GARF f. 5363, op. I, d. 6, 1. 9 "BMnxcKa H3 nporoxona No. 42/c. DpaKUen 
BKII(6). 3aceJtattae or 30 asrycra 1930 r.." See also RPTsKG 284-285. A great 
deal of former priests had been able to work as specialists of religious matters 
and antireligious cadres of the SVB movement. Actually, according to Daniel 
Penis, the SVB-movement and the newspaper Bezbozhnik were run by former 
priests and sons of priests. The SVB was the main recruiter of former priests and 
hired these apostates for working inside the SVB and, of course, for propagandistic 
purposes. Penis 1995, 344, 360. 
68 	 GARF f. 5263, op.l, d. I (pkvk 12, 26/8 1930). 
69 GARF f. 5263, op.l. d. 7, ro1.2. "CeKperapnary IIpe3nunyMa BIIHK 31 
OKTA6pS1 1930." 
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AHrNcoaercKoe rHe3,l7,o 
"Antisoviet Nest." During the 1930s nearly all Orthodox monasteries were liquidated as "nests 
of espionage and anti-Soviet agitation.° Source: Bezbozhnik 1938, No. 3. 
Later this unfortunate priest70 is mentioned as having practised 
propaganda inside Soviet cooperative premises. In his message to 
workers he utilized nationalist slogans (."..the Russian country is 
dead!"). He also mentioned that in case of war, the Soviet power 
would be certain to perish by the intervention of foreign countries. 
According to the OGPU's report, this particular priest was sure that 
the Soviet power was aiming at a kind of barshchina — a new kind 
of a Soviet corvee.71  
70 The maximum penalty for anti-Soviet propaganda or agitation especially in 
"utilizing the religious or national prejudices of the masses" (c Hcnonb3osanneM 
peRHrHo3HbIX HRH HauHOHaJIbHbIX npeapaccy txon Macc..) was execution. See, 
SZR, No. 12, 11 March 1927, 286. 
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	 "..norx6na crpaHa Pyccxan, onnesann ee cynocTarm - KOMMYHHCTbI - 
rpa6ar. y6HBaloT; CKOpO HM 6yaeT Konen, H OHH He 6yAYT 3HaTb, Kyaa HM 
IeBaTbCSI, a MM ,gOR)KHbl BbInaBRHBaTb HX. Y IHHATb paCnpaBbl. TepnnTe -
KOHeu COBBnaCTH 6.1130K. CKOpO ace CTpaHbi nonayT BORHON H pa3pyulaT 
It is quite captivating to see in how straightforward a way this 
notorious priest was pictured by these reports. It is also quite amusing 
to realize, how his sermons were full of Soviet political jargon and 
moreover included some rhetoric from the Bible. Thus, it is quite 
likely that these "sermons" were fabricated. The Orthodox clergy, no 
doubt being against the destruction of the traditional Russian 
countryside, hardly could practise this kind of politicized propaganda 
in order to create organized and militant resistance against the 
Bolsheviks.72 Nonetheless, the most significant detail in these many 
cases against Orthodox priests was the fact that the Soviet regime 
wanted to decapitate the potential leadership of the peasantry, which 
suggests that there existed literally a pathological fear of some kind 
of a "putch" from below. The fear of an international war that would 
coincide with internal peasant revolt was lurking behind these 
accusations and the servants of cults were indirectly blamed for a kind 
of a "Clemenceau statement."73 
Interestingly enough, the resistance of believers did not cease once 
priests were arrested. Women were the last to defend their own church 
bells. However, in some places, arrests and lootings had made an 
impact on the people. In many places these repressive methods, arrests 
of priests and the confiscation of property led to confusion among 
believers and voluntary abandonment of parishes. People were afraid 
to come to their churches. However, there were examples of persistent 
HeHaBHCTHylO COBBAaCTb. 3TO He BJIaCTb, a 6aHAHTbi. ECJIH OHH Hac My'ialoT, 
TO nOTOMy, 9TO Mbl BparH, a 3a 'ITO BaC?...OHH XOTAT CaejlaTb sac HHutHMH, 
3araam B KOAX03bI H 3aKa6aJIHTb Ha BeKH — He XOJtHTe B Hero - 3T0 6apluHHa." 
GARF f. 5263, op.1, d. 7, ro1.2. "CexperapHaTy Hpe3HjlHyMa BLjHK, 31 
oxTA6psi 1930." See also SV, 10 October, 1931, No. 19(257). "H3 nncbMa 
pa6overo." 
72 According to Bazarov this was the case. See Bazarov 1991, 268-269. 
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On the Clemenceau statement in the communist power struggle: Deutscher 1967, 
310. See other cases against priests, e.g. the case of Ivan Fedovich Kiselev: GARF 
f. 5263, op. 1, d. 14, rol. 2 "B KOMHCCHIO no BonpocaM xynbroB"; Hpoxypopy 
MOCKOBCKOh o6.1IacTH 20.6.1931"; HocraHOBAenue lIeHTpanbHoro 
HcnonnnreJlbHoro KOMHTera H COBeTa Hapopnblx KoMHccapos Colo3a CCP. 
O 6opb6e C KOHTppeBORIOHHOHHb1MH 9AeMeuraMH B pyKOBOAAIUHX opraHax 
pennrno3Hblx o6vetHHeHrik 11 Vivaria 1930." See the NKVD reports on the 
religious political situation prevailing in certain districts in the USSR. According 
to this individual report, the situation was more than heated in the Soviet 
countryside; the protests and "riots" against collectivization had a religious nature. 
RSS, 288-291. "Rapport de la section Information du commissariat du peuple å 
1'Interieur sur les deviations et abus en matiere de politique religieuse (mars-juin 
1930)." See also Ivanitsky 1996, 153-155, 160-161, 188. 
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women who were ready to resist these massive confiscations of church 
bells. These cases were usually taken care of with the assistance of 
the OGPU, i,e, with brutal methods.74 
6. Hasty retreat: Stalin's "Dizzy with 
success" 
The backlash against collectivization and wild rumors concerning the 
fierce antireligious campaigns in the Soviet Union were spreading 
abroad and caused international protests at the beginning of the 1930s. 
The Soviet press responded to these international protests with 
irritation; for example Yaroslaysky accused the Autocephalous 
Ukrainian Church, émigré generals, SR's, and Mensheviki for inspiring 
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these protests.75 International protests culminated on 8 February 1930 
when on the behalf of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope Pius XI 
presented his protest against Soviet antireligious persecutions. 
Moreover, the Archbishops of Canterbury and York announced their 
dissatisfaction over the situation prevailing in Russia.76 
The Soviet newspapers responded by organizing a forceful press 
campaign against the Pope, the Catholic Church in Poland, and other 
Western protesters. According to these numerous articles, the Pope 
was seen to be speculating with the feelings of Polish fanatical 
peasants, thus giving a signal for a forthcoming crusade against the 
workers' state. According to other articles, German bankers were 
actually behind this protest, backing the Pope in his coming crusade 
against the Soviet Union.77 This reaction was in part an offspring of 
74 TsGA SPI, f. 1000, op. 51, d. 26, 11. 87 "B npe3HUHyM fleannrpatcxoro 
o6JHCnonxoMa 25/X -1934." See also TsGA SPb f. 1000, op.48, d. 77. 1. 25a 
"Pennrno3Hble o6tuecrsa"; Shinkarchuk 1995, 70. 
75 Pravda, 6 February 1930, No. 36 (4481) "KoHTppeBontouHA noa cpnaroM 
uepKBH." 
76 	 For Western evaluations of the Pope's protest, see Martel 1933, 84-85. On émigré 
evaluations of religious freedom prevailing in Russia in the 1930. See VKR 1930, 
No. 5(17), 9-12. "3a cso6oay pennrnH"; Dmitrievsky 1930, 258-262. 
77 	 Pravda, 13 February 1930, No. 43 (4488). "CBArehunni cnexynstnr Bo rnase 
"xpecrosoro noxoaa"; Pravda, 16 March 1930, No. 74 (4519) "FepMattcxne 
6anxnpbl ()HHaHCHpyIOT xpecrosbI6I noxoa." See also Pravda, 15 February 
1930, No. 45 (4490). "IIaxner He(1)TM". "OTnop aHTHcoseTcxoti xaMnaHHH B 
Hopserin"; Pravda, 14 March 1930, No. 72 (4517) " IIHncyucKHR HatuynbtsaeT 
novsy anm BbICTynJIeHHA nporHB CCCP"; Sheinman 1932, 512-515. As a 
the "war scare" of 1926-1927. Originally, hysteria about a coming 
war was created during the middle of the power struggle by the "leftist 
opposition." Later, Stalin found these cries of his adversaries useful 
in his own propaganda, when he mobilized Komsomols in his fight 
against older party cadres. Moreover, his push for industrialization 
required some extra motivation.78 
However, for the Stalinist propaganda machine, the Pope's protest 
seemed to justify the fear of a forthcoming attack; when the Pope and 
other foreign powers were protesting over religious persecutions in 
the USSR they seemed simply to be searching for an excuse for 
interventing. This touchiness which the Bolshevik regime showed in 
this press campaign was highlighted on 21 March 1930 by the editorial 
article of Pravda condemning prayer meetings for persecuted believers 
as a "full-field inspection of the forces of world counter-revolution." 
According to Pravda, the actual reason for these protests was the 
desire of the bourgeoisie to mobilize the masses for a "crusade" against 	 91 
the USSR.79 According to this rather original logic, the capitalists of 
the world were willing to utilize everything in order to undermine the 
first socialist state. For example, a certain G. Krunin claimed in 
Pravda of 14 March 1930 that the capitalist class will pull out from 
the "dust-bin of history" all potential means, from "the cross and the 
fascinating detail it is interesting to see how ordinary workers were harnessed to 
demonstrate against the "crusade of the Pope." See Pravda, 18 March 1939, No. 
76 (4521) "OTBeT TpyHaumxCB Ha aHTHCOBeTCKyIO KaMnaHHKO uepKOBHHKOB." 
Even Soviet scientists were obliged to express their dissatisfaction over the Pope's 
protest and appeal to the "working intelligentsia of the world." ."..PennrHsl y Hac 
He yrHeTaerest, a c pOCTOM CO3HaHHn IIIHpOKHX Macc tama Hc'ie3aeT TaK )Ke 
ecrecTBeHHo H 6e3 npHHy)xaeHHB. xax Hc9e3aeT npeapaccseTHMti TyMaH c 
BocxoaoM conHua. JiHueMepHas 3aM1HTa periHrHH - TOJIbKO 11)HrOBbIh JIHCTOK. 
KOTOpbIM npHKpbiBaeTcsi KnaccoBail npHpo,aa 3roro noxo,ta, OpraHH3OBaHHOFO 
npoTHB nepsoro rocyaapersa pa6o'lex H KpecTbslH." Pravda, 18 March 1930, 
No. 76 (4521) "Hay`IHbie pa60THHKH J1eHHHrpata — K TpyAOBOsi 
HHTemmireHUHH Bcero Mnpa." For a "positive reaction of foreign workers and 
symphatizers, see Pravda, 20 March 1930, No. 78 (9523); Pravda, 21 March 1930, 
No. 79 (4524). 
78 	 Tucker 1990, 74-76. See also Erlich 1960, 167-168. 
79 	 ...,IIeHb Mone6CTBH171 6bui pace—Hiram OprBHH3OBBH H npose teH KaK AeHb 
Hpe,gBapHTenbHOrO CMOTpa CHn MMpOBOcI KOHTppesomouHH...1'1MnepHaJlHCTbI 
npexpacuo noHHMaloT, `ITO AOBeCTH aHTHCOBeTCKyKO KaMnaHH,o Ao ee 
nors',ecxoro KOHua MO)KHO JIHMIb np$IMbIM pa3rpOMOM COBeTcxoro Co,oaa. A 
ASA 3T0r0 Hy)KHM SKOAN, Hy)Knbl Maccb,." Pravda, 21 March 1930, No. 79 (4524) 
"Knacc npoTHB xnacca." See also Pravda, 22 March 1930, No. 80 (4525) 
"HHxoMy He 3anyraTb COBeTCKHH C0103." 
Roman Pope" to oppose the Bolshevik party.80 The above reactions 
and the prolonged campaign against these Western protests reveal how 
sensitive the Soviet regime actually was when facing foreign pressure. 
Even the ostracized N.I. Bukharin (1888-1938) participated in this 
campaign against the Vatican and blamed the papacy for being in the 
service of "the world's counter-revolution."81 To sum up, the Soviet 
press followed anxiously all foreign reactions concerning the 
rumoured religious persecutions inside the USSR and aggressively 
denied all such accusations against it.82 
Together with a fervent press campaign, Soviet officials arranged 
on 15 February 1930 an interview of Metropolitan Sergii, who was 
at that time the acting head of the ROC. In this interview Sergii 
adhered to the Stalinist propaganda lines and, in accordance with the 
official Soviet response, condemned protests made by foreign church 
leaders. Sergii denied all allegations of religious persecutions and 
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	 collaboration with the Soviet state, and blamed the Pope for being 
hypocritical. According to Sergii, the Pope was actually defending 
English landlords and French-Italian magnates, and concealing the 
preparations being made for a war against the USSR. Sergii believed 
that the situation in the USSR was not so gloomy: churches were 
sometimes closed, but only in response to the demands of the local 
population, not the Godless-movement. He saw the future of the 
churches in a positive light, but also showed some distress over the 
rapid growth of atheism. However, he believed that the ROC would 
be able to continue its work although collectivization had brought 
80 ..r103TOMy H3 MycopHoro AniHKa HCTOpHH BbITaCKHBaeTCA AAA 6Opb6b1 C 
60nbnieBHKaMH BCe. 'TO BO3MOJKHO, BHAOTb 110 eBanrennsi H KpeCTa H nanbi 
pHMCKoro. TaKHM nyTeM HarnAgHo ,aeMOHCTpnpyeTCA nepea BceM 
Tpy1AH1HMCA 'Ienose`iecTBoM oprannvecxas CBA3b H TecnehHiag cnatKa 
Me)Bay eBaxrenseM. nanoh pHMCKHM H xynavecTBOM Pravda, 14 March 1930, 
No. 72 (4517) "Bopb6a 3a noBumeHHe TOBapHOCTH cenbCKOrO x0351NCTBa H 
KOHTpaTauHA." 
81 	 Pravda, 7 March 1930, No. 65 (4510) "<DHHaHCOBbni KanITan B MBHTHH Hanbl 
(naMcneT)." 
82 	 When one examines Politburo protocols and other so-called "special folderns" 
(oco6as nanKa) of the Politburo, it appears that this institution only payed 
attention to matters of religion when there was a need to react someway to foreign 
protests (i.e. foreign protests took place on behalf of the persecuted religious 
people). This was case when the Politburo faced foreign protests on behalf of 
Soviet Muslims. Therefore, the Politburo decided that the SCE and Agitprop 
should shed light on the real situation of the Muslims population in the USSR. 
RTsKhIDNI f.17, op. 162, d. 13 (Pp. 112, 16/8-32). 
about a deterioration in the circumstances of the church.83 
The above version of the interview was meant for public 
consumption84, but in his private memorandum to Smidovich of 19 
February 1930, Sergii exposed the real situation of the ROC. In this 
lengthy address, Sergii enumerated a list of problems relating to the 
excesses of harassment by local officials, the desperate economic 
situation of the clergy, over-taxation, "arbitrary" insurance rates, the 
closing down of churches by non-believers, etc.85 Moreover, Sergii 
demanded the rectifying of the Soviet Constitution of 1929, which 
denied the right to conduct religious propaganda!' 
It is very likely that foreign reaction mentioned above, reinforced 
Stalin's desire to save the harvest of 1930, causing him to write the 
famous article "Dizzy With Success: Problems of The Kolkhoz 
Movement", published on 2 March 1930. This initiative of Stalin had 
a cobra-like impact on the whole process of collectivization. By April 
1930, millions of peasants fled the kolkhozes and returned to their 	 93 
own farms. Consequently, the first phase of sovietizing the Russian 
countryside ended in confusion. The explanation for this hasty retreat 
of Stalin was simple; the chaos and peasant resistance during the 
83 	 RPTs I, 312-316. "IiHTepBblo c rnasol+ LIaTpHapmeil lIpasocnaeHoH LlepxsH 
B CCCP, 3aMecrHTeneM Harpaapmero MecTO6nIOCTHTenA MHTPOnonHTOM 
CeprHeM H ero CHHObOM (15.2.1930)." The interview was also signed by other 
church leaders such as Serafim, Metropolitan of Saratov (Aleksandrov), Aleksi 
(Simansky, Sergei Vladimirovich, 1877-1970, later Patriarch Aleksi I), Filipp, 
Archbishop of Zvenigorod (Gumilevsky,), Pitirim, Bishop of Orekhovo-Zuevo 
(Krylov). Pravda, 16 February 1930, No. 46 (4491). "0 nonoxceHHH 
npasocnaanoN uepxBH B CCCP." 
84 	 See also Pravda, 19 February 1930 "K nonoxceHHro npasocnasHoN uepKBH B 
CCCP. H3 HHrepsblo c mason narpnapmer'I npasocnasnoü uepxBH B CCCP, 
3aMecTHTeneM narpnapmero MecTo6nlocrHTenSi MHTPOHOAHTOM CeprneM, 
bannoro xoppecnonj[eHTaM HHOcrpannoN ne4arH B MocKBe." 
85 RPTs I, 317-320. "HaMATHaB 3anncxa 3aMeCTHTenSI HaTpxapmero 
MecTo6n1ocTHTenA MHTponOnHTa HHNCeropOucKoro CeprHB 0 Hy)KuaX 
Hpasocnaanon HaTpnapmeH LlepxBH B CCCP (19.2.1930)". See also RPTsKG, 
268 "HHCbMo MHTpononnra H.H. Crparopobcxoro H.E.[I'.!] CMHuosH4y 0 
Hy)Kbax HpasocnasHoli LlepxBH s CCCP 19 cpespanB 1930 r." 
86 	 "...21. BBHby ra3eTHbIX cTaTQN 0 He06X01HMOCTH nepecMOrpa KOHCTHTyuHH 
CCCP B CMblcne cOBepmeHHOrO 3anpemeHHA pennrHo3HON nponaraHbbl A 
banbHeNnIHX OrpaHH9eHHN LlepxOBHOH beBTenbHOCTH, npOCHM 3a11.01Tb1 H 
cOXpaHeHHA 3a 11paBOCnaBHON llepKOBbK) TeX HpaB, KaKHe npe3,OcraBneRbl eh 
beNCTByK)mHMH 3aKOHOHOAOACeHNSIMN CCCP..." RPTs I, 320. "HaMBTHaB 
3annCKa 3aMecTHTenB HaTpNapmero MeCTO6n10CTHTen5I MHTPOHOJIHTa 
HH)KeropOACKOrO CeprHA O HyACuaX HpasocnasnoH Harpnapmel; IIepKBH B 
CCCP (19.2.1930)." 
collectivization grew steadily before winter 1929-1930.87 
In order to save the 1930 harvest, Stalin spoke over the heads of 
his party officials and addressed the peasantry directly, declaring that 
he did not agree with the careless tempo of his own volunteers and 
apparatchiks. Stalin's démarche also had a perturbing effect on the 
Soviet religious policy as one of the matters Stalin criticized in his 
article was the over-zealous drive in Soviet religious policy. He 
mocked those "rrrevolutionaries" — with a triple r — who organized 
collective agriculture in order to confiscate church bells.88 
The above voice was "the master's voice" and the Central 
Committee was quick to respond: in its resolution of 14 March 1930 
it condemned all haste in the closing down of churches. Just as in 
Stalin's "Dizzy with Success" those, who were to be blamed for 
"excesses" were local party organs, who were advised to stop the 
"administrative" closure of churches, usually "disguised under the 
94 	 general will of the local people."89 Suddenly Soviet newspapers and 
87 	 See Radzinsky 1997, 265-266. 
88 ."...51 yxce He roBoplo o rex. c no3BoneHHA cKa3aTb, "peaonlouHoHepax". 
Komp Ie nano opraHH3aLHH aprenH Ha9HHaloT CO CHATHA C uepKBeil 
KOnOKOnOB. CHATb KOJIOKOna - nortyuaeulb KaKas pppeBoniouHOHHocm. SS 
12, 198. "I'onosoxpyxceHHe OT ycnexos. K BonpocaM KOAX03HOro ABHxceHHA." 
89 ."..HaKoHeu. LIK C9HTaeT Heo6XoJHMbIM OTMeTHTb COBep1IIeHHO 
HeJOnyCTHMble HCKPHBneHHA napTH1I110N JHHHH B o6naCTH 60pb6bl C 
peJHTHO3HbIMH npeApaCCyAKaMH, TaK )Ke K8K H B 0611aCTH TOBapOo60poTa 
Mc)KAy rOpOAOM H AepeBHeh. Mbl HMeeM B BHAy  å AMHHHCTPaTHBHOe 
3aKpbITHe UepKBeh 6e3 cornacHA noaaBnsuourero 60nbmHHCTBa ceJla, BeAynlee 
O6bPIHO K yCHneHH1O penHtH03HbIX npegpaccy2KoB...1IK C9HTaeT, 'TO 
aanbHehmHH POCT KOiiX031IOro ABH)KeHHA H JHKBHAaUHA KynageCTBa KBK 
KnaCCa HeB03MOKHbl 6e3 HeMeAneHHOI1 JHKBHAaUHH 3THX 
HCKpHBneHHt1...PeIUHTenbH0 HpeKpaTHTb npaKTHKy 3aKpbITHA UepKBecI B 
aAMHHHCTpaTHBHOM nOpAAKe. C)HKTHBHO npHKpb1BaeMy/0 061.1IeCTBeHHO-
A06pOBOnbHbIM )KenaHHeM HaCeneHHA . ,UOnyCKaTb 3aKPbITHe UepKBe i JlHmb 
B CJIy'ae AeHCTBHTenbHOrO >KeJ1aHHA HOAaBAAIOIUero 6oJ1bIHHCTBa KpeCTbAH 
H He HHa'ie, KaK C yTBeP)KAeHHA HOCTaHOBneHHN CXOAOB 06naCTHbIMH 
HCHOJIKOMaMH. 3a H3AeBaTeJIbcKHe BbIXOAKH B OTHOmeHHH peJH1HO3HbIX 
'IyBCTB KpeCTbAH H KpeCTbAHOK npHBJIeKaTb BHHOBHbIX K CTpo)Kahme11 
oTBeTcreeFHocrH." KPSSvr IV, 396-397. "IIocTaHoBneHHe LIK BKII (6) o 
60pb6e C HCKpHBJ1eHHAMH napTJIHHHH B KOJX03HOM ABH)KeHHH 14 Mapra 1930 
r." See also Pravda, 15 March 1930, No. 73 (4518) "0 6opb6e c HCxpllsneHHAMH 
napTJIHHHH B KOJIXO3HOM t,BH)KeHHH. BCeM UK HaupeCny6AHK, BceM KpaeBbIM, 
O6JIaCTHbIM, OKpy3KHbIM H pa iOHHbIM KOMHTeraM napTHH." This new policy 
towards religious matters was seen in the decision of Politburo on 25 March 1930. 
The Politburo had decided to organize demonstrations against these international 
protests (in the Soviet Union and abroad) but stressed in its resolutions that these 
demonstrations should anyhow employ aggressive slogans ("npoTHB 
all political figures were adapting themselves to this volte-face of 
Stalin. First to show its loyalty to their master's voice was, of course, 
the main newspaper Pravda, which in its articles started to rehash 
Stalin's new initiatives. For example, Pravda in the same number 
started to discuss the "excesses" in collectivization.90 The Soviet 
regime suddenly realized that, among other "excesses", spontaneous 
and hasty actions in the fight against religious "prejudices" had been 
harmful. In the view of the writer of Pravda's article, the "class 
enemies" and "right opportunists" had been able to utilize these 
"excesses" for their own ends 91 
However, we detect a slight difference when we compare the 
massive self-criticism over the "excesses" of collectivization and the 
nposoxaropoB,HHrepnenuHH,nporHB uepxoBHblx areHroa xannrana,npOTHB 
nanbl H apxnenacKonon") take care that there would be no provocations towards 
religious people. RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 780, II. 12- (Pp 121, 25/3-30). 
90 See, Pravda, 2 March 1930, No. 60 (4505) "Kro AonycxaeT neperH6bl B 
OTHomeHHH cepeJH$IKa, TOT noMoraeT xynaxy" (See also the vicious caricature 
made under the pseudonym Deni); Pravda, 4 March 1930, No. 62 (4507) "Yuap 
no cepejHnxy - ynap no KOnneKTHBH3aUHH", "YpoKH, KOTOpMe Hano ynecrb." 
91 ."..K 3TOMy HpHCOeAHH$HOTCH ewe oT,nenbHMe CpaKTbl BAMHHHCTpaTHBHOrO 
ronosoTanCTBa B 6opb6e C peJlnrHO3HbIMH npenpaccyAxaMH. YNCe 
MHOrOKpaTHO yKa3b1BaJOCb, 9TO ace 9TH neperH6bl H HCKpHBneHHn sIBJUII0TC51 
npnmoil ycnyroh HafHM KIIaCCOBbIM BparaM H BOAOti Ha MenbHHAy npaaoro 
onnopryHHsta." Pravda, 12 March 1930, No. 70 (4515). "3axpenarb 
npotuoeHHblH 	 3Tan 	 KOnneKTHBH3a1HH. 	 PeujHTenbHO 	 n Flex parwrb 
HcxpnsneHHs." See also how the Oblast Committee in the Leningrad area sent 
a memo concerning duties in antireligious activity. In it they also draw attention 
to "excesses" in the antireligious activity. However, the general tone of the memo 
was that the local officials should pay more attention to their antireligious activity 
in general. BLOK, 11 April, 1930 No. 7, 16. "06 oyepeoHblx 3auanax 
aHTHpennrHo3Hott pa6oru.(IIocraHosneHHe CexperapHara O6KoMa BKII(6) 
OT 19 Mapra 1930 r)." As an example of this cautious attitude we may examine 
the case of a certain Slepkov who was condemned in Pravda. According to this 
article, Slepkov had erroneously comprehended religion as being a private matter 
for workers and that the party fought against religion not only by economic means 
but also on an ideological front. The message of this article was to stress that 
religion could not be destroyed by "leftist phrases" that demanded the confiscation 
of church property. The only communist solution was to expand antireligious work 
among the workers and peasants. ."..Y Hero BbIxO tHT, YTO CTOHT 33Kpb1Tb Bce 
uepxBH H 1(0nOKOJ1 nepenarb B CTaHKH — H Aeno 6yAeT B mnane. CnenKOB 
"3a6bIBaeT", 'ITO B Hameil crpaHe HMeeTcsl pAA pel1HrH03HbIX CeKTaHTCKHX 
TegeHH11, y KOTOpMX HeT HH nepKBeil, HH KOJIOKOJIOB, H ace NCe 3TH Te'IeHH5i 
noxa `iTO cyutecrsylor...AHTHpenHrno3Haa nponaraHAa He MONCeT H He 
AOnNCHa npOBOAHTbcsl B nopnnke "nesoro" 3arH6a, a B Mepy pa3BeprMBaHHn 
MaccosoH pa6orbl cpejn pa6ovnx B KpeCTb$1HCKHX mace. Pravda, 15 March 
1930, No. 73 (4518) "OnepejHasl Bbin33K0 TOB. Cnenxona. IlporHB npasoro 
yxnoHa H "mesa" cppasbl." 
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petty worry over overdrives in antireligious activity. Nevertheless, 
Stalin's speech was enough to provoke self-criticism; on 14 March 
1930 Pravda published an exemplary "case" from Ukraine where some 
"lower organs" had been guilty of "administrative interferance in 
religious matters and the life of the church."92 It seems that the 
apparatchiks reacted to the message contained in Stalin's article by a 
face-saving solution; the party should condemn both the "right 
deviation" and "leftist phrases" in its antireligious activity. 
Inside the Soviet antireligious movement, "Dizzy with Success" 
proved a veritable bombshell. The Bezbozhnik movement suddenly 
realized that it was regarded as acting against the wishes of the 
"Vozhd." Actually, this could be regarded as the start of the gradual 
"withering away" of this movement. Its membership rose to 5.7 
million by 1932, but the importance of this organ began to decline 
simultaneously with the "quiet funeral" of the Cultural Revolution. As 
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	 we may see, the impact of Stalin's article was enormous; in one 
sentence he placed under suspicion all antireligious activities of the 
local organs. The only logical solution seemed to lie in more 
intensifying work in order to demonstrate the value of the SVB to 
Soviet society. So in 1932, the Central Council of the Bezbozhnik 
movement declared a 5-year plan to "liquidate" religion and to create 
a totally atheistic society by 1937. Moreover, the leader of the SVB 
movement, Yaroslaysky, was also forced to submit to his master's 
voice and inside the Central Council of the SVB movement he 
condemned the practise of hastily taking church bells, without any 
propaganda work having been conducted among the population. The 
will of the population was supposed to be the decisive factor in this 
process.93 
The new tone of Stalin made the Cult Commission in Moscow 
92 Pravda, 14 March 1930, No. 72 (4517). "H3BpauteHHe Ampex-Hs 
npaBHrenbcrsa." See also Powell 1978, 31. 
93 YIV, 115-116, 118-119 "floxnaa Ha II nnenyMe UK CBS CCCP 20 Marra 
1930 r." See also YI, 170-171. "He nonycxarb nepern6oB B 6opb6e c 
penHrxen : Roslof 1994, 275-276. According to Daniel Penis, it was also the 
Stalinist homogeneous policy itself which gradually suffocated the SVB 
movement. ."..The homogenizing pall of high Stalinist political culture that had 
emerged by the early 1930s obviated the need for open, institutional politics as 
such...religion has been defeated. The League was no longer necessary and quickly 
collapsed." Penis 1995, 362. However, according to Larry E. Holmes the SVB 
movement was revitalized during the late 1930s and the membership rose from 
2 million (1937) to 3 million by 1941. Holmes 1993, 145-146. 
suddenly realize that "local" organs had been guilty of numerous 
"violations" against Soviet law and that it had an urgent need to 
"rectify" this activity.94 The question of "violations" against Soviet 
legality were later discussed seriously at the special meeting of the 
CSCRQ on 6 April 1930 (attending were Smidovich, Krasikov, 
Pronin, Tuchkov and Vladimirova). At this meeting, the Cult 
Commission decided to report to the VTsIK Presidium some of the 
violations made by local officials. According to this list of misdeeds, 
priests were illegally expelled from towns and villages; this internal 
exile was usually executed by raskulachivanie action. During the 
"de-kulakization" local officials confiscated the house of an individual 
priest and expelled his family out of the village. Moreover, the 
committee called attention to the fact that in some places the servants 
of cults were automatically expelled to limber camps or priests were 
put doing hard labour. The CSCRQ summed up this list by remarking 
that local organs usually imposed "back-breaking taxes" on all servants 
of cults, thus making their life a misery.95 
As a way of stabilizing the situation, the commission proposed that 
local officials should treat priests as they did other citizens. For 
example, the commission remarked that officials should not as a rule 
confiscate the houses of those servants of cults who were not kulaks. 
Local officials could, officially, freely decide about the social status 
of priests; whether they were kulaks or not. Usually they were 
categorized as kulaks. Moreover, internal deportations could be 
implemented for priests only by recourse to the same procedures as 
utilized for ordinary citizens. According to the Cult Commission, the 
whole question of priests should be resolved by creating experimental 
agricultural "colonies" for those servants of cults, who had given up 
their duties, and those who did not have any income (priests without 
a parish). In financial matters local organs should not act 
independently; taxes on priests should be imposed in accordance with 
real income and, as a rule, should not exceed 100 percent of their 
income. Therefore the inspection of the local financing organs in this 
matter should be given to the official procuracy. Moreover, prayer- 
94 	 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 6. " LIHK" aM ACCP. xpaHHcno7lxoMaM H o6nacrxoMaM 
HKIO PCOCP." 
95 GARF f. 5263, op.l, d. 1 (pkvk 9, 6/4 1930). 
97 
houses should not be subjected to any "punitive-insurance rates."96 
From this time on, some of the party bosses inside the VTsIK and the 
Cult Commission started to make discreet attempts to restrict the "illegal" 
acts of local officials. As mentioned above, it was Stalins article "Dizzy 
with success" which inspired these calls about "revolutionary legality" or 
complaints about "excesses." The term "revolutionary legality" was an 
example of the famous Bolshevik jargon that could be utilized in the 
most divergant ways. On the one hand, the hardliners of the Soviet regime 
comprehended it as an excuse for harsh methods against class enemies. 
On the other hand, "moderate" Communists understood it as a way of 
observing "normal" legal forms. It is hard to judge how sincerely this 
expression was used in the discussion inside the Soviet regime. 
Nevertheless, in some cases the worry over "revolutionary legality" and 
local misbehaviour seems have been quite genuine. For example, if we 
examine the letters of a certain Kotomkin to Georgy (Sergo) 
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	 Konstantinovich Ordzhonikidze (1886-1937) we find that this 
high-ranking secretary (the PredVTsIK and the VTsIK) quite frankly 
revealed the intolerable situation among the clergy. The source of his 
information came from ordinary people who complained to the head of 
the state — Kalinin — about the religious persecutions. In his letter 
Kotomkin revealed that Kalinin had received a myriad of protests in 
which ordinary people complained (see Table II.2) about the total lack 
of "revolutionary legality" in relation to lishentsy.97 
In this letter Kotomkin listed twenty-six exemplary cases in which 
the local officials had over-taxed some member of the clergy and 
when they were not able pay these taxes (money, potatoes, grain, 
livestock...etc.). As a result of this semi-official blackmail, local 
96 	 GARF f. 5263, op.l, d. 1 (pkvk 9, 6/4 1930). 
97 ."..HHKaKHX npH3HaKOB aneMeHTapHoi peBOJIKHIHOHHoh 3aK0HHOCTH no 
OTHOmeHH o K HHM, KBK J1HIIIeHIIaM. He CyllteCTByeT. Ha Mecrax uapin 
nOnHbI41 npOH3BOn H HenOHHMaHHe nOJIHTHKH naprHH B 3TOM HOJIHTH4eCKH 
Ba)KHOM Bonpoce. Bce MepOnpHATHA °prams McCTHOYI BnaCTH HanpaBneHHbl 
K TOMy. 4T06bI 3a0AHO C KynaKaMH "paCKyna4HTb H cny)KHTeneil KynbTa. 
3TO He3aKOHHOe paCKyna4HBaHHe npOH3BOAHTCA HOA BHAOM Hanoroaoro 
o6noxceHHA...." GARF f. 5263, op. I, d. 7, rol. 2. "1114K. BKII(6) TOB. 
OpA)KoHHKHA3e 14/III -30." In 1929 the commission received 5242 complaints 
and dealt with 5473 cases. Next year the amount of complaints increased to 17 
637 cases. In 1931 the commission received 12 350 complaints from Soviet 
citizens. See GARF f. 5263, op. I, d. 43. "LUHcppoabie cBeueHHa o Ncano6ax H 
nepenHCKe. nOCTynHBWBI1 no BonpocaM. CB$I3aHHbIM C KYJ1bTMH 3a 1924-1934 
officials had imprisoned these priests and sentenced them to internal 
exile and, as a rule, the security organs had confirmed these sentences. 
Kotomkin's letter is a revealing document; it clearly shows how the 
VTsIK and its officials were totally unable to control the situation in 
the provinces. For instance, when the VTsIK insisted on having an 
explanation from below, the local officials could easily defend 
themselves and their policy of closing the churches. They only 
claimed, as a certain Goryatsev did, that local Soviet officials were 
surrounded by hostile enemies — lishentsy — constituted 20% of the 
population of that particular place. Moreover, it was the masses of 
the local population, as Goryatsev stated in his reply to higher organs, 
that had actually demanded the closing down of churches.98 
As a result of its meeting dealing with these "excesses", the VTsIK 
announced on 20 May 1930 a declaration to the all TsIK's in the 
autonomous Soviet republics, krais, and oblasts in which the local 
organs were blamed for many violations such as the illegal 
confiscations of churches, over-taxation of religious premises and 
clergy, restricting the right to live wherever one wanted and all sorts 
of violations of "revolutionary legality." However, official worry over 
the mistreatment of the servants of cults seemed to have been limited 
to maintaining appearances. For example, when the VTsIK demanded 
that local officials should not let raskulachivanie servants of cults and 
their family-members settle down in public places, such as squares 
and municipal buildings lest their poor plight cause a scandal. The Soviet 
regime was apparently worried over the impact of wandering destitute 
families of priests. Moreover, according to the VTsIK, these people could 
not join cooperative farms. As a final accolade the VTsIK announced 
that local officials should not allow anything to happen that could hurt 
the feelings of believers. This quite inconsistent administrative order was 
signed by Kalinin, the secretary of the VTsIK, A.S. Kiselev (1879-1938) 
and a consultant of the CSCRQ, Vorobev.99 
98 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 7, rol. 2. See especially how local officials defended 
themselves: GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 7, rol. 2. "IIpeuceuarenlo 
npaBHTenbcrBeHHON KOMHCCHH HO xne6osarorosxaM npH COBeTe Tpyaa H 
O6opoHbl 10/1-30." See also Slavko 1995, 63. 
99 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 8. IleHTpanbHblM HCnoJmHTeJIbHbIM KOMHTeTaM 
aBTOHOMHbIX pecny6nHK, KpaeBMM H O6JIaCTHLIM HCHOJIHHTeJIbHbIM 
KOMHTeTaM." As seen in the instructions given after Stalin's speech, the blame 
was put on local officials who were seen to be guilty. The instruction 
demanded:."..HeMeuJIeHHOMy HCnpaBJleHHIO uonyweHHMx McCTHbIMH 
99 
The real impact of "Dizzy with success" proved of short duration; 
although party officials paid lip-service to "excesses", the wave of 
collectivization was already under way. Quite soon afterwards Stalin 
made intimations that his article "Dizzy with success" only had a 
tactical value; in June 1930 Stalin himself praised the achievements 
of collectivization100 and in 1931-1932 masses of peasants were forced 
back to sovkhozes and kolkhozes. As time went by, the local officials 
realized that Stalin's article had been a mere manoeuvre and the Soviet 
regime was bent on total collectivization. Consequently, the calls for 
a more moderate religious policy and "revolutionary legality" proved 
futile and the Cult Commission was obliged to repeat its powerless 
protests against local excesses.10' 
The outcome of this short-lived détente was a spate of re-openings 
of churches. As we can detect from the documents, the decision to 
re-open churches did not come easily; in its first meeting on 26 March 
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	 1930, the CSCRQ had a lengthy discussion concerning this matter. In 
the official protocol, the whole discussion was dealt with by a short 
remark that there had been some "argumentative questions" when 
dealing with the matter. However, the Cult Commission had to pay 
attention to this new line and in its next meeting on 26 July 1930 it 
decided to re-open 12 churches. This wave of re-openings continued 
but gradually the CSCRQ also began to give more negative answers. 
For example, at its meeting on 16 September 1930, the Cult 
Commission decided to give permission to open 19 churches and to 
close 9 churches and one synagogue.102 
opranaMH HapyweHH i." See GARF f. 5263, op.l, d. 6 "LIHK"aM ACCP. 
xpauHcnonxoMaM H oOnHcnoJlxoMaM. HKIO PC<DCP." See also RPTsKG, 294. 
100 SS 12, 261-262, 280-290. "II0nHTH9ecKHh oTwer LIeHTpanbHoro KOMHTeTa 
XVI cbewty BK1I (6)." For the sake of interest, see how the Trotskyite opposition 
in exile commented on the events of the early 1930s and Stalin's letter "Dizzy 
with Success." Stalin's letter was viewed as "a capitulation" in "the face of 
bourgeois pressure." See BO 1930, No.11, 34-35. See also the reaction of the 
Orthodox émigré, Maslov 1937, 121-122. 
101 The local officials realized quite soon that Stalins speech had been a manouvre 
in order to save the harvest and before Christmas 1930 the local officials were 
busy in planning anti-Christmas campaigns. See BLOK, 20 December, 1930, No. 
26, 11. "0 nposegennn aHTHpoNCAecrseHcxoh xaMnaHHH (lIocranosnenne 
cexperapnara O6nacrxoMa BKH(6) OT 8/XII-30 r.)" 
102 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 1. (pkvk 10, 26/3, 1930); (pkvk II, 26/7 -3930); (pkvk 
13, 16/9-1930). As time went by the amount of negative answers increased; on 
16 May 1931, the commission gave permission to open 6 churches and ordered 
37 others to be closed. In June 1931, the commission gave permission to open 
As a matter of fact, Stalin's article only caused a brief interlude in 
the frontal attack against the religious organizations in the USSR. At 
the same time the practice of looting church bells continued with a 
gradual tempo and even the VTsIK and CSCRQ were obliged to give 
a "categorical order" that church bells should be confiscated only from 
those churches that had been restricted from ringing bells.'03 
As a result of this letter, Soviet officials attempted to avoid the 
most obvious forms of harassing religious organizations. The basic 
attitude was, anyhow, the same — to exploit churches and gradually 
liquidate religious organizations. This more refined attitude was put 
to the test when local officials invented a new method of control: the 
re-registration of parishes. This was, of course, a hidden threat against 
churches. On the one hand, the Soviet regime was eager to know how 
much it could confiscate from religious organizations and organized 
an inventory of ecclesiastical property. On the other hand, by means 
of tight registration formalities, the government was able to liquidate 	 101 
a certain percentage of the parishes and confiscate their property at 
once. This new policy was also discussed in the orders given to local 
inspectors in Leningrad on 27 November 1931; these officials were 
supposed to concentrate on compiling an inventory of ecclesiastical 
property, on re-registration of contracts with parishes, supervision of 
these parishes and, interestingly enough, supporting Renovationist 
parishes "within the limits of the law."104 
However, when examining the general situation, we may say that 
Stalin's lip service to "revolutionary legality" also had a more solid 
impact on Soviet religious policy. The central organs now had a 
weapon against the autonomous actions of local officials. Especially 
the local Soviet security and judicial organs did not want to comply 
with orders coming from the VTsIK or the CSCRQ. The burning 
20 churches and at the same time closed 35 others. See GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 
9. (pkvk 5, 16/5-31); GARF f. 5263, op. I, d. 9, (pkvk 6, 16/6-31). According to 
Sheila Fitzpatrick:..."for a number of years after savage onslaught against religion 
of 1929-30 and its abrupt halt, the states policy towards rural priests and believers 
was relatively tolerant." Fitzpatrick 1994, 210. 
103 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 14, rol. 2. "HOCTOHHHON KOMHccHH no sonpocau 
KynbTOB npn Hpe3H2sHyMe BIIHK 4 uexa6px 1931." 
104 TsGA SPb f. 1000, op. 48, d. 77,1. 123. "BceM HananbHHKaM roppattapMHHHcoT-
,genos H 3aBOAO13, paNaaMHHHaa3opa J1eHHHrpa.acxoii o6nacTH 11.1.1931"; 
TsGA SPb f. 1000, op. 48, d. 77, II. 188 "Hporoxon Ho.4. CoseulaHHA 
HHcnexropos KynsroB r. Jlexxxrpa,aa OT 27/X -31 r.." See also the situation 
in Moscow in the early 1930s, see Shimotomai 1991, 4. 
question was: how to execute the policy of the central organs, how 
to control the periphery which was conducting its own policy? 
This was also realized by the Cult Commission when at its meeting 
on 19 February 1932 it acknowledged the prevailing contradictory 
situation. The CSCRQ had realized that the local organs were not 
complying with the VTsIK's circular dated 20 April 1930. The 
commission comprehended suddenly (just as Sergii had stressed in his 
private protest against the prevailing religious political situation) that 
there were too few impartial local officials dealing with this matter. 
As the commission put it, there existed "improper behaviour by local 
judicial organs" when dealing with religious organizations. Therefore 
the Cult Commission required "second instances" to deal with matters 
related to religious organizations and servants of cults.'o5 
Moreover, during the next meeting on 16 April 1932 the Cult 
Commission listed more detailed "errors" such as "nonformality" 
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	 (HeocpopMneHHocrb) and the "weak implementation of established 
legal standards" (c.na6oe BbInOJiHexxe ycTaHOB.nexxblx 3aKOHOM 
HopM) when liquidating prayer houses. The commission finally 
decided that there was a need to stipulate new laws which should 
regulate this problem.'o6 
The problem, however, was that the Cult Commission had no means 
to enforce its resolutions or demands for more "revolutionary legality." 
At first, the Soviet regime had tried, as we have seen above, to 
consolidate the position of the CSCRQ by legal actions; by officially 
regulating the position, the goals and missions of the CSCRQ from 
the central commission to the grass-roots level.107 The main problem, 
however, remained: how to handle local officials. The first proposal 
with respect to handling such local officials was initiated by the 
secretariat of the VTsIK on 9 June 1932. Their solution was to 
organize an inspection of the local situation — this secret proposition 
written by the secretary of the VTsIK Novikov, stressed that the Cult 
Commission should conduct an inspection inside local regions and 
later inform the fraction of the leading party working in the Presidium 
105 	 ...11pH3HaTb. 'ITO cy.ae6Ha51 HpaKTHKe Ha MecTaX BIIJIOTb tO COB BTOpOIi 
HHCTBHUHH no OTHOIHeHH10 K ;lens/ Cny)KHTenell KyJIbTa H penHrHO3HbIX 
06HtecTB HART B 3Ha4HTeJu,Hoh CTefeHH B HapytueHHe uapxynapa 
rlpe3H2HyMa 20.4.1930." GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 15 (pkvk 1, 19/2, 1932). 
106 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 15 (pkvk 2, 16/4, 1932). 
107 SURc, No. 27. 15 June 1931, 357-360. See published instructions concerning the 
duties and structures of the CSCRQ, see ZOK, 108-125, 126-130. 
of the VTsIK on the facts which contradicted the "line of the party 
and the state" in this matter.108 
However, it seems that local officials had also more "concrete" 
reasons to persecute religious organizations. The local Soviet organs 
had always a chronic lack of money and it led the locals to squeeze 
money from religious organizations. This practice was both 
ideologically acceptable and it appeared that demanding taxes of all 
kinds from priests and believers turned out to be a profitable business. 
The local Cult Commissions could do little when facing the "local 
mafia." All they could do, as a certain circular to the Leningrad rik 
reveals, was to send letters of warning and orders to stop this kind of 
behaviour. In any event, as a following circular put it, the local 
officials just "loved" religious celebrations in order to be able to 
blackmail believers.'09 
The decision to gain information and supervise the activity of local 
officials guided the religious political practices of the Cult 	 103 
Commission in 1929-1932. In order to fight against the excesses of 
local officials and to reclaim its authority in the Soviet religious 
policy, the CSCRQ needed basic information on the prevailing 
situation in the provinces. Earlier the only source of information had 
been the material coming from the VTsIK, from the protests and 
petitions of religious organizations to president Kalinin. Now the 
commission wanted to obtain information straight from the 
provinces.110  
108 "..HpeJuTo mTb KOMHCCHH no KynbTaM np0H3B8CTH Ha MeeTe paccneAOsaHHe 
(1aKTOB H3BpaWIeHH$ JIHHHH naprHH H npasHrenbcrsa n0 AaHHOMy sonpocy 
H BHeCTM Ha paccMorpenne ()paxuHH BKII(6) IIpe3HAHyMa BL[i3K Amin( o 
AeBTenbHOCTH MOCTHb1X opraHos C BbI3OBOM npeAcraBHTene9 0Tt J1bnb1X 
MBCTHbIX opraHos. KOTOpbIMH 6bInH AonymeHb1 HaH6onbWHe HapyUIeHHA 
3axoHortaTenbcTBa 0 KynbTaX." GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 6. "BbInHCKa H3 
cexperHoro npnno)KeHHA K nporoKony Ho. 29 COseH1aHHA Cexperapsl BLIIHK 
c ero 3aMecTHTeJI MH OT 9 HIOHA 1932 roua." 
109 TsGA SPb f.1000, op.48, d. 77a, 1. 53. "BceM pHxaM H ropcoseraM 
,11eHHHrpaucKOc1 06naCTH H HHcnexropaM no AenaM penHrHO3H61X KynbTOB 
npH paricoserax F. JIeHHHrpaaa. L[HpKynslpHo." 
110 The local CSCRQ was always dependent on other organs. For example, the actual 
"dirty work" of the party's antireligious activity in Leningrad was executed by 
special military units under the GPU. TsGA SPb f. 1000, op.51, d. 27. See also 
Shinkarchuk 1995, 73. In 1931 the Cult Section of the NKVD was fused with 
the CSCRQ. GARF f. 1235, op. 73, d. 1649, roll (pkvk 18, 16/1-31); GAFR f. 
5263, op. I, d. 9. (pkvk 18, 16/1 1931). The intention of this act was to consolidate 
the position of the CSCRQ in Moscow and strengthen its authority in regard to 
local officials. GARf f. 1235, op. 76, d.21 "llocranosnenne llpe3HArlyMa 
Summing up the activity of the Cult Commission during the years 
1929-1932, it is captivating to realize that although the Cult 
Commission had rather limited powers to decide the outlines of Soviet 
religious policy, it played a substantial role, as mentioned above, as 
a court of appeal between the demands of local militant atheists and 
local believers. As a matter of fact, decisions to close or open churches 
constituted one of the few things this commission could take care of 
quite independently. When investigating the piles of delo's coming 
from this organ, one has to conclude that decisions to close churches 
or to open them seem to have constituted the real battlefield of the 
CSCRQ. In this work the Cult Commission was compelled to vacillate 
between the demands of militant atheists — of those who were for 
closing all churches — as well as deal with complaints coming from 
local believers who appealed to the VTsIK. Moreover, the documents 
of this organ are filled with demands for more "revolutionary legality" 
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	 and fewer "spontaneous" acts from local party officials, a fact which 
clearly contradicts the belief that the religious policy of the early 
1930s and the policy of the CSCRQ were conducted in a spirit of 
total destruction. On the contrary, there is evidence that indicate that 
the opposite was the case. The pressure from below and the pressure 
from abroad did, as a matter of fact, have an effect on the religious 
policy of the Soviet state. Even the sudden change of direction in 
Stalin's religious political initiatives such as his article "Dizzy with 
Success" were partly initiated by foreign reactions to Soviet 
campaigns. 
According to Terry D. Martin, the Cult Commission was in general 
trying to appease religion. He characterizes the role of the CSCRQ 
as a great appeaser working on behalf of the Soviet proletariat; trying 
to build up a détente between the Communist system and the needs 
of the Soviet people. According to Martin..."they [the protocols of the 
CSCRQ meetings] reveal that the commission virtually never 
attempted to increase religious persecutions on any issue, but rather 
at almost every meeting attempted in some way to alleviate it." Martin 
has stressed that this was partly because the Soviet state wanted to 
BcepoccHHcxoro 1ZeHTpanbHoro iicnoAHHTeJ]bftoro KoMHTera o6 
yTBep»CAeHHH IIOAOJKeHHA 0 nOCTOAHHOH 1ZeHTpaJIbHOH H MeCTHbIX 
KOMHCCHAX no paCCMOTpeHHK) peAHrHO3HbIX BOnpOCOB 30 MBA 1931." See also 
GARF f. 1235, op. 76, d.21, 1. 21 ..0 nOCTOAHHOH üeHTpanbxoH H MeCTHbIX 
KOMHCCHAX no paCCMOTpeHHK) BOHpOCOB KyJIbTOB." 
preserve its "friendly" image among the population.' 1 ' Perhaps this 
was the case, but nonetheless, it seems that Martin is overestimating 
the appeasing nature of the Cult Commission in its role as an 
instrument of Soviet religious policy. According to documentary 
material it seems that the Cult Commission was trying to follow the 
general line of the party and that this commission was against a 
"voluntary" and "anarchist" religious policy and for a coordinated 
religious policy. 
Gradually the tide turned against the "interventionists" in Soviet 
religious policy. The bureaucracy inside the Cult Commission and 
VTsIK could now start to collect the data and regulate the activities 
of local officials by sending their own men and women to the 
provinces and making their own inspections when the turmoil of the 
early 1930s was calmed down. The period of the "good years" of the 
1930s was now ahead. 
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111 Martin 1995b, 146. 
III The years of 
stabilization and 
consolidation of the 
committee's position 
(1933-1935) 
1. The "good years" of the 1930s and the 
ambivalent relaxation of antireligious 
campaigns 
As described by Professor Nicholas Timaseff, Soviet society 
experienced its second set-back — a kind of strategic retreat — in the 
early and mid-1930s. This should, of course, only be interpreted as 
Timaseff's personal opinion, which he expressed in the heat of the 
battles of the World War II. In Timaseff's view, Soviet Communism 
was obliged to recognize its failures in the battle against the old 
society and capitalism. It was the idea of communism that had gone 
bankrupt when the first pyatiletka appeared to be a "grotesque 
delusion." For Timaseff this had been the fatal moment for Soviet 
rule; from that time onward, the Soviet system was forced to accept 
more and more ideological concessions that would inevitably lead to 
a restoration of capitalism in Russia.' 
Timaseff's views were taken seriously during his time. We are also, 
of course, entitled to argue whether he was correct or not. However, 
the undeniable fact remains that there was, indeed, a substantial 
1 	 Timaseff 1943, 150-156. 
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change in the ideological atmosphere in the Soviet Union after the 
Cultural Revolution. This so-called "Great Retreat", which Timaseff 
mentioned, coincided with the "good years" of the 1930s.2 
The background of this change is obvious: the dreadful ghost of 
famine was nearly gone in 1934. Furthermore, Soviet industry was 
recovering. As a matter of fact, even collectivized agriculture was 
slowly convalescing after the turmoil of the years 1929-1931. 
Ironically, the change in the ideological atmosphere coincided with 
the partial retreat towards traditional values. 
The escape to old traditions was apparent everywhere in the Soviet 
society. Gradually, the harassment and baiting of bourgeoise 
specialists, so-called spetsedstvo, was a diminishing phenomenon.3  
Moreover, the Soviet "sexual Thermidor" coincided with more 
conservative family life, school curricula were reshaped together with 
the adoption of school uniforms. In addition, certain old "bourgeois" 
features, such as dance halls, reappeared in Moscow. Moreover, in 
the mid-1930s, Soviet high art, cinema and theatre gradually adopted 
a new appreciative approach towards the "positive features" of old 
Russian culture!' 
Nevertheless, in the middle of this lovely idyll, Stalin was already 
planning his next step towards total dictatorship. The détente during 
the 1930s was a delusive phantom - the master himself was devising 
a plan for total revenge in order to settle his scores with his own 
party. In public, nevertheless, everything seemed to be normal: the 
Soviet mass media were exuberantly celebrating Stakhanovism, heroic 
polar explorers, and highlighting new joyous victories in the Soviet 
economy. Even so the mood of public joy and overflowing optimism 
of the Communist party were only one part of the picture. On the one 
hand, the Vozhd himself seemed to be promising better times to his 
people when he declared in 1935 that "life's getting better, life's 
2 	 See, N.S. Timaseff: The Great Retreat. New York. 1946. According to Jerry F. 
Hough, the term itself, Great Retreat, is somewhat ambiguous and Western 
commentators have not been able to shed light on the more significant questions 
such as "retreat from what?." See Hough 1984, 242-243. On the changes in the 
political culture and atmosphere from the Cultural Revolution until the 1930s, see 
Fitzpatrick 1984b, 153-154; Barber 1990, 9-10. See also VOG, 15 November, 
1935, No. 29. "3BontouHoHHpyer nH COBeTCKas Bnacm?" 
3 	 Joraysky 1961, 135-136; Lewin 1984, 57, 67-70. 
4 	 Stites 19906, 386-391; Stites 1992, 72-78, 94-97; Andrle 1994, 204-205; 
Khlevnyuk 1996, 106-107. See also Medvedev 1984, 205-206. 
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getting happier" ("xu4Tb cTaJIo nyzIule, AHTb cTaJlo seceneii!"). On 
the other hand, to begin with, Stalin was silently getting rid of his 
former allies in the Cultural Revolution. These overly ardent 
communists, interestingly enough, after a few years of heroic 
campaigns, were removed in the first significant party purge of 1932-
33, so-called chistka. These vigilantes — communists of worker-
peasant origin — who had shone in the collectivization and industriali-
zation campaigns, were usually simply expelled from the ranks of the 
party. This rather lenient "cleansing" was accomplished by with-
drawing party membership cards (so-called proverka) from the 
"unworthy." From now on, this new wave of cleansing the party was 
enforced by the actions of the security organs, which, according to 
this new policy, were reorganized and renamed. The old OGPU was 
abolished and absorbed into the new NKVD, which, at first, took a 
more civilian outlook than its revolutionary predecessors. In actual 
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	 fact, during the years 1933-1936 Soviet officials were energetically 
imposing limitations on the NKVD. In order to protect individual 
rights, the troiki, three-person field courts, were disbanded in 1934. 
Soviet society as a whole seemed to be moving towards regular 
judicial procedures. It is interesting to note that everything took place 
under the new slogans of the mid-1930s; these new demands of the 
party were expressed as an urge to be "cultured" (KynbTypHLIH 6bIT).5 
The mastermind of this new volte-face was, as in the case of earlier 
sudden changes of policy, Stalin himself. He and his close colleagues, 
after the era of ideology (1928-1931) were now starting to favour 
more traditional Great-Russian values in music, literature, education, 
newspapers. However, the logic of the one-party system required a 
constant warfare against potential enemies: purges inside the ruling 
party and the supervision of subordinated people. So, as a consequence 
of the Stalinism, the breathing-spell of "the good years", 1933-1935, 
proved to be only a short interlude. 
Stalin's political motivation was simple: he wanted to consolidate 
his own power by means of a new détente. In one sense, Stalin's 
5 	 See, for example, Pravda 20 February, 1932 No. 50 (5215). "KynbTypHo- 
Maccosyto pa6oTy B 6pxra,gbi. Ha yYacrxH." See also Fitzpatrick 1984b, 
146-153; Geldern & Stites 1995, 237-243; Khlevnyuk 1996, 129-132; Thurston 
1996, 2-4; Bergman 1997, 57-92. For official purges of the party, in which over 
1.6 million people were expelled from the party, see Schröder 1992, 166-167. 
For Western evaluations on the role of the culture during the communist 
revolutions, see Meyer 1972, 360-367. 
position was indeed firmer than ever. In the early 1930s the victories 
of collectivization and industrialization seemed to be complete with 
the political apotheosis of Stalin. The XVII party congress, "the 
congress of victors", which took place in 1934, officially constituted 
Stalin's triumph. However, this façade of Stalinist unity and the 
general optimistic mood hid the possibility of quiet rebellion inside 
the party. In the middle of the XVII congress — nearly simultaneously 
with the lofty accolades to the great Gensec — certain local party 
bosses made a cautious attempt to dethrone Stalin.6 
According to rumours, which historians have usually repeated 
without any clear evidence, some of the old party cadres had 
contemplated overthrowing Stalin and replacing him with S.M. Kirov 
(1886-1934), the party leader from the Leningrad area. Moreover, 
according to some observers, when voting for a new Central 
Committee, at least 166 delegates out of 1225 crossed out Stalin's 
name. Consequently, this nameless opposition and the quiet 
discussions previously mentioned were enough to embitter Stalin in 
the middle of his triumph and, as some historians have claimed, this 
filled him with a desire for revenge.' 
Nonetheless, in public, the exultant tones of the XVII congress 
seemed to imply that a lengthy period of political détente should 
prevail. All signs were promising: ex-oppositionists were allowed to 
work inside the party and in July 1934, as a gesture of liberalization, 
the notorious OGPU was replaced by a new security organ — the All 
Union NKVD under the leadership of G.G. Yagoda (1891-1938). 
This mild détente was also apparent in relation to religion. When 
reading the main Soviet newspapers, such as Pravda and Izvestiya one 
cannot help noticing that the number of antireligious articles 
diminished greatly after 1932. Henceforth, it was only occasionally 
that these newspapers published some short notices about harmful 
manifestations of religion. Compared with the massive piles of 
antireligious articles of the early 1930s, this change is quite 
significant.' 
6 	 Conquest 1993, 178. 
7 	 Conquest 1993, 177-178. For the opposition against Stalin, see NR, 74-101. See 
Thurston's critical evaluation on missing voting ballots and the conspiracy created 
by Stalin. Thurston 1996, 20-23. 
8 	 For some occasional notices and "horror stories" concerning religion (a priest had 
led a league of thieves, a teacher with a religious background had caused the 
suicide of a child, etc.) see Pravda, 12 February 1935, No. 42(6288) "Hon no 
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The relative relaxation is obvious from the records of the XVII 
congress, where the delegates hardly ever mention religion or 
antireligious work. The ideological warfare against this enemy was 
not in full swing any more. Only Yaroslaysky drew the attention of 
the party members to Soviet religious policy and maintained that the 
party should not be too confident on overcoming religion. The class 
struggle and the fight against religion should actually now coincide. 
As Yaroslaysky stated... 
."..But it would not be right to relax because we have put an end 
to religion. Comrade Stalin has warned us against such false 
rejoicing and serenity that originate from ideas like "we have 
entered a classless society, which means that we may ease down 
the class war", or that "we must put down our weapons and go to 
take a nap while waiting for the emergance of the classless 
110 	 society."9 
Religion was, according to Yaroslaysky, liquidated not by waiting but 
by fighting, because... 
."..religion and religious organizations are up to this moment a risk 
for the working class and peasantry, they have concealed the 
surviving remnants of the capitalist elements (in our society) 
nurturing their ideology. To root out and cast out all the relics in 
the economy and in the consciousness of people is impossible 
without rooting out religious ideology which is not less vivid than 
nationalistic ideology and has concealed a whole package of 
counter-revolutionary organizations."10  
In fact, this citation of Yaroslaysky's illustrates the basic dilemma of 
the Soviet religious policy during the "good years" of the 1930s; the 
partial relaxation in matters of religion, such as the whole interlude 
of 1933-1935, was in actual fact partly an illusion. On the one hand, 
the Stalinist leadership wanted to consolidate its political mandate 
ruse macKH rpa6HreneIi"; Pravda, 15 February 1935, No. 45(6291) "SoNcbsi 
Marepb'; Pravda, 24 February 1935, No. 54(6300) "CaMoy6HHcrso 1HxonbHHxa'; 
Pravda, 11 April 1935, No. 100(6346) "0 6paxoHbepax. ceneuxe H none"; 
Pravda, 13 April 1935, No. 102(6348) "C nonoM B coloae"; Pravda, 28 June 1935, 
No. 176(6422) " 3sepcxasl pacnpasa." 
9 	 SXVIT, 297. 
10 	 SXVII, 297-298. 
among the ordinary people and favoured a more moderate policy in 
relation to old traditional values. On the other hand, the Soviet regime 
was gradually tightening its political grip on newly established 
collective farms, factories and plants. Moreover, the machine of terror 
that had been launched at the beginning of the 1930s continued its 
search for the enemies of the people. As a matter of fact, during 
1933-1935 the Soviet security apparatus was increasingly discovering 
new "nests of sabotage." Together with a more intense quest for 
suspected terrorists, the security apparatus was gathering evidence and 
in nearly every newspaper announcements appeared of trials against 
some new "enemies of the people or terrorist formations." These usual 
enemies, kulaks and lishentsy, had been wiped out at the beginning 
of the 1930s and the Russian peasantry suffered a fatal blow together 
with the ROC. On the other hand, it may be stated that the Russian 
peasantry was able to maintain many aspects of its traditional religious 
roots even in kolkhozes. For example, as a lengthy article in the 	 111 
newspaper Pod Znamenem Marksizma, written by M. Sheinman 
testifies that religion had not vanished from the collectivized 
countryside. The Soviet officials knew well that this "relic" was too 
stubborn to wither away. Nonetheless, the general tone of the party 
ideologists was that the decisions made in 1929-1932 had been 
basically correct and that the collectivization had destroyed the kulak 
roots in the countryside, shattering the social roots of religion there. 
Nevertheless, according to Sheinman's, the remnants of the kulaks 
were able to entice ordinary peasants to religion. Moreover, the 
problem was that churches and sectarians were hiding themselves 
behind "communist forms of slogans and language." To sum up, 
Sheinman was convinced that organizing more "Soviet festivals" 
instead of "ecclesiastical ones" would remove old habits and harmful 
traditions.' 
The Bolshevik mistrust over the uncontrollable spirit of the 
so-called "dark masses" (peasantry) and the worry over the "weak 
ones" (women) was considered one of the main problems in Soviet 
religious policy. Consequently, the cadres of antireligious activity 
were also engaged in a never-ending fight against to "dark masses" 
(TeMHbie Maccbi). Yaroslaysky, for example, acknowledged once that 
one-third of the trade union women were believers. According to him, 
11 	 PZM 1936, No. 4, 79-89. "Pennrxosnble nepexcnTxM B Konx03H0 aepeeHe." 
the Soviet regime should be patient with them and guide them towards 
atheism by means of education. However, the fight against religion 
itself should be merciless because "hostile" elements utilized religion 
to mask their real objectives of "wrecking" and "sabotage." Therefore 
Communists should fight mercilessly against religion and against those 
with "opportunistic" ideas.'2 Worry over "the dark forces" was often 
expressed elsewhere in the Soviet newspapers during the 1930s. Soviet 
ideologists were rehashing the fear that the enemy would utilize the 
weak spots of Soviet society: peasantry and women. This "dilemma 
of the weak ones" was also the favourite stereotype discussed in the 
antireligious newspapers and publications during the mid-1930s. For 
example, during the XVII party congress, some delegates were more 
than anxious to maintain that the "enemy" was actually utilizing 
religion \"ocTaTKaMH TeMHOTb1 H peJIHrH03Hb1MH npeApaccyA-
KaMH") in order to entice women to fight against the Soviet power.t3  
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	 Although during the mid-1930s Soviet society was retreating 
towards traditional values, this did not save the Russian peasants. The 
tide was inescapably against the traditional Russian peasantry. The 
last remnants of the private farmers were destroyed during these years, 
and the fight against kulaks, nationalists, priests, and other "enemies" 
was harsher than ever. Also, the Soviet trade unions were busy purging 
"alien elements" from their ranks.14 The activity of these evil enemies 
was highlighted against the heroic activity of Stalin himself. He now 
emerged as the sole "organizer of victory" and his cult of personality 
was now approaching its zenith.15 
12 	 SPS IX, 296-297 "Pevb TOB. 5lpocnaBcKoro." 
13 SXVII, 640. "Penh TOB. IIJa6ypoBoit." See also how a certain female 
representative, Kasatkina, criticized trade unions for allowing workers with 
religious convictions to celebrate their religious feasts. SPS IX, 531. 
14 	 See how the officials were worried that kulaks or other elements would "crawl 
back" to newly established kolkhozes." Pravda 31 January 1933, No. 30 (5556) 
"0 3a tavax 6opbObt B xonxo3ax c ocrarKaMH xynanecrBa." See also how in 
the ranks of Ukrainian nationalists there were "dozens of kulaks, priests, and 
petlyurian officers." Pravda, 27 April 1933, No. 116 (5642) "Tax opyAosanr 
6ypxrya3Hbte HauHoxanucrbt." See how the newspaper Pravda starts to utilize 
systematically the notorious expression "the enemy of the people" (Bpar Hapota) 
as a term referring to those prosecuted in trials. Pravda, 12 July 1933, No. 190 
(5716); Pravda, 13 July 1933, No. 191 (5716). This expression was mentioned in 
No. 87 but in a more normal way than in the last two numbers. See also stenografic 
accounts from the protocols of the IX Congress, see SPS, 67. ",IIoxnaA TOB. 
IIJBepaxxa." 
15 	 See Pravda, 13 January 1933, No. 13 (5539) "IIenu H 3asa9m nonmTHnecKHx 
This ambivalent situation of synchronous relaxation and tightening 
was also visible in the sphere of Soviet religious policy; the total 
amount of protests coming from believers to the CSCRQ was clearly 
diminishing during 1933-1935. However, we may claim with good 
reason that this reduction in petitions could also be evidence of 
frustration among the believers — that there was no sense in 
complaining, if the government was determined to crush the church 
and all those who protested. Moreover, the local administration and 
local CSCRQ grass-roots commissions went to great lengths to ensure 
that religion could not revitalize itself.'6 As archival documents point 
out, local officials were usually keenly taking care that neither parishes 
nor priests could collect any money." 
The historical paradox was, that in the mid-1930s there was a 
substantial emphasis on returning to more normal procedures in the 
Soviet judicial system. The practice of "administrative order" was 
condemned by higher officials in Moscow. For example, when A.Y. 
Vyshinsky (1883-1954), the notorious prosecutor of the Great Trials, 
gained a reputation of being almost an advocate of Western liberalism 
in the mid-1930s, when he tried to restrict the extraordinary powers 
of the Soviet security institutions. As Robert W. Thurston has 
remarked, at that time Vyshinsky propagated for use of the term 
"objective evidence" in the Soviet judicial system.t8 Moreover, the 
return to traditional values and the tide of decreasing antireligious 
fervour could also be detected in the activity of the SVB movement; 
oraenoB MTC H COBX030B ; Pravda, 16 January 1933, No. 16 (5542) "HoBble 
xpenocTH coüxanH3Ma B aepesae." For the publicity, Stalin's speech received, 
see Pravda, 17 January 11933, No. 17 (5543) "O pa6ore B aepeBHe. Pevb TOB. 
CTanHHa Ha 06beaHHeHHOM nneHyMe LIK H UKK BKHI(6). I1 AHBapB 1933 
roaa." For the calls for a more militant and aggressive attitude against "religion", 
"enemies" and "capitalism", see Pravda, 1 January 1933, No. 1 (5527). "Ha nopore 
1933 rona." 
16 For activities of local CSCRQ commissions in St. Petersburg, see for example 
TsGA SPb f. 7384, op.33, d. 112, 1. 2. "llporoKon Ho.1 COBeutaHHA 
HHCnexTOpoB no BonpocaM KynbTOB OT paflcoaeroB r. JleHHHrpaaa H 
npHropoaHoro p-Ha B AaMHHHa t3ope npH o6nHcnonKOMe H .IeHCOBere OT 21 
apa 1935 rona." 
17 See also TsGA SPb f. 7384, op. 33, d. 112, 1. 44. "BceM HHcneKropaM no 
BonpocaM KynbTOB npH paitcoserax r. .IeHHHrpaaa." See also RPTsKG, 
306-309. "IloxnaaHas 3anHCKa 0 COCTOAHHH peJIHMO3HbIX OpraHH3at1Hh B 
CCCP. OTHOIIIeHHA HX K npoexry HOBO KOHCTHTyt1HH. pa60Ta KOMHCCHH 
KynbTOB LINK CCCP H npaKTHKe npoBeaeHHA 3aBoHoaarenbcrBa 0 
penHrHO3HMX KynbTax.' 
18 Thurston 1996, 5-8. 
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its membership was now starting to decline dramatically and many 
SVB cells in the countryside suffered from a "lack of spirit" and 
"bureaucratic forms of work." These problems were clearly realized 
afterwards — i.e., during the IV plenum of the SVB Central Council 
in 1938 the main lecturer, P. Kashirin, acknowledged that the years 
1931-1938 could be characterized as the period of great "weakenings 
in the antireligious work and total disintegration of the SVB work."19 
This contradictory situation can be observed in the activity of the 
Cult Commission and in the official bilateral consultation held on 28 
October 1935 with the Soviet judicial organs. On the one hand, the 
official resolution of this meeting stressed the fact that the Soviet 
power had gained "colossal successes" in "getting rid of religion 
among the population." On the other hand, it acknowledged that it 
had recently suffered substantial losses "in the field of social policy, 
culture and enlightenment, especially amongst the most backward part 
114 	 of the population."20 
The main emphasis of the Cult Commission was on restricting the 
activities of the most ardent local organizations. Nevertheless, the 
CSCRQ was obliged to pay lip service to the general atmosphere of 
the 1930s, and in its meetings the Cult Commission in Moscow 
underlined the importance of the fight against "counter-
revolutionaries", who were consolidating their position inside the 
religious organizations. 
19 	 See, PZM 1938, No. 3, 146-147. "0 pa6ore IV nneHyMa IZeHTpanbaoro cosera 
Coto3a BOHHcrsyionutx 6e36oxcnnxos'; Pravda, 14 August, 1937, No. 223(7189) 
"2000 6e31tetcrnytousHx 6e36oxcnxxos"; Pravda, 30 September, 1937, No. 
270(7238) "YcxnHTb aHTHpeJHrHo3Hyto nponaraHay." Pravda. 2 February 1938, 
No. 32(7357) " IInettyM Ilexrpanbxoro CoBeTa COIo3a Be36oxcxxxos." The 
problem was crystallized in the basic question: how to not practise "dry" 
antireligious propaganda. For how the SVB movement organized competitions for 
better antireligious texbooks "uchebniks", see Pravda 11 February 1933, No. 41 
(5567). 
20 ."..npH3Harb, 4TO B nocnepnee spew' Ha6ntopaeres[ ocna6neane o6ttIecr-
BeHHO-n071HTH9eCK0tt H xynbTypno-npocBeTHTenbHoil aHTHpenHrHO3HOH 
pa6orbt. oco6eHHo cpean OTCTanbtx CJ!O B HaceneHHst." GARF f. 5263, op. 1, 
d. 23. "rlpOTOKOJ COBMeCTHOro 3aceitaHHst 11paBHTenbCTBeHHot KOMHCCHH H 
KOMHCCHH no BonpocaM KynbTOB npH 11pe3HJHyMe 1.114K Cox)3a C.C.P. 28-ro 
0KT516p5f 1935 r.." 
2. Lack of information and lack of 
centralized religious policy 
The main worry of the Cult Commission was, accordingly, that it was 
dependent on the VTsIK for information about the situation in the 
provinces. The need for information was acute at that time; after the 
chaos of the Cultural Revolution, the Soviet regime in Moscow was 
anxious to tighten its grip on the surrounding provinces and party 
organizations. This need for genuine information can clearly be seen 
from the pages of Pravda or Izvestya; as a sign of a new era, the 
battle cries of the Cultural Revolution were exchanged in 1932 for 
exhortations to enforce party discipline and for calls to improve the 
party organization in new factories and kolkhoses.21 By liquidating 
the okrug level administration, the Soviet regime was even trying to 
intensify the hold on the party organization on individual kolkhoses.22 
Earlier, the will of Moscow was usually enforced by sending special 
emissaries to remote areas in order to bring local organizations into 
line. The principle of "democratic centralism" was applied here; the 
Central Committee possessed a "right to veto the decisions of the local 
organizations which interfered with the proper conditions of Party and 
Soviet work." Moreover, local party officials were also obliged to 
report regularly to Moscow, and if necessary, they were obliged to 
give oral accounts of their activities. Those local party officials 
reluctant to obey were usually purged or removed from their posts.23 
21 	 See the extensive article of I. Vareikis in Pravda in which he urges enforcing 
"concrete leadership" in the party and the fight against caMorex: Pravda, 31 
January 1931 No. 360. (5165) "0 Hexoropbix OpraHH3aUUHOHHblX 3anavax N 
xapaxrepe nap-rut-more pyxosoucrea." This theme was underlined also by L.M. 
Kaganovich in his speech in the Moscow area party organizations in January 
1932. See Pravda, 28 January, 1932, No. 27 (5192) "Bonpocbi BHyTpHnapTHs{Hoti 
JKH3HH." See also Pravda, 13 January 1932, No. 13 (5178). "KoHKperHo 
pyKOBOANTb nepecTpo xoht pa60Tbl 3epHOCOBX03OB" and Pravda, 14 February, 
1932 No. 44 (5209) "HapoaHoxo3HficTBeHHNN nnaH 1932 r. H 3aaarm LIKK -
PKI3. Pe3onlouHsl IV nneHyMa 11KK BK17(6) OT 10 cpespansi 1932 r. no 
Aoxnaaxy TOB. 51.3. Pyt3yraxa." 
22 	 Pravda, 17 January 1933, No. 20 (5546) "06 Hrorax o6betHHeHHoro nneHyMa 
LIK H LIKK BKI1(6). ,loxnaA TOB. A.M. KaraHOBHva Ha 0675eAHHeHHOM 
nneHyMe MocxoBcxoro o6nacTHoro H ropoucxoro KOMHTera BK11(6) 
COBMeCTHO C CeKpeTapAMH PK H aKTHBaMH MocxoBCKON OpraHH3auHH 17 
slHsapst 1933." See also Pravda, 25 April 1933, No. 114 (5640) "Ha 
OTBeTCTBeHHehmeM nocry." 
23 	 Fainsod 1958, 183. 
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From the beginning of the 1930s, the practice of party discipline 
had been the same: the leadership of the party usually attempted to 
restrict local activity ("caMoTeK") or "anarchy" by sending their 
emissaries to check on and enforce the party discipline. Together with 
these disciplinary actions, questions of education and propaganda were 
discussed again and again in the party newspapers. It was obvious 
that the leadership of the party sincerely hoped to control the situation 
in the provinces by emphasizing discipline in its ranks. 
On account of its small size and limited resources, the Cult 
Commission in Moscow could not afford to send its own 
plenipotentaries to the provinces. However, it tried to enforce its 
authority by sending official letters of inquiry to local party 
organizations. In doing so, the Cult Commission was engaged in a 
hopeless fight against the local bosses and their network of power. 
The method itself was a simple one: the central Cult Commission 
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	 circulated strictly formulated instructions on how to implement the 
will of Moscow. Especially with regard to the question of taxation, 
the CSCRQ seemed to make a real effort to bring local officials into 
line. In these letters the local officials received carefully planned 
questions and answers to resolve the more practical problems. The 
commission obviously wished to signal that Moscow wanted to stop 
the most brutal aspects of religious political practices. It seems that 
the main purpose of these letters was to explain to local officials that 
the central organs favoured less aggressive taxation than during the 
Cultural Revolution.24 For example, the Cult Commission wanted to 
reduce the level of taxation by 25% (from the level of 1928-1929 (at 
which time it had been nearly 100%) and sent an official circular to 
all Narkomfins in the USSR (unions, autonomous republics, krais, 
oblasts) to remind local financial organs of this order. It seems that 
the CSCRQ made serious attempts to answer the numerous questions 
coming from the provinces but it had not the personnel or resources 
to handle these questions.25 
The paradox of this situation was, of course, immense. On the one 
24 	 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 27, rol. 1 " IIpeaceaaTenro nocroaHHoN KOMHCCHH no 
BonpocaM KynbTOB npH 11pe3H,gHyMe BI),l'1K T. H.F. CMHaoBHTiy, 5.1.1934." 
See also GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 26. 
25 See GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 29 "HapKoMcpHHaM CO/03HbIX H aBTOHOMHbIX 
pecny6nnx/KpaH/o6n./ cpHHoprnpaBHTenbcTBo 27.3.1934." See also GARF f. 
5263, op. 1, d. 34, 35, 36, 37. 
hand, the general political situation created by the highest leadership 
of the party was revolutionary and "illegal." On the other hand, the 
growth of the Soviet economy and production required more stability 
and discipline. The solution of the leadership was to adopt a policy 
of "revolutionary legality." So together with witch-hunting, the Soviet 
judiciary system was given the responsibility of noting the obvious 
"excesses" of the collectivization and terror in the countryside. As the 
secret letter signed by Stalin and Molotov on 8 May 1933 underlined, 
the actual arrest of enemies of the state was supposed to be the duty 
of the organs of OGPU and the militia — not a duty of local officials, 
thus condemning the principle of "first arrest and then investigate." 
Another secret circular is even more revealing in this sense; the joint 
letter of the Central Control Commission and RabKrin of 25 May 
1933, suggested that local "excesses" and imprisonments had burdened 
all the judicial organs.26 
One way to interpret this schizophrenic situation is to realize that 	 117 
the Soviet government was desperate to distinguish itself as a 
"people's government." It was eager to identify itself with the people; 
its basic interests were supposed to be identical with the best of the 
masses. According to Bolshevik dogma, the general outlines of the 
party's policy were always good for the people although in details the 
Soviet regime could make mistakes. The Soviet regime was ready to 
admit that in some particular cases arrests and accusations had been 
groundless. Nevertheless, the "excesses" the regime admitted to were 
always of little significance compared with the flood of terror 
experienced by the Soviet population. As Oleg Khlevnyuk states... 
"The centralized initiation and direction of the terror as a whole 
does not mean that there were no elements of a spontaneous 
character. Indeed they existed in all such actions — during the course 
of collectivization and forcible grain requisitioning in 1932-33, in 
the so-called struggle against "terrorism" following the murder of 
Kirov, etc. In the official language these phenomena were referred 
to as "excesses" (peregib) or as breaches of the socialist legality." 22 
Therefore it was understandable that the Soviet regime was anxious 
26 	 Fainsod 1958, 185-186. 
27 	 Khlevnyuk 1995, 167. 
to grant ordinary peasants and workers the possibility of writing 
letters, complaints and applications to higher organs. As Merle Fainsod 
in his splendid account on the Smolensk Archives puts it... 
."..The function served by letters in official publications was 
therefore primarily "educational" or "propagandistic." Through them 
the regime in effect signalled its people that it was aware of certain 
types of abuses, and that it was determined to stamp them out. At 
the same time, it dissociated itself from any responsibility for the 
abuses, and it provided approved scapegoats on whom the 
complaints and grievances of an outraged citizenry could vent 
themselves. The image of itself which the top leadership sought to 
project thus became one of a somewhat remote but benevolent 
guardian who interfered to protect his charges from arbitrary 
behaviour on the part of local satraps who were exceeding their 
118 	 authority."28 
Consequently, the method of sending letters of complaint and appeals 
to Kalinin in support of the right to religious freedom was the only 
means whereby believers could react to the local "excesses." 
Moreover, these complaints were almost the only way the Cult 
Commission could obtain information on the religious policy situation 
in the provinces. The first solution to this problem was, as we have 
seen, that the Cult Commission in Moscow started to send its official 
letters of inquiry to local organs. As an example, we may note how 
the CSCRQ stressed on many occasions the need for a unified policy 
in relation to religious organizations. During the year 1934, the Cult 
Commission demanded on several occasions that the Soviet Union as 
a whole should have comprehensive procedures when dealing with 
religious policy matters.29 These demands were, in any event, quite 
futile, as the commission could not enforce them. 
Together with the problem of how to get information from the 
provinces, there was the dilemma of how to supervise the actions of 
the undisciplined local party bosses and implement better policy. 
According to Arch Getty, the main reason behind the Great Purges 
was the desire of central party officials to restrict the damaging activity 
28 	 Fainsod 1958, 378. See also Thurston 1996, 185-194. 
29 	 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 33 (pkvk I, 26/5 1934); GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 33 
(pkvk 7, 16/9 1934). 
of the local authorities. Getty's interpretation stresses that the use of 
terror was simply another method of tightening the grip on the nearly 
independent provinces.30 This opinion — which has been criticized 
seems to be one of the most fascinating hypotheses that has arisen 
with regard to the centre-periphery relations in Soviet religious policy. 
The arguments of Getty could be justified by referring to archival 
documents from the central level of the Cult Commission; these papers 
often testify that worry over the nearly independent local satraps 
troubled officials in Moscow more than anything. These independent 
areas with their own deeply rooted social networks of dependency 
appeared to be too problematic to be handled simply by means of 
written orders. There was a need for more radical solutions. 
This urgent need for drastic measures was highlighted even more 
when looking at the possibilities to resolve this problem; the normal 
channels of authority seemed closed and the Cult Commission was in 
the same position as other central organs of the state. Firstly, the Cult 	 119 
Commission played by the book and, as seen above, sent official 
letters of instruction to the periphery. Subsequently, when facing 
problems from local officials, the Cult Commission turned to the 
Soviet procuracy in order to get some help in implementing its will. 
Nevertheless, this method proved to be too slow and inefficient. The 
procuracy of the RSFSR, for its part, could only complain that the 
local officials were engaged in illegal acts in closing down churches. 
The real problem, however, was in the slow tempo of implementing 
these acts. As we see here, the Soviet procuracy indirectly admitted 
that local officials were able to protect themselves against their legal 
interventions.'' As certain other documents from the Soviet judicial 
system in the mid-1930s testify, the party officials were tightening 
their political grip, and instead of neutral legal investigations, the 
leadership of the party demanded more resolute actions against the 
"counter-revolutionaries."32  
Krasikov's letter to the procuracy of the USSR, Vyshinsky, is an 
extremely revealing document in this regard. In it Krasikov remarks 
30 	 Getty 1983, 77. 
31 	 GARF f. 5263, op.1, d. 47. "B IlpesHaHyM BLjHK." 
32 	 See RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 120, d. 171, 1. 12-20 "LIK BKI1/6/ - TOB. CranHHy. 
CHK CCCP - Toa. Monoroay. 0 Kaapax H 0 pa6ore cyaos." See also 
RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 120, d. 171, 1. 31-36. LIK BKrI/6/ - TOB. Crankily. CHK 
CCCP - TOB. Monoroay. Coaepmexxo ceKperao." 
to Vyshinsky that in many places judicial officials were simply 
engaging in an administrative battle against religion. Krasikov was 
able to list many excesses commented by judicial officials, that 
contradicted the "correct" religious political line of the Cult 
Commission. For example, local officials were closing churches 
without authorization and unjustly insisting on taking grain from 
religious organizations. As Krasikov mentions, these "illegal" actions 
were increasing the number of petitions and complaints being sent to 
central organs. Therefore Krasikov asks Vyshinsky as federal 
procurator to take the necessary actions to stop these "abnormal 
procedures."33 
The fight against the habits of local officials was a labor of 
Sisyphus. Especially when it seems that local officials also had more 
concrete reasons for their illegal actions against the religious 
organizations. The local Soviet organs seemed to have had a chronic 
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	 lack of money and it led them to squeeze the religious organizations. 
This was ideologically acceptable, in the atmosphere of the Cultural 
Revolution; gradually demanding taxes from priests and believers 
turned out to be a profitable business for local officials. The central 
organs and even the local CSCRQ commissions were quite helpless 
when facing the basic interests of the local satraps. All they could do, 
as a certain circular to the Leningrad area reveals, was to send 
categorical warnings and orders to stop this kind of behaviour. In any 
event, as this circular put it, local officials simply "loved" religious 
celebrations, as they afforded them an opportunity to blackmail money 
from believers.34 
Thus, it was no wonder that the central organs would respond to 
this dilemma only by increasing the powers of the central Cult 
Commission. The Soviet regime tried to enlarge its authority and 
established more channels of information to the Soviet periphery by 
the order of the VTsIK on 7 May 1934. On this occasion, the 
commission's authority was extended to the rest of Soviet territory. 
The Cult Commission in Moscow became as an All-Union 
33 	 .-..npOCHM Bac npHHATb n0 JIHHHH IIpoKypopa COI03HbIX pecny6JIHK cpo`iHble 
Mepbl K npe/70TBpaII(eHHIO yKa3aHHbIX HeHopMaJlbHOcreN." GARF f. 5263, op. 
1, d. 39 "IIpoxypopy CCCP A.51. BbIIHHHcxOMy 1.9.1935." 
34 See for example, TsGA SPb f. 7384, op.33, d. 112, 1.53 "BceM pnxaM H 
ropcoseraM JIeHHHrpaucxoN o6nacTH H HHCieKTopaM no neaaM 13enH1-HO3HbIx 
KynbTOB npH pancoserax ropoAa JleanxrpaAa. IZHpxynapno. 1/1-1934." 
government organ under the authority of the All-Union Central 
Executive Committee (TsIK).35 Its rights and authority were confirmed 
on 30 May 1934 by defining it as an all-union agency with extensive 
rights over religious policy matters. Moreover, the TsIK ratified its 
formal relations with the local authorities on 16 July 1934 and in so 
doing wished to establish better links for the central CSCRQ over the 
whole country 36 The basic question remained, nonetheless, unsolved. 
The illegal actions of the local party bosses continued their "business 
as usual" and the Cult Commission in Moscow remained as much a 
"paper-commission" as before. 
3. The "open hand" policy and the 
CSCRQ 
The Soviet religious policy had always been a touchy area in Soviet 
foreign policy. The Soviet Foreign Commissariat had always publicly 
denied rumours concerning any religious persecutions prevailing in 
the Soviet Union. Moreover, it had discreetly tried to restrict the most 
obvious and brutal methods of Soviet atheist campaigns during the 
1920s. For example, in "Tikhon's case" the Soviet Commissar of 
Foreign Affairs, G.V. Chicerin (1872-1936), had appealed to Stalin 
to prevent the execution of the Patriarch. As a justification, Chicerin 
argued that foreign enemies might use the possible execution of 
Tikhon as a pretex, in order to stir the Polish peasants against the 
Soviet state. He also stressed that the Western bourgeoise states and 
especially the Anglican church of England might become offended if 
Tikhon were persecuted.37 
This "intervention" for a moderate religious policy was also 
apparent in Soviet relations with the Catholic Church, which had 
worsened since the Soviet Union had expelled the representatives of 
the Vatican famine relief mission in 1924. Nevertheless, in 1925 the 
Soviet regime proposed negotiations in order to settle issues on 
finances, the religious education of the Catholic population, the 
35 GARF f. 3316, op. 27, d. 386, 1. 4. 
36 	 GARF f. 3316, op. 27, d. 386,1. 24-30; GARF f. 5263, op. 2, d. 355,1. 13; GARF 
f. 3316, op. 27, d. 386, 1. 36-38; GARF f. 3316, op. 13, d. 22, 1. 122. 
37 	 GARF f. 5446e, op. 55, d. 409. "Tos. Cranxny. CeKperapro UK PKII 10. anpenn 
1923 r." See also TRRR, 127-128, 133-134, 170, 172. 
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5[350}I{HMII XII geaa6p1, 1935 roa xaaanH, XIV tlponerapxe ecex crpae, coeneeaareesl 
CoHisy 80WEHCTSyfpli{N7C 6e36o14cHNH06-10 ne-; 
"X years Jubilee of The League". The methods and means of antireligious propaganda 
remained as vulgar as ever. Source: Bezbozhnik 1935, No. 12. 
appointment of bishops, the promulgation of papal bulls, and general 
communication between the Vatican and the Soviet Union 38 
For many representatives of the Soviet regime, any political 
compromise with the Vatican was a bitter pill to swallow. As Krasikov 
put it in his letter to the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Chicherin, 
any concordat with the Vatican would be harmful for propaganda and 
would discredit Soviet power in the eyes of the European and 
American proletariat. According to these hardliners, there was no need 
to treat the Vatican any differently from other religious organs?' 
As seen in the foregoing, the Soviet Foreign Commissariat was 
anxious to reduce the foreign reactions instigated by rumours of 
religious persecutions. However, the secret negotiations between the 
Soviet Union and the Vatican were formally broken off in 1926 when 
the Soviet secret police discovered the clandestine activities of 
d'Herbigny, which intensified the suspicions of Soviet hardliners. The 
second and much more important reason for termination of these secret 
negotiations may have been the fact that the internal power struggle 
was turning the Soviet Union in a leftist direction and that Stalin 
favoured the "Soviet war option." The Catholic church, with its 
international connections, was a suitable scapegoat. The axis of 
nationally-minded Poland and the "aggressive" Catholic church was 
a formidable threat in the minds of the Soviet leadership 4° 
When coming to the mid-1930s, Soviet foreign policy was revised 
again. Earlier in the 1920s, the relations with foreign powers were 
orchestrated partly in accordance with the principles of the coming 
38 	 Dunn 1977, 36; Conquest 1968, 82-83. See the protocols of the Politburo meeting 
of 2 December 1924. RTsKhIDNI f.I7, op.3, d.480 (Pp 40, 2/12-24). 
39 GARF1 f.5263, op.l, d.55(1) "B HapoaHbih KOMHCCapHaT no HHOCTpaHHbIM 
JLenaM (22. Mapra -24)"; GARF1 f.5263, op. 1, d. 55(2) "B HapxoMHH ten TOB. 
7-iHwepnHy nos16px 24.23 r.." Despite these warnings, official meetings between 
Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin and Papal Nuncio Pacelli (later Pope Pius 
XII) took place in Berlin, the first on 6 October 1925 and again on 14 June 1927. 
These negotiations dealt mainly with the possibility of the legal recognition of 
Catholicism. Simultaneously the Vatican sent its emissary Michel d'Herbigny 
(1880-1957) to the Soviet Union for more detailed negotiations. Together with 
his official duties, he had a clandestine mission secretly to consecrate new Catholic 
bishops in Soviet Russia. This "dual diplomacy" did not produce lasting results. 
D'Herbigny was able to consecrate some bishops but quite soon, in August 1926, 
he was expelled and the bishops he had ordained were put in prison. RTsKhIDNI 
f.17, op.112, d.353 (PCAP 74, 6/6-26); Dunn 1977, 36; Stehle 1990, 348. 
40 RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, d.353 (PCAP 77, 8/10-26); RTsKhIDNI f.17, op.112, 
d.353 (PCAP 80, 24/12-26); Kolarz 1961, 190-191; Dunn 1977, 36-37. 
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Communist world revolution. However, this goal was downplayed 
after Stalin took charge; he was more interested in creating socialism 
in one country and was less and less dependent on the ideological 
premises of his own party. However, the rise of Nazies in Germany 
in 1933 represented a major change in Soviet foreign policy. The 
earlier foreign propaganda and Comintern policy had stressed that 
there should be no kind of cooperation with Social Democrats or other 
major enemies. However, from 1934 onwards, this hostile attitude 
towards the Social Democrats was abandoned; henceforth Social 
Democrats and Fascists were never termed as ideological "twins" as 
had been done earlier. Now, after the collapse of the Weimar Republic, 
Stalin wanted to proclaim a new line in foreign policy. It was after 
1933 that the Soviet regime became ready to cooperate with other 
countries to stabilize Germany. The efforts to master the new situation 
started in 1934 when the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations. 
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	 Furthermore, in 1935 M.M. Litvinov (Vallakh, Meer Genokh 
Moiseevich, 1876-1951) tried to build up a military network, an 
alliance against Nazism; i.e., the Soviet Union signed a military pact 
with Czechoslovakia and also with the French government. 
Consequently, Soviet propaganda started to emphasize that all 
democratic countries should join forces in a so-called "United 
Front/Popular Front" against the "bestiality of Fascism." Nevertheless, 
this was only done in order to be able to "negotiate with strength" 
with Hitler's government. According to Robert Conquest, Stalin had 
always cherished the idea of reconciliation with Nazi-Germany.4' 
The real significance of this new revision of policies was, of course, 
only tactical. The whole operation of altering the Comintern slogans 
was done, as could be seen from the documents of Comintern, in 
order to win the Social-Democratic "masses" for Communism. The 
logic of this new operation was simple; the masses of the Western 
people were supposed to be converted into this new pro-Soviet 
coalition. So, as the Comintern propaganda stressed, this new United 
Front was supposed to prove to the Western people that the Soviet 
Union was the defender of its interests. As this consistory of 
Communism, Comintern secretaries, simplified their ideas, the main 
emphasis of this new turn was to demonstrate to the Western people 
41 	 Kennan 1961, 293-295; Conquest 1993, 218-219. Also as Robin Blick states, 
Stalin's real object was actually to form a "united front" with Nazi-Germany 
against the decadent West. Blick 1995, 59. 
that "we have everything good, they have everything bad." Moreover, 
the Western communists should remain suspicious of the ideology of 
the church, especially when dealing with peasantry 42 
In practice, the adoption of the new policy required change in nearly 
all the slogans utilized in Comintern propaganda. As mentioned 
earlier, one of these new slogans was concerned with the need to 
create a unified alliance among all those who sought to resist Nazism. 
In accordance with this line, the Comintern and the European 
communist parties were told that their foremost concern must now be 
the maintenance of civil peace in their bourgeoise societies and the 
fight against the common enemy. Earlier ideological confrontations 
were supposed to be pushed aside when Moscow wanted to emphasize 
this common cause. This was especially visible during the crisis of 
Saarland, when, e.g. the German communists were told to reject earlier 
"sectarian" slogans such as "For a Red Saar!" and alter them to "For 
Status Quo!." Too radical or too ideological slogans were now 	 125 
forgotten in order to entice liberals and conservatives in the West to 
join these "leagues of resistance."43  
The objectives of Soviet foreign policy vacillated from a 
determination to chain Hitler's Germany to Stalin's will to negotiate 
with Nazies in strength. Together with the necessity to improve 
relations with the West, these aspects dictated this new "open hand" 
policy. In all these options, it was crucial for the Soviet Union to 
preserve its prestige in the eyes of the bourgeoise states. Naturally, 
the Soviet ideologists were now in awkward situations. As we may 
detect from the Soviet newspapers of that time, one of the main 
objectives was to maintain to Western nations and people that there 
was no need to fear of the Soviet rule; the ghost of bloody revolution 
and undemocratic principles were now introduced in a better light. 
Accordingly, the Soviet ideologists were eager to declare to the 
42 RTsKhIDNI f. 494, op. 1, d. 8, I. 7 "HporoKon 3aceaaHHSI KOMHCCHH no 
Bblpa6orxe re3Hcoa x VII xonrpeccy KoMHHTepHa": RTsKhIDNI f. 494, op. I, 
d. 3, 1. 111-112 "3aceaaHHe no 1-oMy nyHKTy nopslaxa AHA 23.8.34"; 
RTsKhIDNI f. 494, op. I, d. 7. 11. 18-23. "O6cysxneHHe npoexroB Te3ocoB 
[IOAHTKOMHCCHA. BblCTynneHHe MaHyHnbcxoro"; RTsKhIDNI f. 494, op.!, d. 
12, 11. 180-181. "rlpoexT rJIaBbI oTHeTHoro aoxna ta I'ICnoJIKOMa KOMHHTepHa 
VII KOHrpeccy: 6opb6a KOMHHTepHa 3a KpeCTI AHCTBO." 
43 	 KIPVK, 115, 202. The idea of "United Front" against Fascism was emphasised 
in the Fourth Congress of the Comintem. This slogan, however, was abandoned 
later at the Sixth Congress (1928). Hochman 1984, 80-81. 
foreign audience that, among other democratic principles, freedom of 
religion actually prevailed inside the Soviet Union. Consequently, the 
reactions of the foreign audience were regarded as more and more 
important in this relation and inquiring delegations from abroad were 
treated in the mid-1930s with kid gloves and propaganda. 
For the representatives of the Cult Commission in Moscow this 
meant a new additional assignment, and from the early 1930s the 
members of the CSCRQ had the important duty of dealing with 
foreign delegates who were interested in the religious situation in the 
Soviet Union, and they were usually put in charge of formulating 
official explanations44 The tactics of the members of the CSCRQ were 
simple, the Soviet side denied all charges made by the foreign press. 
For example, the chairman of the Cult Commission, Smidovich, often 
simply explained to foreign newspapermen that the Soviet Union did 
not persecute religion as such. After the sudden death of Smidovich, 
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	 Yaroslaysky inherited this duty of official spokesman and, for 
example, in his meeting with an American group of intelligentsia, he 
simply denied that there existed any kind of religious persecution in 
the Soviet Union:6  
The highlight of the Soviet propaganda aimed at winning Western 
souls lay on heated declarations and propaganda delivered to the 
international audience. As another example, we may take a speech of 
A.V. Kosarev's (1903-1939), who in front of an international audience 
explicitly stated that all rumours about the persecution of religion were 
only fabricated by enemies of the USSR; Communists and 
nonbelievers "actually respected" feelings of the believers. According 
to Kosarev, the Communists no longer classified Catholics in the 
category of enemies, both groups having "mutual interests in the 
struggle for peace." This speech was, of course, not meant for 
domestic consumption and if it would have been given before an 
44 	 For negotiations between the members of this commission on how to handle these 
meetings with foreign delegates, see GARF f. 5263, op.l, d.39, ro1.2. By intense 
falsifying of facts, the Soviet propaganda apparatus was able to convince many 
foreign scholars that the Soviet society was actually stable. For example, a certain 
American sociologist, Wasserman, believed in the 1930s that "the majority of 
youth and a great amount of the workers and peasants of an older generation truly 
believe in dogmas of revolution". See SP3, 207. 
45 RTsKhIDNI f. 89, op.4, d. 56. 1. 14. "Beceua TOB. 5lpocnancxoro c 
aMepnxancxoft rpynnofi HHTennxrenroB, noceTnsmxx CCCP neTOM 1936. 
CTenorpaMMa.'; GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 30 "F-ny C.M. LIeM6epneny." 
audience in the USSR, the author would have been sure to attract the 
attention the NKVD. Nevertheless, the objective of the Soviet power 
was now clear: to entice believers into the Popular Fronts.46 Sometimes 
these explanations to Western audiences were touching and naive to 
an extreme. As one of these ideologists, a certain Putintsev, was eager 
to demonstrate in a lengthy article, real freedom of consciousness 
existed inside the Soviet Union. He also stressed that there had been 
good reasons to confiscate church bells since local peasants had in 
some cases needed metal in order to be able to purchase a tractor 
(sic!)." 
The actual "Nazi coup" was treated with silent astonishment in 
Soviet newspapers. As Robert Conquest has remarked, Stalin did not 
consider Hitler's government as "a major problem" and even from the 
very beginning tried to establish confidential contacts with it 48 
Moreover, Stalin probably wanted to await the aftermath of the power 
struggle in Germany and know whether the Nazi rule would be only 
a short interlude and whether the opposition would overthrow Hitler. 
These hopes were, in any event, vain. Although the Soviet 
newspapers at first treated the situation in Germany with official 
restrictions in order to avoid political provocations, they were eagerly 
commenting on all signs of possible upheavals in the new Germany. 
Therefore all forms of opposition were noted in their pages and 
commented on in an apprehensive tone. For example, in 1935, articles 
appeared in the Soviet newspapers in which the battle between the 
Nazi regime and the Catholic Church and the German 
"Confessionalist" church was commented on with caution. The natural 
question was, could the ecclesiastical opposition be a potential ally 
for anti-Fascist forces? Could there even be transient cooperation with 
churches that were opposing Hitler? 
The old and expected ideological reaction of the Soviet 
commentators was to place believers in the same category with 
enemies49 Nevertheless, the Soviet side did realize the potential help 
46 K1 1936, No. 14, 52-54.."Monoaexcb Ha 6opb6y 3a coxpaneHHe Mupa! (Pevb 
npeacrasnrena cosercxol Monoaexar Ha xceHeacxoM toHomecxoM xoHrpecce 
6opb6b1 sa MHp 3.9.1936 r." 
47 PZM 1937, No. 2, 65-66, 68-69, 70-72, 74-79. "0 cso6oae cosecrH B CCCP." 
48 Conquest 1993, 217. 
49 For "more realistic" opinions ("The German Lutheran Church is a weapon of 
Hitler's") concerning the churches in the West; see KI 1935, No. 20-21, 87. 
" 1 amH3M 14 egxeblh cppoxr BO Opal—milli." See also PZM 1937 No. 8, 166-168, 
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of these religious organizations and slowly started to cherish this idea 
of agreement even with believers when organizing united leagues 
against the Nazis. But the change of mind did not come easily. For 
many Soviet ideologists this did not occur in 1935; i.e., the newspaper 
Bezbozhnik told its readers that the fight between Hitler and 
ecclesiastical oppositionists was simply nominal. Actually, the Soviet 
audience was told that the "Kirchenkampf' was a kto kogo —
"who-whom" situation — the question was who would be in charge of 
the churches in Germany — the Nazi government or oppositionists. As 
the newspaper Bezbozhnik stated, it was the same who would defraud 
them, Hitler or religion." 
Interestingly enough, it seemed that the antireligious Soviet 
newspapers and ideological bulletins were gradually obliged to 
swallow the bitter pill and acknowledge these new allies. This was 
emphasized even more in the speeches of foreign communists. 
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	 Actually, it was the Comintern, which became a mouthpiece of 
collaboration among all anti-Fascist people. Later, after the Nazis had 
stabilized their power in Germany and there was no fear of 
ecclesiastical counterrevolution, the French Communist party, (a 
German Communist) Wilhelm Florin (1894-1944) and Maurice 
Thorez (1900-1964), were advising Western Communists to learn 
some respect from former enemies when facing the threat of Nazism. 
In actual fact, the French comrades were asked to rectify their earlier 
political programmes and told that it was not appropriate to identify 
ecclesiastical organizations with the Fascist ones in France. The local 
Western Communists were told to march "hand in hand" with 
Christian workers and peasants.51  
This change in policy was, of course, rather difficult to explain to 
174-177. „0 HeKOTOpbtX CpaKTaX KOHTppeBOJI1OüHOHHOH H IHIIHOHCKOH 
p,eATeAbHOCTH AyXOBeHCTBa." See also PZM 1937 No. 10, 143 
.. KOHTppeBOn10uHOHHaA pOJtb peJIHrHO3HbIX OpraHH3auHH H a1tTHpeJINrH03Ha6 
npOnaraHAa." 
50 	 Bezbozhnik 1935, No. 8 „ IlponeTapCKHH aTeH3M B 6opb6e npOTHB BONHbI H 
4)a1IIH3Ma." 
51 	 KI 1935, No. 25, 9. "HapouxblH (ppoHT BO NpaHüHH (M. Tope3. Pe, , Ha VII 
KOHrpecce KoMHHTepHa, 3.8.1935)"; KI 1935, No. 26, 53-54. "P. Iloilo. 
KoMcoMon (topaxuHH B 6opb6e 3a HapouHblH cppoHT." See also KI 1935, No. 
25, 58-61. "B. 4:1)11opHH. 3a eaHHbIH nponeTapcKHH H HapouablH 
aHTHCpaIIIHCTCKHH CppOHT B 1'epMaHHH" (cOKpauleHHaA cTQHorpaMMa pemH Ha 
VII KOHrpecce KoMHHTepHa 3.8.1935). See also KI 1936, No. 15, 53-54. 
"HapO1IHbI1i (ppOHT BO CDpaHIiHH H 3aA.a9H KII4)." 
the Soviet populance and the Soviet ideologists had to work hard 
when justifying this volte-face. One solution was to explain this 
religious opposition as a "primitive mass protest" against the the 
Fascist regime. According to this explanation, the German bourgeoisie 
who at that time was against Hitler, did not oppose Fascism in 
principle but because it did not want to support the idea of a nation 
as an absolute principle.52 However, it is strange to note how after 
the years of the Cultural Revolution and ideological purity, the gate 
for collaboration with Communists was now open to nearly everyone. 
As Florin declared, the Popular Front was open to all Social 
Democrats, Christians, non-party people and even to those who were 
under the influence of National Socialism — in short, to all those who 
were willing to join a united front against Fascism.53 These new 
prospects of cooperation with ecclesiastical organizations raised 
fantastic and unrealistic hopes among some foreign Communist 
delegates. Nevertheless, it is fascinating to see how this new "deus ex 	 129 
machina" — cooperation with religious organizations was supposed to 
be the key element in the fight against Nazism. For example, the 
"powerful" mass organizations of the Catholic Church with their 
"centuries-old traditions" raised strong hopes in a certain Spanish 
delegate in the Comintern.54 
The logic of this tactical alliance with the Western masses of 
believers was simple. The Soviet Union would not alter its own policy 
in relation to its own believers but was more than willing to cooperate 
with all kinds of people abroad, provided they were anti-Nazi. In fact, 
"the policy of the open hand" was not intended for internal use in the 
Soviet Union. However, in its leading newspapers and journals, the 
Soviet government contemplated and discussed the new situation and 
possibility of an alliance with "alien elements." The help of religious 
organizations was therefore considered very useful in foreign activities 
towards forming a "democratic front" against Fascists. The importance 
of this union was that it provided a possibility for "cooperation" even 
with the religious organizations. This, of course, did not mean that 
52 Kl 1935, No. 30, 28. "HOBbIN nyTb B COBMeCTHON 6opb6e 3a csepxceHHe 
cpaIDHCTCKON {'IHKTaTypbl." 
53 	 KI 1935, No. 30, 41 "Haile OTHoweHHe K couHan-1IeMOKparxH." See also KI 
1935, No. 31-32, 67 "CnaceM gamy CTpaHy OT KaTacTpoCpbl! (Bo3BaHHe uK 
KOMHapTHH I'ITanHH)." 
54 See KI 1935, No. 35-36, 36. "Eopb6a 3a e1IHHbIH nponerapcKHn cppoaT H 
HapOAHbIN aHTH(pa[llHCTCKH}i cppOHT B I'ICnaHHH." 
r. 
religious organizations were encouraged inside the Soviet Union — 
actually quite the opposite was the case. However, this was another 
reason to preserve a decent facade in Soviet religious policy. 
This cooperation with ideological arch-enemies was never 
wholeheartedly approved of inside the Soviet ideological apparatus. 
Even one of the most authoritative Communist periodicals, Bolshevik, 
commented on the possibilities of cooperation with churches in a dry, 
nearly academic tone. Interestingly enough, ecclesiastical 
representatives at different peace congresses and their speeches were 
scrutinized with keen interest in this mouthpiece of Soviet ideology. 
The usefulness of such people was something that the Soviet 
ideologists always, willy nilly, recognized. However, in order to 
maintain the general party line, e.g., to take over the non-Communist 
organizations in the West, as it was agreed upon at the VII Comintern 
congress, these Christian organizations were not supposed to be 
130 
	
	 neglected. As a matter of fact, the Catholic people constituted a 
substantial part of the population of Germany and Soviet officials 
working in the Comintern realized that they were to be treated with 
care and should not be allowed to be enticed by Hitler.55 The situation 
was different in the SVB movement; obviously the antireligious 
activists in the Soviet Union were not so eager to treasure these new 
comrades-in-arms. Their position was, however, concealed under mild 
criticism when facing political necessity dictated from higher 
instances. For example, the newspaper Bezbozhnik could publish a 
lengthy account of I.G. Ehrenburg's (1891-1967), who had cast doubt 
on the honesty of priests working in the Popular Front. As Ehrenburg 
claimed, "today they (priests) write in a Fascist newspaper, another 
day they are responsible for an anti-Fascist meeting."56 
During 1936, the high hopes concerning the possibility of utilizing 
ecclesiastical organizations in the West to destabilize the Nazi regime 
began to fade. The Nazi government was finally able to get "a 
concordat" — a treaty — with the Roman Catholic Church and by 
forming the National Church of Germany, thus overcoming formidable 
55 	 KI 1937, No. 6, 84-86. "TpeTHFi (ppOHT - OnacHMN caMO06MaH KaTOJIH4eCKHX 
Kpyros I'epMaHHH." See also Bolshevik 1936, No. 19, 72, 74-78. 
"Meacnyeaponabiifi xoarpecc MHpa"; Bolshevik 1937, No. I, 83. 'T'epMaHcxHN 
Hapon 06BHH51eT." 
56 	 ."..ceronHA OHM runur- B cpamHCTcxoN rase-re. sasrpa ce6e >tce oTBevaIOT Ha 
aHTHcpamHcrcxoM MHTHHre." Bezbozhnik 1935, No.12, 9. "CopaHuysKHe nonbl 
H enHHb1(i HapOAHbI}"i cppOHT." 
protestant churches. This new concord in Germany was a shock to 
many and not least to the Soviet regime. The natural bitterness arising 
from these fading hopes was also visible in official Soviet propaganda. 
Finally, the "ecclesiasticals" had acted in accordance with their real 
nature — these organizations rejected the idea of cooperation against 
the Nazis! Ironically enough, it seems here that the Soviet 
commentators were among the most ardent defenders of "real 
Christians" in Germany. According to these Soviet commentators, the 
betrayal was at the leadership level of the churches — the Vatican and 
protestant leaders had abandoned their flocks and allowed Fascism to 
persecute the "Catholic masses" or "protestant population."57 
Despite these lost hopes, the idea of a Popular Front with 
noncommunists, i.e., believers was never really abandoned. When the 
hope of utilizing believers in fighting the Nazies in Germany was 
fading, the appeals were directed at other countries, especially the 
Western intelligentsia. For Soviet ideologists, this appeared more than 	 131 
appropriate. Instead of these "wavering" religious organizations, the 
newspaper Bezbozhnik introduced new allies — the Western 
freethinkers. The congress of free-thinkers held in 1936 in Prague was 
celebrated on the pages of this newspaper to quite a degree. The 
congress itself was convened as a congress of unity between the 
Western, "bourgeoise-liberal", anticlerical movement and the Soviet 
"proletarian" atheists. The newspaper Bezbozhnik was especially ready 
to utilize a letter issued by Romain Rolland (1866-1944), the famous 
French novelist, which called on his movement to prepare to fight 
Fascism, was highly eulogized as a leading document at this congress. 
According to the deputy of the SVB movement, A. Lukachevsky, the 
congress had concentrated on fighting against the "barbarism of 
Fascism, imperialist war and popovshchina." The message of his 
article seemed obvious; between the lines, the author seemed to 
declare that it was more appropriate for the USSR to cooperate on a 
57 	 See KI 1937, No. 4, 105-109. "I HrnepoBcxHH cpaumsM npoTHB xaronHvecxnx 
Macc"; KI 1937, No. 4, 110-112. "HacrynneHHe rnrnepa H Posen6epra Ha 
nporecraxrcxoe HaceneuHe." The reaction of the newspaper Bezbozhnik was 
notoriously malicious:."..xax H cneuoaano oxcwuarb, uepxosHHKH scex crpaa 
(npexcue Bcero — xaronHyecxne) Haxou$resa B nepsblx psuax BparoB 
nponerapcxoro eaHHoro cppoara." Bezbozhnik 1935, No. 3, 16 "KaTOAHUH3M 
- Ontior MHpOBoI peaxuHH." See also more official "bitter" reactions, KI 1937, 
No. 4, 93-95. "flocnaHHe nanbi pnMcxoro o nonoNceHHH xaronw9ecxotI uepKBH 
B FepMaHHH." 
united front with less suspect people than believers. Instead of bargains 
with religious organizations, Lukachevsky recommended that 
freethinkers, scholars, writers, artists could be called on to fight for 
the "freedom of thought, for the right of individuality against the 
gloomy powers of religion and churches, against the obscurantism and 
barbarism of Fascism."58 Especially Yaroslaysky, the leader of the 
Soviet antireligious movement, was eager to advertise the need for 
cooperation with Western freethinkers instead of Catholics.59 
However, despite the failures in enticing official churches to join 
in the fight against Hitler, the call for a united front persisted as an 
official part of Soviet foreign policy before World War II. According 
to their official dogma, the Soviet delegates and ideologists were 
obliged to seek support for the unified movement against the Nazis. 
The opportunity to denounce the "persecutions" of the Catholic 
believers, monks and priests in Germany was too good an issue to be 
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	 missed in Comintern newspapers and propaganda. The paradox of this 
situation was that the Soviet newspapers, which were willing to root 
out all religious dissenters in their own country, were in their 
propaganda supporting religious dissidents in Germany. Or as 
Comintern officials declared, there was a real opportunity to work 
together with radicals, liberals, Catholics, Christians, pacifists. Despite 
ideological differences, the need to work jointly against the threat 
coming from Germany was the main maxim.60 As mentioned, the 
international union of freethinkers was regarded as a potential ally in 
the fight against Fascism. The Soviet side was eager to demonstrate 
that League, SVB was not trying to meddle in the affairs of the 
international union of freethinkers but was only ready to "assist" these 
foreign comrades with their experience. However, the official 
explanation was that it was the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, not 
ordinary Catholic people, that had been working against democratic 
forces.61  
58 	 Bezbozhnik 1936, No. 6, 3."Koxrpecc eaxxcrsa." See also Seppo 1992, 26-27, 
37. 
59 	 See RTsKhIDNI f. 89, op. 4, d. 59, 11. 31, 35-36. "Bopb6a nporxs penxrHx Ha 
cospeMeHHOM crane." 
60 	 KI 1936, No.7, 51-52."MeHcAyHapoAxaa ioxomecxasi xoHcpepexuxa Mxpa."; KI 
1937, No. 6, 31. "I'xrneposcKxN cpamH3M - noaxcxrarenb soliHbl." See also 
Bolshevik 1938, No. 3, 79. "MmayHapoaHbiN o63op." 
61 	 KI 1936, No. 9, 42-43, 45, 49. "Bopb6a 3a nposeaexxe nHHHx VI xoxrpecca 
Ki3M' ; KI 1936, No. 10, 29 "Bopb6a c rHrneposuaMH 14 I'a6c6ypraMx a 
This Soviet explanation of the reactionary ecclesiastical hierarchy 
and radical masses of believers gives us a key to why the actual 
cooperation never took place between these two parties. The churches, 
for their part, were too preoccupied with the rumours of "bestial 
antireligious campaigns"in the USSR. The Soviet ideologists and the 
antireligious activists, on the other hand, (even some officials inside 
the Comintern) were too stuck up in their doctrinal disagreements with 
religion. They could only put the blame on the higher hierarchy; it 
was the Vatican that was engaged in anticommunism, not the masses 
of Catholic believers.62 
Consequently, it was ideological distrust that made the difference. 
As Isaac Deutscher put it... 
."..No matter how moderate and "purely" democratic, how 
constitutional and "purely" patriotic, were the slogans he [Stalin] 
had composed the Popular Fronts, he could not undo the 	 133 
revolutionary potentialities of these Fronts."63 
ABCTpHH"; Kl 1936, No. 11-12, 51. "Pa3Bepr6IBaHHe AeMOKpaTH9ecKON 
pesonlouHH B IicnaHHH"; KI 1936, No. 11-12, 133. "3aceAaHHe npe3HAHyMa 
IicnonKoMa KoMHHTepHa B Mae"; KI 1936, No. 11-12, 77. "EAHHaI}i cppoHT B 
IllseauapxH"; KI 1936, No. 13, 57. "jlexcrBHrenbHble npaBHrenH ABcrpHH." 
62 	 KI 1936, No. 16, 70-74. "KaronHKH Ha pacnyrbe." 
63 	 Deutscher 1967, 422. 
IV The quest for 
unification and the years 
of the Great Terror 
(1936-1938) 
134 	 1. General background 
The "good years" of the 1930s came to an end as Stalin's reign of 
terror and purges were launched in 1937-1938. Open questions, such 
as the number of victims, the scale of the damage, and the names of 
the guilty still remain open.' However, if leaving the horrible figures 
and the moral condemnation aside, we must try to find rational 
explanations for this bacchanalia of blood that took place in the Soviet 
Union during the late 1930s. 
The peculiarity of the reign of terror and the purges was that they 
coincided with the pseudo-liberal reforms and reorganizations of the 
Soviet institutions. Consequently, the Soviet life during the late 1930s 
was characterized by an absurd dichotomy of both hilarious and dreary 
realities. For instance, as the secret police was hunting down convicted 
people's families in order to fulfil its quota of "enemies of people", 
the ordinary Soviet people were celebrating their new "democratic" 
way of life. The cries of pain echoing from the execution chambers 
did not disturb people's merrymaking in popular dance halls. On the 
contrary, while prisons were being crowded with people's enemies, 
the Soviet press was discussing such matters as equality and 
1 	 For the latest figures (made by the Russians themselves) concerning the nunmbers 
of victims, see LM, 37-50; Demidov-Kutuzov 1990, 41; Shelestov 1990, 8; 
Antonov-Ovseenko 1996, 3-5. See also Western evaluations: Wheatcroft 1996, 
1319-1353 versus Getty & Rittersporn & Zemskov 1993, 1017-1044. 
democracy. Furthermore, the Soviet cinema was showing high-
spirited, joyous films alongside show-trials2 — recalling of ongoing 
witch hunts. The same peculiar dichotomy was apparent when we 
examine Soviet religious policy and the "fall" of the Cult Commission 
in 1936-1938. 
2. The 1936 Constitution, elections, 
census of 1937 and question of clerical 
"misinterpretations" 
The main reform of the late 1930s was the Constitution of 1936. This 
new law was promoted personally by Stalin during the plenum of the 
Central Committee in February 1935. The principles of this new 
legislation were simple, such as "further democratization" and bringing 
the Soviet constitution into conformity "with the present correlation 
of class forces in the USSR." The official slogans for these democratic 
gestures were "consolidation" and "victory" of the Soviet rule. As 
Molotov stressed in his speech to the VII Congress of Soviets, the 
Soviet Union had "rebuilt its socio-economic basis, transforming the 
country into a socialist one."3 The message of the Soviet regime was 
clear, confirming the fact that the Stalinist socialism had been 
victorious. As Molotov emphasized, no internal threat existed. In 
accordance with the Stalinist interpretation of history, socialism had 
been victorious inside the USSR and the working class had organized 
itself around the party. Even the prodigal son of the Soviet society - 
the peasantry - was working unified in socialist agriculture. Moreover, 
the intelligentsia was for socialism. In accordance with the new 
optimism, the internal enemies had been rooted out and it was time 
to relax. Since, the former exploiters were extinct, it was possible to 
loosen the discipline of the proletarian dictatorship. Consequently, the 
band of people's enemies was supposed to decline in numbers; as a 
2 	 The names of these films are quite revealing: "Happy-Go-Lucky Guys" (one of 
the Stalin's favourites), "Circus", "Volga, Volga", see Geldern * Stites 1995, 234-
235. 
3 	 ."..Haura crpana xopeHHMM o6pasoM nepecrpoxnacb B csoeh corrHarrbH0-
9KOHOMwiecKori ocaose, Hpeo6pasosasmxcb B crpaay couHarrrrcrx'[ecxyro." 
Molotov 1935, 11. 
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matter of fact, according to Molotov, only 2.5% (!) of the adult 
population were disfranchised, having lost the full status of Soviet 
citizenship, and had no right to participate in elections.4 
As pointed out in the foregoing, the Constitution of 1936 was 
supposed to be the manifestation of "triumphant socialism" in Russia. 
The actual mission to draw up the new Soviet Constitution was given 
to a special commission, consisting of future people's enemies, such 
as Bukharin and Radek. The commission was supposed to make a 
draft of this law. Stalin, a great manipulator of audiences, was also 
capable of quasi-democratic manoeuvres when necessary. In 
accordance with his wishes, Soviet officials announced that a 
nationwide discussion on the Constitution would be organized in order 
to give the ordinary people an opportunity to suggest possible 
revisions. As a result, Stalin's Constitution was contemplated at 
approximately 527, 000 meetings, attended by 36,5 million Soviet 
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	 citizens. More than 154, 000 amendments were suggested. 
Interestingly enough, only 43 changes were made as a result of these 
proposals coming from ordinary Soviet citizens.' 
Together with the official constitutional commission, a legion of 
Soviet ideologists enlisted to contemplate the coming Soviet 
Constitution. It seemed that the real ambition of these ideologists was 
to preserve the Soviet system and Bolshevik idea of class-state 
conception. Especially, the often used word "democratism" could raise 
4 	 Molotov 1935, 11, 17. Compare this information with earlier statistical figures, 
see SSS, 57, 900-901; Zhiromskaya 1996, 104, 120, 122, 125, 153. As seen here, 
during 1928-1929 there occurs a dramatic and "too good" decline of these 
"lishentsy." See also Bolshevik 1935, No. 1, 1-4. "CeabMort Bceco1o3Hbtit Cbe3a 
CoseroB. rlepeaoaan"; Bolshevik 1935, No. 3, 1-8. "flo6eabI couHanH3Ma H 
pacuser cosercxo} aeMoxpaTHH. nepeaoBan." See especially the detailed article 
of Ya. Berman in which he "comments" on the dramatic decline of the "lishentsy." 
SG 1936, No. 5, 11, 43-44. "Conercxoe H36Hparenbnoe npaso." See also ISK 
1957, 28-29. 
5 	 See protocols and documents from the actual draft-commission. GARF f. 6982, 
op. 1. See also, Izvestiya 12 June 1936, No. 136(5993); Larina-Bukharina 1990, 
404. "BceHapoaHoe o6cyHcaeHHe Ha'anocb." The future "people's enemy", 
Bukharin used to contemplate on the Soviet Constitution in the newspaper 
Izvestiya before his arrest, see Izvestiya, 1936, June 14, No. 137 (5994) 
"KOHCTHTygHB COuHanHCTM'iecxoro rocyaapCTBa"; Izvestiya, 1936, June 15, 
No. 138(5995) "KOHCTHTyUHi[ CounanHcrH'iecxoro Tocyaaperna. 
npoaonaceHHe CM. II3BecTHH No. 137." With reference to popular discussion 
concerning the Constitution, see RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op.120, d. 232, 1. 36-52. 
",ILoxnaaxaH 3anHcxa 0 xoae BceHapoanoro o6cyxcaeHHs npoexra 
KOHCTHTywiH CCCP Ha 15/X -1936 r.." See also Little 1989, 81. 
the eyebrows of some Communists. These ideologists therefore 
concentrated their main efforts on explaining why the Soviet Union 
could not constitute a Western-type democracy. According to these 
explanations, the idea that the Soviet Union was copying Western 
models of democracy was, of course, out of the question. The general 
outcry of these texts was that the Soviet democracy was something 
higher and more democratic than the system prevailing in the West. 
When making their apology, they justified the idea of the social 
inequality of the Soviet system, claiming it to be a logical outcome 
of Marxism. Moreover, as these articles pointed out and as Molotov 
reiterated, Communists had "suppressed" only a tiny minority of the 
populace, just 2.5% of the whole population.' 
Therefore, it was not surprising that this army of party ideologists 
proved to be right when they expected that the new Constitution would 
consolidate the one-party system. The class-minded principles of the 
proletarian dictatorship remained a part of the new Soviet Constitution. 
According to certain Western observers such as Aryeh Unger, the 
Constitution of 1936 seemed to be even more "conservative" than its 
predecessors (the 1918 and 1924 Constitutions). The real significance 
of this Constitution was, however, that it consolidated the 
achievements of the Stalinist society and calmed down the people 
while the society was under the yoke of the Great Terror. The 
democratic features of this new law also made an impact on foreign 
and domestic propaganda. Stalin himself was one of the most eager 
Soviet leaders to stress the new democratic nature of this Constitution 
to foreign inquirers. For example, in his interview with the American 
journalist Roy Howard, Stalin predicted that "vivid election 
campaigns" would be held in the future.' Finally, it should be 
6 	 Bolshevik 1935, No. 5, 35-47. "CouHanH3M H paaeHcrao"; Bolshevik 1935, No. 
6, 31-35. "HponeTapcKoe rOCyaapCTBo H H3MBHeHHA B KOHCTHTylIHH CCCP"; 
Bolshevik 1936, No. 11, 75-83. "Bceo6wee, npsMoe. paaaoe H36HparenbHoe 
npaao npH TaÜHOM ronocosaHHH." Bolshevik 1936, No. 14, 76-89. "OTKJIHKH 
McAnyHapOAHON ne9aTH Ha npoeKT HOBO1 KOHCTHTyUHH CCCP." See also 
how a certain B. Borilin suggested to do away with former exploiters. ."..A 
HC9e3HyTb B )KH3HH OHO MO)KeT JHmb n0 Mepe nOAHOro yHH`ITO)KeHHA 
KafHTBJIHCTH9eCKHX 3JIeMeHTOB H HX OCTaTKOB." It iS hard to judge whether 
this means physical killings or just economical means to undermine these 
lishentsy. See Bolshevik 1935, No. 17, 47. "Cosercxas aeMoKparHA." 
7 	 Bolshevik 1936, No. 6, 7-8. 'Beceua TosapHuta CranHHa c npeaceaareneM 
aMepxxaHCKoro ra3eTHoro 06beAHHeHHA 'CKpHHHC-Foaapn Hiocneiinepc' 
r-HOM Poh FosapaoM 1-ro Mapra 1936 rota." 
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remembered that the Constitution of 1936 was a kind of a message 
of solidarity to the ordinary people. The quasi-democratic features of 
this "Stalinist Constitution" were highlighting the fact that "Khozyain" 
- the "Boss" — was actually neglecting his own party and appealing 
to ordinary — "little people" (ManexbKxe suottH) —,and seeking their 
support.8 
The earlier Soviet Constitutions were based on the Marxist ideas 
of social discrimination of former exploiting classes. This same idea 
was expressed clearly in the drafts of the new Constitution and it was 
justified by the class nature of the Soviet state. The draft commission 
mentioned earlier had proposed that this new Constitution would 
preserve old principles. In fact, in one of its suggestions it proposed 
that political rights should be granted to all with one exception: those 
who had limited rights, i.e. lishentsy.9 As Arch Getty has emphasized, 
the majority of the public proposals concerning the Constitution of 
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	 1936 were against the idea that the "former people" should be 
rehabilitated politically. According to Getty, this was a result of the 
Soviet people's "sceptical plebeian reaction and general 
nonacceptance of many of the concepts of Western liberalism 
embodied in the text."10 However, Stalin personally rejected these 
class-minded suggestions and adopted more "liberal" principles; 
according to Stalin's amendments, political rights should be given to 
all Soviet citizens, i.e., to former Imperial officers and priests. 
Nonetheless, this "revolutionary" democratic gesture of Stalin's was 
made only as a counterweight to the Great Terror; during the purges 
and executions, Stalin himself was eagerly demonstrating in public 
that the Soviet Union was about to take a step towards real democracy. 
The inconsistency of this was, of course, immense. In a way, Stalin 
had a sense of vicious melodrama; "the enemies of the people" were 
scheming up a draft for a new Constitution and Soviet ideologists 
were celebrating Stalin's word that "sons are not responsible for the 
deeds of their fathers."11 
8 	 Unger 1981, 79-83; Clark 1984, 195-206; Khlevnyuk 1996, 152. As Sheila 
Fitzpatrick has remarked during the Great Purge, Soviet officials tried to calm 
down the feelings of the peasantry by organizing trials against the local officials. 
The charges were usually connected to the "arbitrary activity" or "abuse of power" 
of these local satraps. Fitzpatrick 1993, 299-311. 
9 	 GARF f. 6982, op.1, d. 1. "npoexr KoHcrHryItHH (ocHo nok 3aKon)." 
10 	 See Getty 1993, 126. 
11 	 Bolshevik 1936, No. 9, 17. "CouttanH3M x Hapou"; Bolshevik 1936, No. 11, 1-7. 
The liberal intervention of Stalin in civil rights also changed the 
principles of the Soviet religious policy. According to the new 
Constitution, the former disfranchised bourgeoisie and servants of 
cults were now granted political rights! It was therefore 
understandable that this liberal gesture of Stalin's forced the party 
ideologists and other communists to perform new ideological zig-zags. 
Accordingly, the Cult Commission compiled one of the most 
significant secret summaries on the impact of the new Constitution. 
This special "Report on the state of religious organizations in the 
USSR, their relation to the proposed new Constitution, the work of 
the Commission of Cults of the Central Executive Committee of the 
USSR, and the practices of implementing legislation on religious cults" 
was handed to the Presidium of the TsIK. It is one of the most 
revealing documents of that time. The candid evaluations and outlines 
of this report also expose the basic dilemmas of the Cult Commission 
with reference to relations to local officials. Consequently, this 	 139 
document is also one of the most authoritive pieces of evidence stating 
that the officials in the central organs in Moscow were aware of 
difficulties involved in supervising the brutal and independent activity 
of local officials in religious-political matters. And as had happened 
on many previous occasions, the central Cult Commission suggested 
more drastic measures to be taken as far as the local Soviet officials 
were concerned.'2 
If we examine this document in more detail, we may see how it 
demonstrates the drastic decline of the churches and prayer houses in 
the Soviet Union. The number of churches had decreased (see Table 
IV.1) in the RSFSR from 39, 530 (pre-revolutionary figure, 1914) to 
19, 212.13 If areas such as the Ukraine SSR, the Caucasian Federative 
SSR, the Belorussian SSR and the Uzbekistan SSR are taken into 
"KOHCTHTyUHA c0UHaJIHCTH9ecKoro rocyaaperaa pa6O'iHX H KpeCTbAH. 
Ilepea0aas." See also KP, 1938, No. 17. "Reno KOMCOMOJIKH lipocToMonoBofd." 
12 	 See GARF f. 5263, op.1, d. 32. rol. 1, II. 1-26. See also reaction of an ordinary 
party worker on allowing political rights to priests. ."..H nonbl xax Ncxaymne Ha 
HeTpy)OBHe ,t[OxOJtbI nOJDKHM 6b5Tb J1H111eHbl H36HpaTem,HBIX riper; H npasa 
6b1Tb H36paHHbIMH...." RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 120, d. 232, 1. 71. "IIHcbMa. 
noKa3bIBaIomHe, KBK pa60THHKH Ha MecTax HenpaBHnbHO 061,5ICHAIOT 
OTaenbHble CTaTbH KOHCTHTy11HH. H3BpaIU 1OT HX. BBO t5IT B 3a6ny)KaeHHe 
KOJIXO3HHKOB." 
13 Did not include figures from Eastern Siberiya, except the Kazakhskaya and 
Buryat-Mongolian autonomous republics, the Chelyabinskaya, Omsk and 
Orenburg oblasts. 
Table IV.1. Status of Religious Buildings in the USSR, April 1, 
1936. GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 32, 1. 3. 
Buildings open before 1917 Revolution 
RSFSR 39 530 
Ukraine 12 380 
Caucasus 3 965 
Belorussia 2 183 
Uzbekistan 15 905 
USSR 73 963 
140 closed legally not closed 
RSFSR 20 318 19 212 
Ukraine 7 341 4 487 
Caucasus 3 310 655 
Belorussia 1 706 477 
Uzbekistan 9 193 5 712 
USSR 41 868 30 543 
account, the number of prayer houses dropped from 72, 936 (in 1914) 
to 30, 543. As the document emphasized, compared with the original 
number, only 23.5% of the churches and prayer houses were 
functioning in the Soviet Union. In some places, Communist officials 
had been very effective, i.e., in Yakutia there was only one functioning 
church for believers out of the original 72 (1.6%).14 There were also 
local areas where all the churches had been obliterated; e.g., there 
were no functioning churches in 34 raions of the Saratov district's 53 
14 There were also other neglected areas, such as (DVK) the Far-East krai (1.6%), 
the Circassian autonomous oblast (1.6%), Azerbaijani (4.3%), the Volga German 
republic (5.8%) and Armenia (6.4%) functioning religious premises indicated in 
parentheses. 
raions. Moreover, as the document reveals, in many places there was 
no functioning church in adjacent areas (within 20-30-50 kilometres) 
where believers could "satisfy their religious needs." Nevertheless, as 
the document notes, there were also areas where over half of the 
churches had been preserved for religious use. Places such as 
Ivanovsk's oblast had 903 (61.3%) churches functioning compared 
with 1473 churches in use before the October Revolution.15 
Significantly this document also stressed that the publication of the 
Constitution of 1936 had encouraged nearly all the religious 
organizations to make complaints and petitions to the higher instances. 
According to this document, (compare to Table IV.2.) the number of 
written petitions to Kalinin and petitions made in corpore (xouoxos) 
to the Cult Commission had increased dramatically. Moreover, it 
claimed that the nature of these petitions had become more aggressive 
by the publication of the Constitution; henceforth people started to 
make demands rather than appeals. In many cases, believers could 	 141 
appeal to higher instances only by stating that the new Constitution 
was on their side. Furthermore, the believers had been able to exploit 
the neglects and errors of local officials. For instance if locals had 
not been able to tum the closed churches into any civil use, the 
believers could then demand that these churches be opened. In some 
cases, the new Constitution had encouraged them to ask for permission 
to perform their religious rites out in the open sky or even inspired 
them to draw up lengthy lists of demands with "overtly hostile 
expressions" such as reducing the taxes for religious premises to a 
minimum and "religious" amnesty, etc.16 
The confused tone of this report reveals how the leading officials 
were quite aware of the problematic attitude of the local authorities. 
Actually, the Cult Commission in Moscow regarded the brutal activity 
against the mass of believers as one of the main reasons for problems 
in the Soviet religious policy. Moreover, people's listed demands and 
believer's numerous petitions were not left disregarded. Moreover, this 
report clearly shows how the Cult Commission had to fight on two 
15 	 See RPTsKG, 300-302; RSS, 291-296. 
16 	 For peoples reactions to the Soviet Constitution, see GARF f. 5263, op.l, d. 32. 
ro1.2 ; See also GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 34, rol. 2; GARF f. 5263, op.1, d. 50, 
I. 14-15. "l1peuceuarenio LleHTpanbHoro HenoJHHTe7IbHoro KoMHrera 
C.C.C.P Toa. Kammnuy 30 imam 1936 rona." See also VG, 20 May, 1937, No. 
47 "B CCCP." 
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Table IV.2. 	 Conclusion on the work of the CSCRQ during 1935 
GARF f. 5263, op.1, d. 21, ro1.2. 
2010 petitions concerning the taxes of servants of cults 
1832 petitions concerning the liquidation of churches or 
other religious premises 
11718 petitions concerning temporary closing of religious 
premises 
petitions on the (hodokov) on personal basis 
1932 	  3219 
1933 	  1719 
1934 	  1094 
1935 	  2090 
fronts; firstly against overzealous local atheists and secondly against 
stubborn believers. The logical aftermath of this fight was that both 
believers and local atheists did not fully understood the role and 
position of this institutions. For believers the Cult Commission was 
just another persecutor; a part of the Soviet system. For local 
Communists the Cult Commission appeared as too "soft" and 
ineffective central organ. 
Nevertheless, with regard to the reasons for the mild détente in the 
Soviet religious policy in the mid-1930s, it was not only the resistance 
of the population or the will to appease foreign countries that brought 
a breathing space to the ROC. The explanation of the gradual modus 
vivendi with the ruling Communist regime was a new nationalistic 
attitude adopted by the Soviet government towards the tradition and 
Russian history." This, of course, did not mean any concord or peace 
with the religious organizations. The march of new traditional values 
represented a kind of restricted rehabilitation of the ROC along with 
17 	 Pipes 1961, 54-55; Carrere-d'Encausse 1982, 30. For the fusion of the Orthodox 
and Soviet nationalist ideology, see Pål Kolstos article. Kolsts 1984, 12-24. 
its traditional symbols. Of course, it might also be argued that during 
the Great Terror the religious organizations suffered more than any 
other institutions in Soviet society. However, the fact is that the end 
of the 1930s witnessed the mild rehabilitation of the national features 
of the ROC. 
As a revealing example of this new atmosphere we might take the 
incident when the famous Soviet poet Demyan Bedny composed a 
comedy featuring old Russian heroes, Bogatyri, in a satiric light. In 
this play Bedny depicted Orthodox clergy and Russian priests as 
drunken villains with very little intelligence. Suddenly, this play was 
withdrawn from the theater. The reason for this was Stalin's personal 
reaction. Stalin did not like Bedny's interpretation of these traditional 
Russian heroes and the fury of the Gensec was visible in a Politburo 
decision of 27 December 1936. Stalin's verdict was severe: this most 
authoritive organ of the Soviet state and communist party condemned 
Demyan Bednys Bogatyri, considering it, among other things, as 	 143 
"contradicting history", "antihistorical", "alien to Soviet high art." 
Moreover, the Politburo banned the performance of this work and 
suggested that P.M. Kerzhentsev (1881-1940), the chairman of the 
the Committee on Art Affairs of the Council of Peoples Commissars, 
should write an article in Pravda "in the spirit of this decision."'s 
Kerzhentsev's well-known article against Bedny and his play is a 
good illustration of Stalin's dislike of blasphemy against traditional 
Russian values. In this article, Kerzhentsev accused Bedny of 
depicting the baptizing of Pycb as a "drunken affair." Furthermore, 
Kerzhentsev, commented that adoption of Christianity had been a 
positive event in Russian history. Its arrival had provided a link 
between Russia and West. Also Greek clergy and scholars had arrived 
in Russia.19 
18 	 RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 3, d. 982 (Pp 44, 27/12-36). 
19 	 ."..B HOBO1t peaaxunn 6a ria uo6asneaa cosceM panbme oTcyrcTBosasma$ 
Tenta pa36okinnxOs, sse,aen0 nn C Toro HH C cero no1113o-n3,tesaTeJ1BcKn 
n3o6paacennoe xpeu[enne Pycx 6ytTo 6b1 "no nbAHOMy Aeny". rycTo 
pa3Manesaxa xapaxTepacrnxa pyccKNx 6orarbipeit." Izvestiya, 15 November 
1936 No.264(6121). "CianacncpnxauHA aapoaxoro npomnoro. (0 BoraTatpAx 
ZteMbAHa Bermoro)." The fashion of the 1920s to idolize pagan pre-Christian 
Russia was now over. See, for example, the instruction manual (from the 1930s) 
for the Soviet schools strongly advised taking into consideration that it would be 
"anti-historical and non-marxist" to idealize pre-Christian Russia and ignore the 
"progressive role of the monasteries" during the first century after the baptism of 
the Rus. PPP, 83-84. See also Vdovin 1995, 220. 
Thus, the creation and adoption of the new Constitution proved a 
watershed in relation to the ROC. Stalin wanted to consolidate his 
position, not only by terror, but by new reforms. In one sense he 
dissociated himself from his own party and played a role of "liberal" 
and wise ruler, who actually was annoyed by the faults and brute 
actions of his own regime. In his famous speech in the VIII All 
Russian Congress at the Soviets on 25 November 1936, he confidently 
endorsed the removal of the political restrictions imposed on "former 
people", such as priests and former imperial officers. According to 
Stalin, it was time to abolish these old restrictions and treat the 
lishentsy like other people. As he put it, the Soviet regime was now 
strong enough and many of these people were no longer enemies of 
the Soviet rule. The communist audience greeted Stalin's "boldness" 
with "massive applause."20 
As pointed out, Stalin's "liberal" opinion confronted officials and 
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	 ideologists inside the Soviet antireligious movement with many 
problems. It was quite a while before minor leaders could "comment" 
on the words of the Vozhd. The Soviet ideologists and officials, 
however, realized that Stalin's turning to the people had been only an 
demagocic gesture — without substance. However, some of the 
apparatchiks were of course afraid that the enemies of the people — 
religious organizations — might "misinterpret" or "misuse" the liberties 
offered to them by Stalin. This fear was obvious in articles and other 
written texts of that time. The popular Soviet legend of lurking and 
cunning enemies, capable of exploiting all the mistakes of Soviet 
power, was discussed again and again in Soviet newspapers. After 
20 	 ."..roBop$T. `ITO 3T0 OnacHO. TaK KaK MOryT n130ne3Tb B BepXOBHbie opranbi 
CTpaHbi Bpa)CAe6Hble COBeTCKON BnacTH 3JIeMeHTbt. Koe-KTO H3 6bIBIHHX 
6en0-rBapaeiiueB. KynaKOB. nOnOB N.T.A. Hy 9ero TyT C06CTBeHHo 6O5ITbCA? 
BonKoB 6o31Tbca. B nec He xoAHTb. (Becenoe o)KHBneHHe B Sane. 6ypHbie 
annOAHCHMeHTM). OKS, 25. "0 KOHCTHTyitHH CoIo3a CCP. foKnaA TOB. 
CranrHa H.B. Ha VIII BCeC0Io3HOM c e3Ae COBeTOB. 0 npoeKTe KOHCTHTYHHH 
Coio3a CCP 25 HOA6ps 1936 r.." See also PZM 1936, No. 11, 19-20. "O npoeKre 
KOHCTHTyUHH Coioaa CCP." According to a certain Soviet ideologist, I. Akulov, 
the majority of the proposals coming from the Soviet people dealt with civil rights 
(article 135). These people demanded that the priests and former enemies should 
not be allowed any political rights. These demands were usually justified by 
typical Soviet jargon..."the necessity of limiting the election rights of priests, 
former kulaks and all those who did not have socially acceptable work" (."..Ha 
Heo6xoAHMocTH JIHIHaTb n36HparenbHbix npaB TI MOB. 6bIBIIIHX xynaxoB H 
Bcex He 3aHHMaiouinxca o6utecTBeHHonone3HblM rpyaoM"). Bolshevik No. 22, 
17. "BceHapotHoe 06Cy)KAeHHe npoeKTa CTaJHHCKOh KOHCTHTyHHH." 
adoption of the new Constitution, these fears were aired over and over 
again in the Soviet newspapers. For example, Yaroslaysky even 
published a pamphlet which pacified his Communist readers by saying 
that there had been no real change in Soviet religious policy. The 
Soviet officials would continue to proceed with antireligious 
propaganda and fight against religion. As Yaroslaysky put it, if priests 
considered themselves to be candidates of local Soviets or even the 
Supreme Soviet, the Communists would reserve the right to fight 
against these people.2' 
Nonetheless, is the paranoia of the Bolshevik party the only 
appropriate answer? Could this interpretation explain the sudden 
abundance of pamphlets and warnings coming from the Soviet 
ideologists after the adoption of the new Constitution? In the light of 
archival documents it seems that the very process of the public debate 
and promulgating the Constitution had encouraged people to make 
real demands, as the Communists stressed — "impossible demands." 
The communist oligarchy seemed to realize that democracy was far 
too dangerous a matter — even to play with. For example, Yaroslaysky 
himself saw this revitalization of the clergy and believers as a real 
phenomenon. Consequently, he remarked that ecclesiastical 
organizations had started "energetic campaigns of demanding 
21 Yaroslaysky 1936, 9-14. ."..Hame oTHomeHHe K penHrHH. uepKBH. x 
CJIY)KHTeJ151M KyJIbTa ocTaeTcsl npe)KHHM. Mbl nonpe)KHeMy 6y.aeM BeCTH 
aHTHpenHrH03HyIO nponaraHay." Yaroslaysky 1936, 10. See also how 
Yaroslaysky defends Stalin's Constitution. RTsKhIDNI f. 89, op. 4, d. 55. "Hosaa 
KOHCTHTYIIHSI H BOnpOC 0 penHrHH (cneltyeT JIM orpaHH'iHBaTb cny)KHTeneh 
KynbTa B rpa)KJIaucKHx npaBax)." As late as 1937 Oleshchuk argued that Stalin's 
Constitution did not mean that it was time to return to the old society with its 
privileges for religion. PZM 1937, No. 8, 145-164. "Bbi6opbi B coseTbi H 
afTHpennrHo3Han nponaraHAa"; Bolshevik 1937, No. 20, 39-40. "IipoTHB 
6narouymHsl H 6ecneMHocTH B aHTHpeJIHrHO3HO}i pa6ore." See also Krylenko 
1936, 38-41. Actually, the 1936 Constitution gave birth to a whole genre of 
commentaries dealing with this matter. These booklets — "concerning the freedom 
of religion" — had one common feature: they all wanteed to rectify "the wrong" 
interpretations of this basic law of the Soviet Union. For some examples of these 
commentaries on the 1936 Constitution, see Kogan & Megruzhan 1938, 47-49, 
50-51; Kashirin 1939, 33-35, 42-46; Putintsev 1937, 6-7. The danger that 
believers would enter Soviet politics was, of course, marginal. However, the Soviet 
leaders seemed to be genuinely afraid that some alien elements might penetrate 
the Soviet system. Therefore, Stalin's democratic concessions were played down 
with these numerous pamphlets. See also Kalinin 1937, 3-4, 12; Kotlyar 1937, 
7-8, 67-69; Vyshinsky 1937, 12-13. Bakakin 1938, 23-24. See also POVVS 
1937, 3; Fitzpatrick 1994, 213. 
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reopening of the former churches."22  
It seems that the masses of the kolkhoz peasantry were obviously 
agitated as a result of the new Constitution. Moreover, it appears that 
believers started to question the acts of local officials and that among 
the peasantry there were rumours that the new Constitution had finally 
sanctioned the forced collectivization of 1929-1931. The Cult 
Commission in Moscow had also realized that the amount of petitions 
had been increased just after the adoption of the new Constitution.23 
Another interesting feature was the wave of émigré commentators who 
were busy criticizing this new new Constitution as Potemkin's 
facade.24 
The real tests for the new Constitution were the elections of the 
Supreme Soviet organized in 1937.25 The government, seeking 
desperatelly the total submission of the population, was, no doubt, 
more than interested to find out all its potential enemies. The elections 
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	 and census planned for 1937 were the best opportunity to do this. 
However, to the chagrin of the Soviet regime, the results of the census 
of 1937 proved to be unsatisfactory. 
The census itself was initiated in the same propagandistic style as 
the Constitution of 1936 and Stalin took a personal interest in this 
22 	 "....B CB513H C npHHATHeM HOBOt1 KOHCTHTy0HH CCCP MHOFHe CBAHIeHHHKH 
O'-IeHb aKTHBH3HpOBa]IHCb: OHH np0BOISIT 3HeprHYHyto KaMnaHHIo 3a 
OTKpbITHe 3aKpbITbIX npe)CJte uepxBeil. CO6HpaiOT CpejtCTBa Ha HX peMOHT H 
06HOBjIeHHe, )3a3Ke COCTaBAAIOT Te3HCbI Ans! riponoBeaei H 6ecet Ha TeMy 
KOHcrHTyuHH..." Bolshevik 1937, No. 4, 35. "AHrupenxrxo3Hast nponaranjta 
B cospeMeHHbIx ycnoBHAX." 
23 	 See examples of the complaints sent to the VtsIK and Kalinin. The attitudes 
expressed in these complaints and petitions seemed to be now (after the adoption 
of the new Constitution) more decisive. See especially GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 
41. See also GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d.45, (pkvk 8/21.8.-36). BP 1937, No. 7-8. 3. 
"IHHpe pa3Bepnyrb nponaraH)3y H36HpaTenbHorO 3axoHa!"; See the 
enthustiastic letter of the priest Aleksei Pospelov in which he glorifies Stalin and 
declares his total loyality to him for having created such a Constitution. 
RTsKhIDNI f.17, op. 120, d. 256, 1. 42-44. "HocHcpy BHccapnoHoBH'sy 
CTAJ1FIHY." See also BP 1937, No.9-10, 11. "IIe9aTm H Bbl6opbl B BepxoBHbIH 
CoseT CCCP." 
24 	 On the accounts of the émigré observers, N.N. Alekseev: Kytta HTTH? K Bonpocy 
O HOBON coeeTCKOIf KOHCTHTyuHH. 113AaHHe EBpa3161ueB. Petropolis-Verlag 
A.G. Berlin. 1936; S.I. Varshaysky: Hong CoseTexa$ KOHCTHTyuHB. 
Co)3epacaHHe ee. MOTHBbt H HCTHHHbHi CMbICn. BH6JIHOTeKa XyTOpb. Hpara. 
1936; B.V. Tryapkin: I(epKosb H rocyj.aperBo. 110)3 pe)axuHeH K)3eonorH-
`iecxoli KOMHCCHH PHCYB. 1I3AaTe7IbCTBO "Fonoc POCCHH." Sofia. 1939. 
25 	 Pravda, 13 October 1937, No. 283(7249). "HmpopMaunoHHoe coo6uteHHe o6 
ogepeAHoM nneayMe IZK BKII(6)." 
survey. The reasons for conducting a census to begin with were 
ambigious. On the one hand, the government needed authentic 
information on the populace. On the other hand, there was an 
ideological tendency to "improve" the results of this survey in order 
to fulfil the prophecies made by Khozyain and to verify the successes 
of communism in Russia. Especially, question No. 5 concerning 
religion was regarded as a question of loyality to the Soviet regime. 
The head of the census, I. A. Kraval (1897-1938), stated in one of 
his articles that, among other things, the census of 1937, should 
demonstrate the "successes" that the Soviet regime had gained in its 
fight against religious remnants. In order to obtain "good" results, 
question No. 5 was reduced to a question of loyalty - concerning one's 
personal conviction. It would take a certain amount of extra courage 
for someone to give a "religious answer" to this question. It is no 
wonder that wild rumours started to circulate in connection with this 
census. As Felix Corley has remarked26, many ordinary people were 	 147 
convinced that this census and the recording of believers was a signal 
for a new, more merciless persecution.27 
Despite all efforts the census gave too "unsatisfactory" results and 
it was proposed that the survey should be rectified again later. As 
usual, the guilty leaders (such as Kraval and others) were purged and 
executed later.28 New leaders were then nominated to lead this survey. 
As mentioned earlier, the results of the 1937 census had been too 
"misleading" and unsatisfactory for the Stalinist leadership. The 
information, on the one hand, was too realistic in the eyes of the 
Soviet regime. On the other hand, local officials were more than 
interested to know the real results of the census in order to discover 
26 	 Corley 1994, 405-410. 
27 	 Bolshevik 1936, No.21, 43, 46. "Bcecoro3Haa nepenncb HaceneHHa 1937 r.." 
See also Izvestiya, January 4 1937, No. 3 (6165); Izvestiya, January 8 1937, 
No.6(6168) "Kax npomna nepem cb." As Prof. V. Stepanov underlined in his 
article about the future census of 1937, the outcome of this sociological survey 
was already quite certain. ."..rlepenxcb AOJJKHa noKa3aTb Te orpoMHb[e CABHrM. 
KOTOpble npOH3OmnH B Haweh cTpaHe CO BpeMeHH BenMxot[ COItHanHCTH-
`iecxoh PeBonlounH AO Hacrosimero MOMeHTa, CABHrx. KOTOpbIMH crpafia 
OÖa3aHa My.HpOCTH H TBepAOMy pyKOBOACTBy KOMMyHHCTH4eCKOfl IlapTHH H 
ee reHHanbHblx BO)KAei J1eHHHa H CranHHa." Izvestiya, January 4 1937, No. 
3 (6165) "B 6binble roam." See also RSS, 304-307 "Rapport du directeur 
departement des Statistiques economiques de Bielorussie sur les rumeurs 
contre-revolutionnaires concernant le recensement." 
28 	 Usually, victims of purges were executed secretly and these people simply 
disappeared. Merridale 1996, 5. 
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t.4eHa 50 non. 
Hone vepnre nJrenbl 
B Kaman, Taacb, noasyr._ 
Tar zaannx rz •crxpearuA" 
Harvaan? wnroxos TDYa. 
Ho 3aranyan ru rpavnou, 
H nanpacao vana SLUT: 
On EatonOA pyaasnuu 
KpecT mnnona ne cnaceT. 
"...cross does not save the spy from the iron rule of Ezhov." A caricature by Dimitry Moor. It 
is composed in the form of a Russian "chastushka." Source: Bezbozhnik 1937, No. 11. 
"suspect elements." Consequently, because of these disappointing 
results the whole census was annulled and the survey was re-run later 
in 1939. In order to make sure that the results of this survey would 
now satisfy the leadership of the party, the new leaders of the census 
organized a massive campaign. Both the Soviet people at large and 
the people conducting this survey received better instructions and the 
notorious question No. 5 was amended: "in what social group do you 
belong; are you a worker...or servant of a religious organization or do 
you belong to non-working elements of the population."29 This time 
the results of this survey were more "convincing" in respect of religion. 
However, the constitution of 1936 and census of 1937 reveal the 
basic problematics of the Stalinist regime: the question of loyality and 
potential disloyality. The question of who would betray the Soviet 
system proved to be the most burning challenge and it seemed that 
the whole Stalinist society was now distinguising the sheep from the 
goats! During the late 1930s, it appeared that whole Soviet regime 	 149 
was in quest of potential Judas-candidates, trying to detect those who 
had no faith in the Communist dogma. For example, the Soviet 
officials were extremly worried over the possibility that the former 
lishentsy would be able to participate in elections and be elected to 
Soviets. So in response to this fear, the Soviet newspapers started a 
powerful campaign against those people to whom the Constitution had 
already guaranteed all political rights. The nature of these campaigns 
seemed to emphasize that the Soviet regime expected 101% support 
and loyality — total control of its people.3o 
This pathological fear of "potential enemies" was the driving force 
everywhere in the Soviet society. The Communist party stressed that 
29 	 Izvestiya, January 3 1937, No. 2 (6164) "Bcecolo3Haa nepenncb HaceneHHs." 
Izvestiya, May 24 1938, No. 119(6586). "Ilepenncb 1939 rota." See also SPR, 
No. 35, 15 August, 1938 "O Bcecolo3Hoii nepenncH Hacenenna 1939 rue"; PS 
1938, No. 16, 15 August, 15-22. According to Corley (he refers to Kolarz 1961, 
12-13), it is likely that the Soviet antireligious movement suffered purges, partly, 
on account of this ineffectiveness shown by the census. Corley 1994, 410. 
30 See examples, Bolshevik 1937, No. 5-6, 6-9. "IloAroToBKa napTHHHbIx 
opraHwsauHH K Bb160pau B BepXOBHbIN COBeT CCCP no HOBOh H36HpaTenbHolt 
cHCTeMe H COOTBeTCTByloma$ nepecTpofKa napTHilHo-noJHTH9ecKoi pa6oTbl. 
floxnaA TOB. )KAaHOBa Ha noel-Lyme UK BKII(6) 26 cpespana 1937 r."; 
Bolshevik 1937, No. 14, 21-23. "CaMbLN AeMOKparH9ecKHN H36HpaTenbHb!h 
saxoH'; Bolshevik 1937, No. 18, 38. "Boesble saua9H nonHTH9ecxoi 
arnrauuH." See also Pravda, 9 October, 1937, No. 279(7245) "PaIKOM napTHH 
6e3A.elicrsyeT. uepKOBHHKH pacnoacanncb." See also how in 1939 there was an 
attempt to "correct" the earlier census of 1937. KG 1939, No.10(6281). 
the purges and all extraordinary measures were justified by the future 
war and the people could not but yield. Moreover, with so many 
lurking enemies the Stalinist ideology justified the purges and all 
following extraordinary measures against the people by the coming 
war;31 in which the Western capitalists would try to entice potential 
traitors from the Soviet side. Thus the Soviet security organs were 
trying to root out the phalanges of possible traitors and wreckers. In 
fact, when questioning the loyalities of the Soviet population, the 
Soviet regime was especially interested in knowing those who were 
addicted to such vices as religion and nationality. So this quest to 
detect potential enemies was pervaded everywhere and the competing 
loyalities were regarded as mortal sin. For example, according to 
hysteric newspaper articles, the ecclesiastical organizations seemed to 
be lurking everywhere and were especially busy infiltrating recruits 
and officers of the Red Army. These "horror stories" claimed that 
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	 religious people and organizations were cunningly trying to steal the 
loyalty of the Red Army conscripts.32 
This desperate hunt for enemies and spies was more energetic in 
those areas where the real enemies were supposed to be more active, 
i.e. on Soviet borders. Consequently, the priests and mullahs in these 
areas were regarded as spies of foreign intelligence services. As a 
rule, these nests of spies, constantly being discovered, were always 
near the borders of the Soviet Union. According to the Soviet media, 
the Japanese, German and Polish intelligence services had eagerly 
trained special religious agents to spy. More notoriously, these wicked 
enemies had utilized especially Orthodox priests as their secret agents 
inside the Soviet Union. Moreover, as a sign of this paranoia, the Red 
31 	 Fitzpatrick 1994, 213-214. The prospects of a coming war were discussed in 
several Soviet newspapers. Especially the newspaper of the Red Army, Krasnaya 
Zvezda, mentioned in every number that a war was inevitable. 
32 	 As seen in this document, the Soviet ruling regime was anxious to seek out all 
conscripts with connections to "alien elements or, "lishentsy." However, it is 
remarkable that only 332 conscripts out of 63,781 turned out to be people of 
"alien- class-origin" or "criminals"; and only 3 of them were registered as 
"religious." See, for example, RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 120, d. 87, 1. 4. 
"ArxrMaccosoMy oraeny 111( BKII (6)." The head of the SVB, Yaroslaysky 
openly stated that the purpose of the antireligious work inside the army was to 
detect the loyalities of the conscripts, to find out who had an ecclesiastical 
background, who was a believer, who had connections to ecclesiastical 
organizations. 1Cz, 8 July 1938, No. 155(4005). "06 axrHpenHrxosHON pa6ore 
B KpacHoh ApMHH.' 
Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda published many letters from 
readers in which the "ordinary readers" complained that some of the 
personnel of the Red Army regarded the "authority of the church 
higher than the laws."33 
The hunt for potential traitors together with Stalins pseudo-liberal 
reforms, devastated the activity of the Cult Commission in Moscow 
during its last phase in 1936-1938. While it tried to adapt itself to the 
Stalinist reforms, it was busy in justifing its existence inside the Soviet 
buraucracy. Its main field of activity was, as before, to consolidate 
its authority over the local officials. However, the purges and reforms 
paralysed this organ and gradually the Soviet administration engulfed 
this Stalinist consistory of unbelief. 
3. "Just before the sunset" — CSCRQ 
struggling with defects and purges 
At the same time as Soviet society was desperately seeking out its 
potential enemies, the officials of the Cult Commission in Moscow 
were seriously trying to find ways of getting information from the 
provinces. The urgency to rectify the misdeeds of local officials was 
now emphasized in the official statistics and reports of the Cult 
Commission. The secret summary of the activity of the Cult 
Commission was, as we have seen, one of the most candid accounts 
concerning the activities of this organ. The report made in 1936 clearly 
acknowledged the "defects" of this commission, such as a lack of 
trained personnel and a lack of means to enforce its policies inside 
the Soviet Union. Moreover, it reveals that there prevailed a 
intolerable situation concerning the rights of believers. Even this 
document made by the Soviet officials themselves stressed that in the 
provinces there prevailed "grave violations of the Soviet legislation" 
33 	 KZ, 17 June 1937, No. 163(3711) "MeutaHHH." See also KZ, 4 August 1937, No. 
178(3726)."Mpaxo6ecta He upeMnxtr": KZ 1937, No. 180(3728) "Mynna 
ulrHOH": KZ, 9 January 1938, No. 7(3857). "IIonvi-mnxoHat": KZ, 22 July 1938, 
No. 167(4017) "IIInHOHM B pstcax." See also KG 1938, No. 25(5995) "r'naBapH 
uepxoBHHKOB"; KG, 27 August 1938, No.248(6218). "B Cy te. lIpouecc 
cexraHroB- KoHrppesontouxoxepoB." On Soviet legislation in 1936 concerning 
the penalties for espionage and for utilizing "religious or nationalistic relics in 
propaganda and agitation; see UK, 25, 28, 30, 35. Compare this with the earlier 
law from 1933: UKR, 24, 28. 
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concerning the religious cults (...Ha ocxosaHHH Hcex HMeloulHxesl 
MaTepHaJIOB B KOMHCCHH HeO6XO) HMo OTMeTHTb 60JIbUI0e 
KOJIH`ieCTBO rpy6blX HapylueHHH COBCTCKOrO 3axOHO,gaTeJIbCTBa O 
peJIHrHO3HbIX KynbTaX Ha MecTax...) This report emphasized that 
the "mistakes and administrative" methods of antireligious work had 
a destructive effect on those areas where "religious prejudices" were 
still strong. The list of mistakes made by local organizations was 
lengthy; one mistake was that local officials were too lenient and 
passive in relation to different religions. As this notorious report put 
it, local officials "did not often grasp politics in depth." These local 
party leaders and officials had no antireligious activity at all in their 
regions and they just excused it by mentioning that "religion had 
already perished" or "only old people (cTapHKH, crapyxH) were 
practising it." As this report claimed, the whole activity was following 
"machine-like order" (annapaTHoM nopA,axe) Moreover, when the 
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	 CSCRQ made formal request on the situation of the confiscated 
churches, the local officials usually justified their actions by saying 
that the former religious premises were now in good use or were 
intended to be transformed into something useful.34 
According to this archival document, local officials were a too 
brutal in relation to religious organizations. The problem was, as this 
document revealed, that the local satraps were totally unaware of 
Soviet laws or interpreted them incorrectly. Moreover, this report 
claimed that this brutal and nontactical attitude of the local Soviet 
executives was apparent in many practical matters; for example, 
churches were demanded to pay taxes in bread, churches were closed 
because of an alleged "epidemy", church bells were confiscated and 
local officials were taxing (summoned overtaxes) religious 
organizations with a heavy hand, etc. To sum up, churches were closed 
without proper knowledge of the local religious situation or 
preliminary antireligious campaigns. The situation inside the SVB 
34 	 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 32, roi. I "BBe,aeHHe"; GARF f.5263, op.l, d. 52, 1. 
1-68." This report is published, see RPTsKG, 310. " j_.loxnaa iiaA 3anHcKa o 
COCTOAHHH peJ1HfH03HbIX opraHH3auHN B CCCP. OTIIOWeIINA NX K npoeKTy 
HOBON KOHCTHTyOHN. pa60Ta KOMHCCHH KyJIbTOB 1HK CCCP H npaKTHxe 
npoBe,aeHHA 3axoHoaaTeJIbCTBa 0 peJIHrHo3HbIX KyJIbTax. For the critical 
report made by I.N. Uzkov, see RSS, 296-304. "Rapport de mission dans la region 
de Voronej de I.N. Uzkov, consultant-instructeur de la Comission des cultes aupres 
du Comite executif central å P.A. Krassikov, president de la Commission des 
cultes." 
movement was even more desperate; as this report quite discreetly 
put it "the SVB was still undergoing its period of getting organized." 
Actually, the real worry of Moscow was that the meaningless 
destruction of the churches and parishes would entice believers to 
form secret religious groups. Literally, fear of the Soviet regime for 
unofficial religious meetings proved beneficial to the official ROC. 
Consequently, fearing the loss of control forced the officials in 
Moscow to supervise the local officials — often with poor results!' 
The main guilt and responsibility for these mistakes were once 
again placed on the shoulders of local officials, who, according to this 
report, suffered from "political short-sightedness" in questions related 
to religion and causing "serious consequences" in the Soviet 
countryside. As a main problem, this report recognized the 
"short-sighted political viewpoints" of the local satraps; in some cases, 
local officials were just convinced that religion was for old people or 
that it would wither away of its own accord. This document also gives 
a frank picture of the disorder and chaos prevailing at the grass-roots 
level of the local Cult Commissions. Firstly, the network of the local 
CSCRQ commissions was not nationwide; as a matter of fact there 
was many local organs, autonomous republics, krais and oblasts where 
there were no local Cult Commission at all. A natural outcome of this 
chaos was, as this report often stressed, that all local matters related 
to religion were decided by administrative order (B annaparHom  
nopsAKe). Moreover, in the places where the local Cult Commission 
was actually functioning, it only dealt with questions concerning the 
closure of churches, etc. Nevertheless, it was the central Cult 
Commission that came under heavy fire: according to this report, the 
Cult Commission in Moscow did not bother to give any systematic 
instructions to raions. According to this rather murderous critique, the 
central bureucrats of this commission did not help locals in any way 
or did not supervise the grass-roots level of their own people in the 
provinces.36 
 
35 GARF f. 5263, op. I, d. 32, rol.l "BBeaexxe"; Alexeev 1979, 30. 
36 ."..KOMHCCHH He 3aHHMaIOTCA H3y9eHHeM Bonpoca, cooraeTCTByIOHIeir 
HH(pOpMaunekl npe3HAHyMOB Kpah-. 06nHCIIOAKOMOB. He 3aHHMaK)TCA 
CHCTeMaTH9eCKHM HHCTpyKTHpOBBHHeM pHK'OB. He nOMOr'aIOT HM. He CJIeAAT 
cHCTeMaTH9ecKH 3a IIpaBHnbHbIM npOBQAeHHeM B paROHaX 3aKOHOABTenbCTBa 
o xynbTax." GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 32, rol. 1 "BBeAeHHe": GARF f. 5263, 
op.l, d. 52, 1. 1-68."" . See also RPTsKG, 310-311. ",IloKnaAHaA 3anncxa o 
COCTOAHHH penHrHO3HbIX OpraHH3aI[HIi B CCCP. OTHOWeHHA HX K npOeKTy 
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Disappointingly enough, this report acknowledged that the main 
functions of the local Cult Commissions were usually dealt with by 
the local NKVD, i.e., terror. And as a rule, believer's petitions were 
simply treated with brutality. As this report put it, there prevailed a 
local anarchy in these matters; in some cases an individual church 
was closed down by the decision of the village Soviet chairman. The 
defects this report list were numerous. For instance, as a typical 
incident a certain chairman of the one individual rik (patio"' HEM 
HcnonHHTenbHbIii KOMHTeT) named Lapshin decided to take down 
(pa36opxa) the local church before the decision of the local 
oblispolkom. Despite the protests coming from the local Soviet 
procurator, this stubborn Lapshin did not bother to change his policy 
towards the doomed church?' 
These numerous accounts of defects and misdeeds proved fatal for 
this commission. The leading role of the Cult Commission in Moscow 
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	 met with escalating criticism from the higher party officials. Although 
the party's religious-political organ, CAP, had been dissolved earlier, 
the party had preserved its special "Section of Culture and 
Enlightenment", SCE (OT,gen KynbTnpocseTpa6oTbl), which took 
intrest in Soviet religious policy. Moreover, as can be seen from 
documents from the early 1930s, the Gensec . himself had been 
interested in leading Soviet cultural questions when members of the 
Politburo divided duties among themselves.38 
When examining these reports, it seems to be likely that the whole 
system of Cult Commissions was gradually exposed to criticism. 
Especially the "non-existing" atheist activity of the Cult Commission 
raised the eyebrowns of the apparatchik's. As a sign of this increasing 
suspicion was a special memorandum written by the party's 
authoritative "Section of Culture and Enlightenment" — SCE. 
According to this memo, delivered in 1937, religious organizations 
were prospering and "the special commission which was supposed to 
HOBO}i KOHCTHTyRHH. pa60Ta KOMHCCHH KyJIbTOB 1.I11K CCCP H HpaKTHKe 
npoBel[eHHa 3aKOH0AaTeJIbcTBa O peJIHrNO3HbIX KynbTaX." 
37 
	
	
GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 32, rol. 1 "BBej[eHHe"; GARF f. 5263, op.1, d. 52, 1. 
1-68." See also, RPTsKG, 311-316. ",Iloxna,gHaa 3anHCKa o cocroxHHH 
penHrH03HbIX OpraHH3aIIHI1 B CCCP, OTHOIHCHHa HX K HpOeKTy HOBON 
KOHCTHTy1[HH, pa6oTa KOMHCCHH KyJI6T0B 1Z14K CCCP H HpaKTHKe 
HpoBeljeHHa 3aKOHOaaTenbCTBa O penHCHO3HbIX KynbTaX." 
38 SPG, 141. "110CTaHOBneHHe IIonHT6lopo 0 pacnpeaeneHHH o6a3aHHocrell 
Meacz[y cexpeTapaMH 11K. 4 HIOHa 1934." 
conduct this work" (it meaning the Cult Commission) was in fact 
doing nothing and had no authority whatsoever among the Soviet 
officials.39 
This criticism presented by the SCE struck heavily on the Cult 
Commission and the SVB movement. Both were regarded as guilty 
of weak performance in the antireligious propaganda when the SCE 
painted the religious political situation in the Soviet Union with dark 
colours. According to this gloomy report concerning "the cultural and 
enlightenment work" in the Russian countryside, the majority of the 
kolhozniki in the Russian countryside were still illiterate and 
non-political. Moreover, ordinary people were still under the influence 
of religious relics; they were baptizing their children and suffering 
from "dirt, sicknesses, icons, alcoholism...."40 Moreover, according to 
this report, believers were utilizing weaknesses in this commission 
and were engaged in an active fight against the collective farms. For 
example, the Buddhist Lamas were conducting their religious festivals 
in order to instigate Japan's "holy war" against the Soviet Union, etc. 
However, as this report stressed, the local party organs (sic!) were 
trying to organize antireligious activity. In fact, the local party officials 
had not been able to follow the ambiguous instructions given to them 
by the Cult Commission. So it was understandable that this would 
lead to chaos; while the local officials were trying to do their best in 
fighting against religion, their administrative methods often aided the 
revitalization of religion. Those really guilty, however, of the weak 
implementation of the antireligious work were not the local comrades 
but people in the Cult Commission and in SVB movement.'" 
39 ."..KOMHCCHH no nenaM KyJIbTOB npH UHK pecny6nax H HCnonKOMax xpae6 
H o6naCTeN. npH3BBHHble Ha6nx)naTb 3a npaBHnbHb1M OCyHIeCTBneHHeM 
coBeTCKOrO 3aKOHOnaTenbCTBa no BOnpOcaM penHrHH H pa3peIDaTb cnopHble 
BOnpOCbl B 3T017 06naCTH - 6e3n.eNCTByK)T H C HHMH HHKTO He C4HTaeTC51." 
RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 120, d. 256, 1. 39-40. "3anncxa oTnena xynbrnpocBeT- 
pa6oTb1 LIK BKII(6) (TaMapKHH, 3nIDTenH, CCKpeTapAM LIK BKII/6/.TOB. 
KaraHoBH4y J1.M., TOB. AHnpeeBy, A.A., TOB. ENroBy H.14. o COCTOAHHH 
aHTHpenHrHo3Hor1 pa6oTb1. GeBpanb 1937." 
40 See RTsKHIDNI f.17, op.120, d. 200, 1.102, "CeKperapAM LIK BKII /6/. TOB. 
CTanHHy 13.B., TOB. KaranoBH4y, TOB. >KnaHOBy A.A., TOB. AHnpeeBy A.A. 
TOB. EJKOBy H.1'1. 0 COCTOAHHH KynbTypHo-npOCBeTHTenbHorl pa60TbI B 
nepeBHe." 
41 RTsKhIDNI f. 17, op. 120, d. 256, 1. 38-41. "3anHexa oTnena xynbTnpocseT- 
pa60Tb1 UK BKII(6) (TaMapKHH, 3nHITeNH) ceKperapAM UK BKII/6/.TOB. 
KaraHoBH4y JI.M., TOB. AHnpeeBy, A.A., TOB. EJKOBy H.14. O COCTOAHHH 
anrHpenHrHo3Hor1 pa6oTb1. 1Despanb 1937." 
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The story of this report bears the hallmarks of the reign of terror. 
When explaining weaknesses and excesses this report believes that it 
was the "enemies of the people" who had been able to nullify the real 
work of SVB activists; according to this report, the League had been 
plagued by "sabotage, counter-revolutionary and avant-garde 
elements." The damage had nearly crippled Soviet atheist activity 
totally; this report summarized the damage by calculating that during 
the period of 1934-36 "enemies of people" had penetrated to the 
Leningrad, Ukraine, Crimea, Uzbekistan, Saratov, and Arkhangelsk 
SVB organizations 42 Exposure of many of these critical evaluations 
of the ineffectiveness of the Soviet atheist work, made it look as the 
whole atheist movement were on the verge of collapse at that time. 
The general tone of these accusations is always the same; the Cult 
Commission did nothing and the Bezbozhniks were "lazy" and did 
little in antireligious propaganda. 
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	 Another interesting feature in the late history of the CSCRQ was 
its increasing emphasis on restricting the most brutal antireligious 
actions of the local vigilantes. As a matter of fact, the increasing 
suspicion of the Cult Commission and the desire to restrict the local 
officials go hand in hand. 
The Cult Commission had started to make efforts against atheist 
zealots and their arbitrary activism in the early 1930s; from the "good 
years" of the 1930s the Cult Commission had tried to pacify the local 
party zealots. This "moderate" stand of the CSCRQ is even more 
striking when compared with the material coming from archives and 
the opinions presented by some modem authors. According to archival 
material, the central organs of the Soviet regime were actually trying 
to restrict the voluntary activities of the local organs. The Cult 
Commission urged several times that the national republics should 
42 	 RTsKhIDNI £ 17, op. 120, d. 256, 1. 38-41. "3anHcxa orp,ena KynbrnpocseT- 
pa6orbl UK BKH(6) (TaMapKHH, 3nIDre iH) cexperapslM UK BKII/6/.ros. 
KaraHosHvty JLM., ros. AllapeeBy. A.A.. TOB. Bacon),  H.H. 0 COCTO$IHHH 
aHTHpenirHo3Hoi1 pa6orbI. tDespanb 1937." See also GARF f. 5407. op. 1, d. 
107 "0 speAHrenbcrae B CBS." See also the grave evaluations of the activity 
of the SVB movement:."..Colos BOHHCTByx)IIHX 6e36o *UIHKOB pa6oraer 
apx H-Hnoxo. sa nocne,tHHe roam cBepHyn CBOIO JIeATeJlbHocrb. B psae 
o6nacrei 0rjteneHH$I colosa pa3BaJ1HJIHcb. pacreps rit CBOH axris, 3acopeHbl 
`Iy)iKAbIMH Jno uMH..." Pravda, 7 May 1937, No. 124(7090) "AHTHpeJIHrHo3Ha5 
nponaraHaa." See also Pravda, 5 April 1937, No. 94(7060) " BesaehcTByJOnlne 
6e360>KHHKH." See also BP 1937, No.2-3, 11. "Ilenarb H aHTHpenfFHO3Ha$ 
nponaraarta." 
correct their mistakes in religious policy. For example, in its letter to 
the chairman of the TsIK of the Belorussian republic, A.G. 
Chervyakov (1892-1937), the Cult Commission in Moscow strongly 
advised local officials in Belorussia to stop their brutalities when 
dealing with religious organizations. As comrades in Moscow stressed, 
the principle of liquidating prayer houses in order to destroy them 
later was no wise policy and these brutal actions only helped the 
"hostile class elements." These believers would then utilize these 
mistakes for their own anti-Soviet purposes.43  
As pointed out, this "unauthorized activity" was seen as a major 
setback in the secret annual report summarizing the activities of the 
CSCRQ in 1936. To sum up, the Cult Commission saw that the main 
error of the local workers was their "the unauthorized (samowolxnoe) 
actions" in respect of religious organizations. As a certain circular 
letter to all the local party organs, such as the oblastkoms, 
kraiispolkoms and TsIK's of the autonomous republics stressed, all 
unauthorized actions against religion were supposed to stop. As a 
matter of fact, the Cult Commission demanded that people "guilty" 
of such brutal actions were to be put under "legal charge."44 
So should this contrast between the aforementioned realistic 
documents and the pompous antireligious declarations issued for 
public use be interpreted merely as the result of an ordinary Bolshevik 
practice of falsifying the truth? On the one hand, this inconsistency 
can be resolved by visualizing the Marxist interpretation of reality. If 
the realistic information from the provinces constituted an objective 
truth, then Soviet propaganda amounted to class truth. It was the ideal 
world of the party. On the other hand, the fact remains that the Cult 
43 Again the "local workers" had to assume the main responsibility for "excesses." 
See, for example, ."..Y Hac co3naercA MHeHHe, 9TO MecTHble pa6oTHHKH 
yaneKatOTCA 3THM nenOM H HeA0y9HTbIBB10T TOTO Bpena, KOTOpbIfl HpHHOCAT 
BCAKHe neperH6bl. OHH npeAn09HTaIOT MaccOBO-pasbACHHTenbHOFI pa6ore 
MeTOn.bl aAMHHHCTpaTHBHOTO HaJKHMa Ha penHTHO3Hble OpraHH3auHH H 
CnyJKHTeneN KynbTa H TOM CaMbIM nbITaIOTCA nOKOH9HTb C penHrHeN." GARF 
f. 5263, op. 1, d. 21 "IIpeAcenarenlo L11iK"a fienopyccxoil CCP TOB. 
LIepBAxosy AT. 8.10.1936." See also GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 21 
"1lpencenaTenlo IRIK"a YKpaHHcxoH CCP TOB. IIeTposcxoMy T.H. 8.10.1936." 
44 ."..Heo6xonHMo nOnOJKHTb Konen 3THM HapylHenaaM coaercxoro 
3aKOHOHAaTenbCTBa H COBeTCKON nOnHTHKH...B O6naCTH nnaHOMepHOH, 
OHHpa101IteHCA Ha pOCT aKTHBHOCTH CaMHx TpyAAH1HXCA 60pb6b1 C 
penHrHO3HbIMH nepexcxrxaMH." GARF f. 5263, op.1, d. 21 "IlHpxynap. BceM 
o6nacTxoMaM, KpanHcnonxoMaM H IIHK"aM ACCP." 
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Commission and the Soviet regime were desperately aware of the real 
situation in the field and had a real concern to gain control of the 
situation in the provinces. Unfortunately, these efforts of the 
Bolsheviks to bring local oblasts into line were something that had 
also posed a problem for other rulers of Russia before them. 
The fact is that the central Cult Commission in Moscow was aware 
of defects in the provinces but it could only criticize these features. 
On the one hand, the Soviet criminal law concerning religious offences 
was quite strict: the activity of the religious organizations should be 
kept to the confines of church buildings 45 On the other hand, it should 
be kept in mind that the rulers were mainly concerned to keep the 
local officials and the masses of believers under control. It may seems 
quite peculiar but when detecting the archival documents, it was only 
very seldom, as during the Cultural Revolution or Great Purges, that 
they were ready to carry out coordinated religious persecutions per 
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	 se. Without proper material stimulus or something to loot such as the 
metal from the church bells or valuable items, the central officials in 
Moscow favoured less belligerent solutions in relation to believers. 
The logic of the central official in Moscow was simple: if the closure 
of some churches were executed with brutal procedures, the believers 
would consider this only as an illegal act and would join "counter-
revolutionary groupings." This was regarded more dangerous than the 
membership in the offical ROC.46 However, it was no wonder that 
the influence of the central Cult Commission started to decline 
dramatically in the late 1930s and that members of the commission 
did not bother to show up at the regular meetings of the CSCRQ. 
Krasikov, Borisov and Oleshchuk were the last Mohicans in this 
commission. The final countdown for the closing down of this 
commission had already started inside the ruling party and the Great 
Terror sealed the fate of the Cult Commission.47 
45 	 UK, 64-65. See especially § 127. 
46 	 GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d.45, (pkvk 6/10.5.-36). 
47 	 GARF f. 5263, op.l, d.47, ro1.2. 
4. Purges and crippling antireligious 
activity 
The purges had a devastating impact on the work of the Cult 
Commission and especially on the activity of the Soviet Godless 
movement. The purges escalated in three phases: the so-called 
ordinary purge of 1932-1933 inside the party. In 1934-1935 physical 
terror was initiated on a large scale after the murder of Kirov; massive 
killings started after 1936 and at the last phase, 1936-1938, the feared 
troiki of the NKVD were revived. On July 1937, the terror was 
expanding to people who could hardly be described as opponents of 
the party or the Soviet system. 
The religious organizations suffered again and with severe 
consequences. Now, during the Great Purges, after somewhat milder 
years of Soviet religious policy, the terror was introduced 
systematically against the servants of the cults. Especially during its 
last phase, masses of believers, priests, bishops, and also sectarians, 
were dispatched to the Gulag or to execution chambers in large 
numbers. The reason for this new persecution was evident: as Robert 
W. Thurston has remarked, in 1937, Stalin turned against anyone and 
the "usual suspects", such as priests and lishentsy, were too good a 
target for this new wave of terror.48 
The actual process of the Great Terror was, however, quite slow. 
The password of the year 1935 had been — "vigilance." The calls for 
vigilance and alertness appeared everywhere in Soviet newspapers. 
As a sign of this proletarian witch hunt, armies of party ideologists 
started to search for "heretical" opinions everywhere, only to perish 
later themselves. To demonstrate the profound nature of this new 
chistka, we could take a revealing example: nearly all earlier Soviet 
publications and works on Marxist philosophy and ideology were now 
criticized for being too soft. Suddenly in 1935, the party realized that 
it had been guilty of not maintaining proper vigilance. This shock 
realization was evident also in the Soviet antireligious activity: earlier 
antireligious literature was put under a microscope; especially the 
48 	 Thurston 1996, 62. See this list of "usual" enemies, who were chosen to be victims 
during the latest phase of the great terror ."..HaH6onee aKTHBHble aHTHcoseTCKHe 
3neMeHTb1 N3 6bIBIUHX KyJIaKOB. Kapa-renen. 6aHJIHTOB, 6enblX, CeKTaHTCKHX 
aKTHBHCTOB, lIepKOBHHKOB H HpoIIHX. cotepxcautuxcsi B Trop:Max. narepxx. 
TpyjtosbIX nocenxax H KOnoHHAX." LM, 43. 
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works of former "Mechanists" and ex-oppositionists were given 
special attention.49 
The chistka escalated to actual purges when S.M. Kirov was 
murdered. The actual process of arrests followed its own pattern; on 
December 1, 1934, Leonid V. Nikolaev assassinated Kirov in the 
corridors of Smolny, Leningrad. The highest leadership of the Soviet 
Union reacted to this act with a strong expression of sorrow and 
solidarity.50 The "Kirov murderers" were now arrested in great numbers 
and Stalin himself arrived to Leningrad to head the investigations and 
issued a decree that demanded the death penalty for terrorist acts $1  
Immediately after Kirov's murder, the Soviet press launched a 
campaign of vigilance and called for the exposure of all hidden 
enemies. Moreover, the Central Committee of the party issued a secret 
letter, "Lesson of the Events Connected With The Evil Murder of 
Comrade Kirov", and had sent it to all the party committees around 
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	 the Soviet Union.52 
49 	 See example, PZM 1935, No. 1, 196-201. "IIosiwara anepea H Tonraube Ha 
Mecre." 
50 	 See Levytsky 1974, 37-40. 
51 	 Conquest 1971, 72-82. In the opinion of many historians, Kirov's murder was 
conspired by Stalin himself. The practical plot to murder Kirov (assisting, arming 
and instructing Nikolaev) was organized by Genrich Yagoda and Ivan 
Zaporozhets, leaders of the Soviet security police. Conquest 1971, 74-77. 
However, the idea of presenting Kirov as a "soft" or "liberal" Soviet leader who 
would have been a better option for Stalin is problematic. As Arch Getty has 
stated, Kirov had been in charge of Leningrad during the brutalities of 
collectivization, he had supervised the rooting out of communist opposition, and 
during his reign churches were destroyed more than during that of Zinovev or 
Zhdanov. Getty 1993b, 44. 
52 	 The victim of this purge had anyhow already been decided; Kirov's murder was 
a pretext for Stalin to settle old scores with his own party. Kirov's murderer, 
Leonid Nikolaev, according to many historians, was a mole inspired by Yagoda, 
the head of the NKVD. Nikolaev was executed after short interrogations. 
However, the main role of scapegoat was reserved to the phalanx of old leaders 
of the communist opposition - mainly Zinovev and Kamenev. Both of these men 
had been expelled various times but before 1934 they had been always readmitted 
to the the party. Now the so-called "Kirov Purge" escalated as a more bloody 
krypteia against all levels of the ruling regime inside the party and state. Moreover, 
the so-called proverka, exchange of party documents in 1936, was transformed 
to a last phase of the Great Purge in 1936. Throughout the end of 1934, the Soviet 
press and security forces had discovered "hirelings" of notorius assassins. The 
Leningrad party organization and those related to the accused old oppositionists 
were the second victims of the purge. So-called "Kirov's murderers" were arrested 
and deported en masse and thousands of those associated with the former 
opposition perished in the Gulag. Conquest 1986, 85-86. 
Kirov's murder was the signal for the commencement of terror and 
persecution against the whole political the opposition inside the Soviet 
Union, including also religious organizations. During the worst mass 
hysteria after Kirov's murder nearly all religious organizations (among 
other suspects) were regarded as directly or indirectly responsible, 
either assisting in the wicked murder or at least supporting it in some 
other way. As a good example of the mass hysteria, we have a letter 
from the members of the Komsomols and pioneers from the 
Petrogradsky raion (Leningrad) in which they appealed to Zhdanov, 
the new party leader of the city, to close the church of St. Vladimir 
because their own parents were "just running to church from dawn to 
dusk and did not let the children go to school."53  
The systematic purge against "the enemies of the people" crippled 
the Soviet antireligious movement and the work of the CSCRQ; 
especially the personnel and cadres of the SVB movement were under 
heavy fire. A few of these people had worked also inside the Cult 	 161 
Commission. Among these first victims was the distinguished leader 
of the SVB-Leningrad party organizations, N.M. Matorin. Matorin was 
found guilty without any deeper scrutiny; it is likely that the main 
reason for his discovery was his past acquaintance with Zinovev, who 
was one of the main victims in this purge. As the periodical, 
Antireligioznik, put it... 
."..At the head of the SVB Leningrad organization stood for a long 
time a double-dealer, Zinovievite Matorin, who actually was many 
times expelled from the party owing to his activity in the 
opposition."54 
53 	 SPI, 68. "AHOHHMHOe nHCbMO "KOMCOMonblles H nHOHepOB" BeTporpaacxoro 
pafioHa A.A. )KAaHOBy C npOCb6O}I 3aKpbITb c06op KH. BnaAHMHpa. PaHee 9 
cpeapana 1935 r.." 
54 "Bo matte neHHHrpaxcxoii opraHH3auHH BOHHCTBy1OUIHX 6e360)KHHKOB B 
TegeHHe aoHroro BpeMeHH CTOAn ABypy1IIHHK 3HHoebeBeU MaTopHH, KOTOpbllt 
3a 0111103HUHOHHyIO AeATenbHOCTb HeCKOnbK0 pa3 HCKn109anCA 1.13 napTHH 14 
npH cBOeM nocneAHeM BOCCTaHOBneHHH. KaK 3T0 BbIACHHnOCb Ha napT9HCTKe 
1933r. ense coxpaHAn 3HHOBbeBCKHe yCTÜHOBKH n0 ueio y paay BOnpOCOB. 
MaropHH BbIBe1teH 113 cocraBa 9neHOB 1LeHTpanbnoro H JleHHHrpascxoro 
o6naCTHoro coseTOB 6e36o>KHHKOB." AR 1935, No. 1, 8. "C.M. KHpoB xax 
peaoniouHoaep H 6e36oAHHx." 6/a. The case of Matorin was dealt with later; 
the information sheet of the Antireligioznik jsimply reported that N.M. Matorin 
was officially expelled from the Central Council of the SVB movement and from 
the ranks of the party. AR 1935, No. 2, 41. "XpoHHKa. PeuserHA pa6o9ero 
flpe3HAHyMa LIC CBE." 6/a. See also how any lucid ideas about being generous 
Earlier, the communist criticism had been conducted much more 
leniently. For example, when the Leningrad organization of the SVB 
had been attacked in 1932, the criticism had contained also some 
"positive" features.55 Now after Kirov's murder, there was hardly 
anything positive to mention concerning the Leningrad SVB 
movement. The leader of the Leningrad SVB organization, Matorin, 
was only the first significant victim and the witch hunt instigated by 
the leadership of the party spread vertically into the party hierarchy. 
All those who had had any close contact with Matorin or had been 
working with him were now in danger of perishing. However, at this 
point, only the Leningrad SVB was considered as the headquarters of 
the "counter-revolution" and the criticism was directed against the 
"failures" of the SVB in Leningrad. 
However, the circle of the accused ones was spreading; A. 
Lukachevsky, the vice-leader of the SVB, was at that time presiding 
162 
	
	 over certain SVB meeting in Sverdlovsk when the resolution of this 
meeting condemned "enemies of the people" responsible for Kirov's 
murder. Nevertheless, in his speech, Lukachevsky was optimistic and 
praised the achievements of the SVB movement, something that 
perhaps accelerated his sudden fall in disgrace. Perhaps, in the 
atmosphere of self-criticism there was no place for overconfident 
leaders such as Lukachevsky, who actually had moved along with the 
official Bolshevik dogma condemning both "leftist mistakes" and 
"opportunist convictions." However, the congress acknowledged that 
there were other enemies of people than Matorin "lurking behind the 
SVB." According to this resolution certain people such as Matorin, 
M.N. Pokrovsky (1868-1932)56 (sic!), Sigorin etc. had been 
or ideas of "mercy upon the enemies" were considered as harmful. As the 
newspaper Pod Znamenem Marksizma put it, the "Proletarian Humanism" did not 
include any traces of "Christian Humanism"; enemies should be treated without 
mercy. PZM 1935, No. 4, 10. " Hponerapcxnii ryMaxnSM." rlepenoean. See also 
Bezbozhnik 1936, No. 9, 4. "MocxoacxoMy KOMHrery BKII(6). Pesoniouax 
oautero co6paaln COTpyAHHKOB UC CBB MocKoacxoro CoBeTa CBB H 
rocy,aapernexxoro aHTHpenxrHosxoro H3AaTenbcTsa" and Bolshevik 1937, No. 
1, 19. "Camas' AeMoKparM'iecxax KOHCTHTylIHn B MHpe." 
55 	 Lanin 1932, 98. 
56 	 If the resolution points at the late M.N. Pokrovsky, this was the first and the last 
time when his name was mentioned. If this was the writer's intention, Pokrovsky 
was among the first ones to be ostracized posthumously. In any event, the 
publication of Pokrovky`s works had ceased in 1934 and it was not until 1936 
that Stalin himself characterized the so-called "Pokrovsky school of 
historiography" as "erroneous." Moreover, his old colleagues, N.M. Lukin and 
conducting their harmful activity inside the SVB.57 
However, the reign of terror was spreading rapidly and had also 
reached the Cult Commission. According to a certain report issued 
inside the central Cult Commission, the whole SVB organization had 
been infested with "counter-revolutionary, Trotskyite-Zinovievites and 
criminal elements." The report stated that these elements had been 
discovered the previous year in Ukraine, the Leningrad oblast, 
Georgia, Crimea, the Kuibyshev oblast, the Western oblast."58 
In fact, the next category of victims in the Soviet antireligious 
movement were to meet their destiny when an editorial in the 
Antireligioznik proclaimed that "trotskyite-zinovievites" Matorin and 
Sigorin were enemies (now comes the notorious phrase — "H !ix 
npHcnemHllxaMH") "together with their followers." This phrase put 
the blame on all those who were still continuing their work inside the 
SVB movement.59 However, this was nothing compared with 
forthcoming revelations at the great political trial against Trotskyites 	 163 
P.O. Gorin (both had been active in the party's antireligious campaigns in the 
1920s) were liquidated in the purges. Keep 1995, 390. See also Enteen 1984, 
159-168. 
57 	 "Binio noxa3aHo Ha pste KOHKpeTHbIX cpaKTOB, KAK XanaTHO OTHOCHMCA MM 
K BbrAa'e 9neHCKoro 6Hnera CBE...oH nonaaaer B pyxn Knaccoro Bpara. 
KOTOpbIN npHKpb1Baer HM CBOIO KOHTppertomouNOHHyIO AeATenbHOCTb, KaK 
3T0 6bIAO C MaTOpHHbIM. IIOKpoBCKHM. CHFOpHHMM B JIeHHHrpaae H T.A.. 
Soldatov 1935, 37. At this time, the main lecture of this meeting was held by 
Lukachevsky. Soldatov eulogized Lukachevsky with accolades such as..."B cBoeM 
aoxna to T. IlyKa9escxHtl o'eHb Sipco H xpaco9Ho noxa3an Te rpoMatHettmne 
AOCTH)KeHHA B 06naCTH COHHanHCT}i9eCKoro CTpoMTenbcTBa, KOTOpbIX 
A06HAHCb pa6o9He H KOJIXO3HHKH B Hameh crpaHe not pyKOBOACTBOM 
KOMMyHHCTH9eCKOti napTHH H JIIo6HMOr0 BO)KAA scex TpyAAWHXCA T. 
Cranium." Soldatov 1935, 37. Criticism against the SVB movement during 1936. 
See PZM 1936, No. 2-3, 90-91. "0 Hamnx 3aJa9ax Ha a HTHpeJIHrHo3HOM 
cpponre." However, it seemed that the remorseful waves of self-criticism were 
the best guarantee against blind terror; for example, an editorial in the journal 
Pod Znamenem Marksizma repented and blamed itself of being too weak in 
antireligious work. PZM 1937, No. 3, 14-15. "K 15-nernto crarbH B. Jlennaa 
"0 3HaMeHHH BOHHCrBytoulero MaTepHaJIH3Ma." See also other accusations 
against Matorin and Pokrovsky. PZM 1935, No. 2, 11-12. "3a 6onbmeBHcrexylo 
6AHTenbHOCTb." IlepeaoBan. 
58 	 ."..PAA cpaKTOB 3a nocneaHHtl roA fOKa3bIBA1OT Haw5onbmylO 3ACOpeHHOCTb 
annapaTOB COBeTOB CBE KOHTp-peBOnIOLIHOHHbIM TpOLIKHCTCK0-3HHOBbeBCKHM 
H yrOnOBHMM aneMeHroM (LIC CBE YKpaHHbt. J1eHHHrpatCKHil 06ncoBeT, LIC 
Fpy3HH. LIC KpMMa. Kyt16MmeBCKHtt o6ncoser. 3anaxubm o6ncoBer H ap.)." 
GARF f. 5263, op. 1, 32 roll "Wwedenie." 
59 	 AR 1935, No. 5. 43. "Ilepecrpotixa pa6orbl CBS B CBSI3H c ynpa3AHeIIHeM 
nnaTHIAX pa6orHHxos B paitoxax." 
and Zinovievites; on June 26, the Central Committee of the party sent 
a secret letter to local organizations concerning "the terrorist activities 
of the trotskyite-zinovievite counter-revolutionary bloc." The Zinovev-
Kamenev trial took place in August and the outcome was that all the 
16 accused were executed. The accusations in party newspapers 
foreshadowed a new round of purges. The main architect of Kirov's 
murder, Yagoda, was removed from his post of as a Commissar of 
the NKVD and given a minor position (later executed) and replaced 
by N.I. Ezhov (1895-1939). The Politburo now ordered with the total 
annihlation of the "opposition" with its decree "Concerning the 
counter-revolutionary trotskyite-zinovievite elements."6° 
As seen above, the reign of terror had started vertically and spread 
in cyclic waves; those who perished first were living in Leningrad. 
An alleged friendship or relations with one of the cursed "enemies of 
the people" was enough to prove guilt. For example, according to the 
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	 angry editorial of the newspaper Antireligioznik, Matorin had actually 
been Zinovev's former personal secretary, was aware of the plans to 
murder Kirov, and actually been involved in it. As an actual 
"Zinovev's genuine disciple" in "double-dealing and hypocrisy", 
Matorin had participated in the obsequies for "our dear Sergei 
Mironovich" and, as an act of duplicity, he had cursed those who had 
murdered Kirov.61  
Later, F.N. Oleshchuk — one of the notorious inquisitors inside the 
SVB movement — gave a more detailed list of Matorin's "sins." 
According to him, Matorin had been too busy organizing antireligious 
festivals rather than taking part in real antireligious work. Moreover, 
cursed Matorin had "emphasized the importance of studying various 
religions rather than fighting against them."62 As usual, there was no 
real logic in this hunt of the guilty ones during the Great Terror. 
60 	 Khlevnyuk 1995, 158-159. 
61 	 "B Te9eHHe MHorHx neT BO rnase pyxOBQi1,CTBa neHHHrpa,7,cKON OpraxH3auHH 
CTOAn spar HapOAa. Mep3KHN j[BypyHIHHK MaTOPHH. 6bIBWHLi nH4HbIFf 
ceKpeTapb 3HHOBbeBa. MaTOpHH He HOPbIBan CB51314 CO CBOHM meCpOM BHnOTb 
AO apeCTa. 3Ha3 0 noarOTOBKe TePpOPHCTH4eCKOrO aKTa HpOTHB T. KHpoBa. 
COy4aCTBOBan B 3T0f4 HOArOTOBKe H. AOCTOIiHbIH y4eHHK 3HHOBbeBa no 
ABypymHHyeBCTsy H nHueMepHK1. BbICTyHa11 Ha TPayPHbIX Co6paHHAX CBE. 
HOCBAH(eHHbIX Ceprelo MHp0a0BH9y. C HpOKnATHAMH HpOTHB y6HFiu H C 
HPH3bIBOM K 6AHTenbxocTH." AR 1936, No. 4, 2. "IIpHrosop HapoAa. 
BCTyHHTenbHaA CTaTbB." See also Bezbozhnik 1935, No. 2, 2. Ilepe.aosaA 
"EyaeM 6AHTenbHbll." 
62 	 Oleshchuk 1937, 21. 
Matorin, the victim, could not have shown himself more "orthodox" 
than he did in his many articles, but the tide was against him.63 
At this stage, the terror had in fact spread from Lenigrad to the 
provinces and the republics. Stalin had realized quite soon that the 
local party leaders were not ready to carry out extensive purges in 
their own territories. As an example of this reluctance to introduce a 
general reign of terror is the Plenum of of February-March of the 
Central Committee 1937. The minor leaders of the party followed the 
Gensec. Once again they pledged themselves to the policy of "the 
general line" by accusing the danger of anti-Soviet elements, 
offenders, returning kulaks or millions of believers. According to the 
heated speeches, the kulaks and believers posed a direct threat to the 
Soviet regime. However, some of the delegates made a last resort to 
stop the machine of terror. One of these eminent delegates from the 
Ukraine, P.P. Postyshev (1887-1940), openly objected to the reign of 
terror. He had been earlier a staunch Stalinist and had fought against 
the opposition. These constrained protests, however modest, were 
enough to bring about a new overall purge in the Soviet provinces 
and oblasts. Especially Ukraine, the area of Postyshev, was treated 
with great brutality by Kaganovich, one of the Stalin's protégés. Other 
areas, such as Caucasus-area and Western Oblast, also suffered 
considerably.64 
As a result of this meeting, Soviet republics and oblast were purged; 
especially the Ukrainian Communist party and, logically enough, the 
local SVB movement became targets of the terror. Together with the 
Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia, the higher ranks of the SVB leaders 
were subjected to terror. Philosophers and leading officials in the 
Ukrainian national SVB movement, such as P. J. Demchuk, V. A. 
Yurinets, M. A. Nyrchuk and Ignatyuk, were reviled by invectives 
such as "Fascists, national and Trotskyite falsificators."65 In some 
63 	 For Matorin's article from 1931 in which he condemned both "right" and "left" 
mistakes in the antireligious activity, see VA 1931, No. 4. 20-21. "I'I3y'IeHHe 
KopHeh peJIHFHO3HOCTH H 3aaa9H aHTHpeJIHrHO3HOc pa6orbl." Matorin was 
actually Zinovev`s secretary but was working as a secretary at a special 
commission dedicated to "bringing together countryside and urban areas in 
Leningrad." See LP, June 2 1925, No. 123. See also LP 1925, No. 230, 5. "Ha 
nopore 3HMHe t pa6orbl. O`repe.iuble 3a,ta'H Halllax O6tuecrs CMbIVKH." 
64 Conquest 1971, 266-269, 343-354. See also Khlevnyuk 1995, 160. See also VI 
1993, No. 6, 5-6; Levytsky 1974, 296-300. 
65 PZM 1936, No. 1, 75-76. "K HroraM 6opb6bl Ha cpHnococpexoM cppoHre 
YKpaHtlbl." 
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cases, condemnation was posthumous and directed against those who 
had been "orthodox" in their time — for example M. A. Reisner (1868-
1928), veteran Bolshevik and one of the architects of the 1918 
"separation decree", was now considered to have been too soft in 
dealing with religion. According to the authors of the articles accusing 
him (E. Muravev and V. Shokhor), the only right method to wage 
war on religion was that employed in the fight against "counter-
revolutionaries."66 
The local purges were extended to all the local Cult Commissions 
and SVB levels in the Soviet Union. The newspaper Antireligioznik 
worked as a mouthpiece of this terror and usually issued new arrests. 
Especially national leaders were under a heavy fire and leaders such 
as Ignatyuk were mentioned as having worked together with "terrorist 
and counter-revolutionaries." According to these invectives, Ignatyuk 
had been hiding behind revolutionary phrases and had presented 
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	 himself as an "orthodox Marxist" criticized leftists. Actually, 
Antireligioznik declared, Ignatyuk had "carried terroristic bands on his 
spine." Together with Ignatyuk, the NKVD had discovered several 
other new enemies among the ranks of the SVB; among others, a 
certain Gokkel, a Soviet German communist and an editor of the 
Volga German-language antireligious newspaper "Neuland." 
Moreover, he was assisted by a certain "Trotskyite Stukov" who had 
also been active in his sabotage. The noose was now tightening around 
the central organs of the SVB when the security apparatus discovered 
that a certain Mashchenko, "a former Trotskyite", had worked inside 
the SVB central organization.67 
The accusations were spreading further and now it was the turn of 
66 PZM 1935, No. 6, 116-117. "K sonpocy o MapKCHCTCKOM noHHMaHHx 
penxrHH." 
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	 AR 1936, No. 4, 2. "llpnrosop Hapoua. BcrynHTenbHasi cTaTbst." Especially 
these emissaries sent by Stalin to the republics were anxious to find signs of 
"nationalism" among local party leaders. For example, Mansurov, a certain leader 
of the SVB movement in Tatarstan, was discovered as an "enemy of the people" 
because of his "nationalistic opinions." AR 1937 No. 7 " 7Kypxan "Cyrbtuptan 
Annacbt3" (063op HOMepos Hcypxana 3a 1936 H nepsoe nonyroaue 1937 r.". 
63. See also AR 1937 No. 8, 54-55. "Pa6ora oprax3auHH CBE" its evaluation 
on Mansurov and his ideological errors. Moreover, one year later, in 1937 the 
newspaper Antireligioznik announced that a certain Grigorev, who had been a 
member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian SVB, proved 
to be a "hostile and anti-party" person. AR 1937 No. 8, 54-55. "Pa6ora 
opraHH3auHi CBS." 
SVB leaders in the Caucasus to suffer, when M.V. Kobetsky 
(1881-1937), one of the main inquisitor inside the SVB movement, 
charged the Central Council of the SVB organizations in Georgia and 
Azerbaidzhan, naming dangerous enemies of the people such as 
"Trotskyite" Gogiberidze, Andriadze and Huluflu.6$ 
The wave of arrests was now inevitably approaching Moscow, and 
it seemed only a question of time before Yaroslaysky, the principal 
leader of Soviet antireligious activity, would also perish too. 
Nevertheless, the reign of terror tightened its grip next on him — 
against his deputy inside the SVB movement, Lukachevsky. The 
official pretext of purging Lukachevsky was his alleged opinion 
regarding the "withering away a religion. In the newspaper 
Antireligioznik Kobetsky mentioned these ideological sins and cited 
certain "mistakes" in Lukachevsky's works. According to Kobetsky, 
"the Section of History of Religion and Atheism inside the Institute 
of Philosophy in Academy of Sciences" had been aiming critical darts 	 167 
against the works of Lukachevsky.69 
The fate of Lukachevsky was discussed during the dramatic meeting 
that took place 1 December 1936. During this meeting, the leaders of 
the Soviet antireligious movement had a fundamental discussion 
concerning reported "defects" and "enemies of the people" inside the 
SVB movement. However, the main question was, as expected, who 
was to be blamed? Who was responsibile for recruiting these cursed 
"enemies of the people" inside the SVB movement? Was Yaroslaysky 
guilty of defending these people? Was the Central Council of the 
League, SVB to be accused?7°  
During this stormy meeting, Lukachevsky was able to defend 
himself and criticize himself for "mistakes" against the party. 
However, this was not enough for his accusers. According to the 
allegations Lukachevsky had made too many mistakes, such as 
cheating the party, defending Matorin and recruiting "open 
Trotskyites" for the SVB movement. Nevertheless, Yaroslaysky 
pacified the most bloodthirsty accusers of Lukachevsky by stressing 
68 	 Kobetsky 1937, 40. 
69 	 Kobetsky 1937, 41. See also AR 1937, No. 4, 62 "Csoaxa aHrHpenHrHo3HoN 
nxreparypu. AHHOTauHA Ha crarbl°: II. (Deaocees - O"TeQpxH" cTHxHHHoro 
OTMHpaHHA penRrHH. CTaTbA B ra3. "KOMCOMOnbCKaA IIpaBaa." 68(3649) or 
24 map-ra 1937 r. 
70 RTsKhIDNI f. 89, op. 4, d. 57. 11. 1-44. "CTeaorpaMMa coseHtaHHA y TOB. 
iIpocnaBcxoro no CBS. 1 aeKa6pA 1936 roaa." 
that his fate was not concealed. According to Yaroslaysky, 
Lukachevsky had a right to "appeal" to higher instances and he also 
reminded his audience that many of them had cooperated with Matorin 
without complaining. He also defended himself by stating that he was 
not responsibile for the mistakes of his deputy." 
Krasikov, however, was able to present some open criticism against 
Yaroslaysky and complained that the Cult Commission offered them 
very little cooperation; actually "comrade Yaroslaysky" had not shown 
himself in this commission. Yaroslaysky's response was revealing "I 
have no time for everything!" (."..si He Mory ycneTb sewn. )
However, Krasikov continued his push and stressed that the Cult 
Commission had no idea whatsoever of the plans of the SVB 
movement. He closed his speech by stressing that there was an urgent 
need for close cooperation with these two institutions. For example, 
the question of closed churches was more than burning; it was a matter 
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	 of who should take care of them. At the same time, believers had not 
enough premises for their needs. According to Krasikov, the SVB 
movement should be able to help people in these kind of problems.72 
The outcome of this meeting was confusing; Putintsev and other 
leaders of the SVB were more than eager to stress that there were 
substantial problems in the whole activity of the SVB movement. 
According to Putintsev and others, the "crisis" of the SVB movement 
was due to "enemies of the people." Yaroslaysky maintained that 
Lukachevsky had not really been able to disturb the activity of the 
SVB, but these explanations did not satisfy Putintsev and other 
vigilantes of the SVB movement. This bitter debate was settled by 
the proposal of Yaroslaysky to organize two separate commissions to 
resolve these problems.73 
Interestingly enough, the "survival strategies" employed during the 
purges of the antireligious cadres literally destroyed the Soviet 
antireligious movement. The "policy of blaming all before they blame 
you" seemed to be one of the suitable insurances of Stalinist terror. 
This is also clearly seen in the history of the Soviet antireligious 
71 	 RTsKhIDNI f. 89, op. 4, d. 57. 11. 6-8. "CTenorpaMMa coseutannx y Tos. 
Apocnascxoro no CBS. 1 Aexa6px 1936 roAa." 
72 	 RTsKhIDNI f. 89, op. 4, d. 57. 11. 27-29. "CTeHorpaMMa coaelllaHHx y Tos. 
Apocnascxoro no CBS. 1 Aexa6px 1936 roA,a." 
73 	 RTsKhIDNI f. 89, op. 4, d. 57. II. 17-20, 24, 43-44. " CTeHorpaMMa coseuzanHx 
y TOB. Apocnascxoro no CBS. 1 nexa6px 1936 rona." 
movement in the late 1930s. For example, in an aggressive article by 
a certain P. Fedoseev, Lukachevsky, Rozhitsyna, Voronitsyna and 
other enemies of the people were described as archenemies of 
communism and as representatives of the "anti-historism" in the Soviet 
antireligious movement. As many other articles of its kind, this 
hysterical paper called for resolute action against the "obvious 
counter-revolutionaries, most evil enemies of the people" including 
the already doomed Matorin and Nyrchuk. However, even being a 
notorious inquisitor was not enough; there was no safe survival 
strategy and being a notorious accuser did not always save one from 
being a victim of terror.74 
The irrationality of the purges becomes obvious when considering 
the fate of many "hounds" of the terror. As George F. Kennan has 
put it ."..the jailors and judges of the one day were the prisoners and 
the victims of the next."75 Interestingly enough, Lukachevsky's 
notorious accuser Kobetsky was himself soon denounced as an enemy 	 169 
of the people. Consequently, the mission of discrediting Lukachevsky 
and other "enemies of the people" was given to a new candidate — 
Oleshchuk, a secretary of the Cult Commission. Oleschchuk proved 
to be an even more ferocious inquisitor than anyone before him. As 
his zealous articles to the newspaper Antireligioznik demonstrated, 
Oleshchuk was a suitable person for this job and certainly worthy of 
his hire. His lengthy letters of accusation against all newly discovered 
enemies of the people emerged as harbingers of new terror inside the 
Soviet antireligious movement. Oleshchuk was especially active in 
crushing the SVB network in the national provinces and busied 
himself accusing many leading SVB representatives in the national 
areas. For example, he accused one eminent SVB leader in Ukraine, 
a certain Ignatyuk, as "a Fascist spy", who had always tried to 
sabotage the activities of the Godless-movement in Ukraine. 
According to these charges, the notorius Ignatyuk had, among other 
things, attempted to break "the united front of workers" in Ukraine, 
thus preparing the ground for Fascism. As to Georgia, Oleshchuk 
74 	 PZM 1937, No. 3, 150-158. "Mapxcn3M-JIeHHHH3M o 6opbbe c penaraeit." On 
the difference between the almost friendly way of conducting communist criticism 
in the early 1930s and later, see, VA 1931, No.2-3. 234-236. "IIpenna no 
jtoKnany B. PanbueBH'ia Ha TMY "3ajtayH anrHpennrHo3Ho i nponaraHi[bi B 
CB513H C 2IHCKYCCHeh Ha (PMJWCOcPCKOM (PpoHTe." 
75 	 Kennan 1961, 307. See also Conquest 1985, 28-35, 67-75, 86-92; Halfin & 
Hellbeck 1996, 462. 
branded as "Trotskyites" such eminent SVB leaders as Gogiberidze 
and Andriadze, who had been, besides other failings, "engaged in 
commercial activities" and had stolen 40, 000 rubles from the SVB 
movement. However, according to Oleshchuk, the real Judas of the 
Soviet atheist movement was Lukachevsky. He bad been able to 
infiltrate "alien" people into the ranks of the SBV organization. 
Moreover, he had expelled active members from the ranks of the SVB 
and filled the empty places with "adventurers, rascals, politically 
suspicious people, Trotskyite-Bukharinists bandits" such as Matorin, 
Pospelov, Gogiberidze, etc.76 
According to these allegations, Lukachevsky had prepared with the 
"filthy hands of Trotskyite bandits and provocateurs" useless 
antireligious booklets, and tried to introduce religious relics to the 
work of the antireligious cadres. Another clear sign of his guilt was 
the fact that Lukachevsky had often tried to be the leading theoretician 
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	 inside the SVB movement. In short, as a clear indication of 
Lukachevsky's liberalism, he had often cited bourgeois authors such 
as H. Spencer (1820-1903) and E.B. Taylor (1832-1917). Only the 
lack of Bolshevik vigilance, as Oleshchuk emphasized in his article, 
could explain how such a man had been given an opportunity to work 
inside the SVB movement.77 
76 	 Oleshchuk 1937, 21-23. See also Fedoseev 1937, 27-28. As another example of 
the irrationality of the purges we could mention the lists of sins of the condemned. 
Usually they consisted of accusations such as "espionage", "sabotage" or 
"wrecking." However, the men who had committed their life to antireligious 
activity were accused, surpringly enough, of being agents of ecclesiastical bands. 
Moreover, during the trials against the former oppositionists, all possible sins 
including that of being secret believer, were cast upon them. For example, 
according to a certain article of Oleshchuk, the "Trotskyite-zinovievites" were 
actually allied with the clergy and servants of the cults. Moreover, as Oleshchuk 
charged, if Bukharin or Rykov had won during the power struggle there would 
have been changes in the relations between the Soviet state and religion, i.e. 
abolition of the "separation decree." PZM 1938 No. 1, 40. "K 20-nerHIo itexpera 
o6 orueneHHH uepxsH OT rocyuapersa H wxonbI OT uepxan." 
77 	 Oleshchuk 1937, 23. This condemnation of Lukachevsky was repeated soon 
elsewhere in the Soviet antireligious literature. See AR 1937, No. 11, 63. 
"Kpxrxxa H 6H6nHorpacpxx. AHrHpenHrHosxaa nxreparypa (csouxa)." It is 
also riveting to see how Oleshchuk accused Lukachevsky of being too optimistic 
about the withering away of religion. However, at the same time Lukachevky, 
according to Oleshchuk, was guilty of "administrative methods in that fight against 
religion" — which usually means that Soviet administrators had treated religion 
too brutally. Oleshchuk 1938, 16. 
The second survival strategy during the Great Purges was called 
"praise the leaders." During the atmosphere of the late 1930s this 
strategy seemed to be more than natural. All written and published 
texts of that time bear the sign of this cult of personality. In order to 
save their skins all Soviet writers and authors were obliged to burst 
into "eulogies for the great leader — Stalin." This was visible also in 
Soviet antireligious writings of the late 1930s. For example, a typical 
sign of this dignified crawling before the Gensec was that nearly all 
antireligious articles considered Stalin to have a "crucial role" 
conducting the atheist activity inside the USSR. It was not a great 
surprise that according to the official SVB history, it was Stalin's 
initiatives that had rectified the failures of the "leftists." Moreover, it 
had been the wise guidance of Stalin again in the Autumn 1930 that 
had rectified the deeds of the "rightist opportunists."78 
However, despite surviving strategies, the whole sector of the 
Soviet antireligious activity was now at stake. The purges were 
escalating in 1937; the deputy of the SVB had emerged as an enemy 
of the people and many important local officials were locked up in 
NKVD cells or in unknown graveyards. At this stage, Oleshchuk 
apparently attempted to minimize the damage when writing his article 
on the history of the Central Council of the SVB movement during 
the last years. According to him, the security services had discovered 
Trotskyite spies inside the SVB, though the real "nest of wreckers" 
could be located elsewhere; according to Oleschuk, it could be found 
in the Soviet trade unions and Narkompros.79 
However, the SVB movement had to yield to the reign of terror. 
The extensive purge had swept across republics and oblasts like "a 
black tornado."80 This storm had also demolished the Central Council 
of the SVB and regional leadership in many areas. All significant 
districts such as Leningrad, Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia and 
Northern-oblast had suffered from arrests and, together with areas and 
cities such as Sverdlovsk, Ivanovsk, Kuibyshev, Stalingrad, Saratov, 
Crimea, Uzbekistan SSR, Mordvinian ASSR and Udmurtian ASSR, 
all activity of the SVB union had to be totally reorganized after these 
arrests. A similar situation prevailed in other parts of the Soviet 
78 Amosov 1932, 299. 
79 Oleshchuk 1938, 16. 
80 Conquest 1971, 331. 
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Union.8' The summary of these purges was dealt during the IV plenum 
of the the Central Council of the SVB. In its resolution, the plenum 
stated that most of the mistakes had been corrected and that the 
enemies of the people — "Trotskyites, Bukharinists, bourgeois 
nationalists — bloody agents of Fascism" had been already rooted out. 
The resolution of this plenum mentioned only two enemies of the 
people by name: Lukachevsky and Kobetsky - the latter being one of 
the most notorious inquisitors during the purges.82 
However, despite many efforts, the whole existence of the SVB 
movement seemed to be at stake and the only way Yaroslaysky could 
defend himself and his organization was to emphasize the importance 
of this organization publicly. Consequently, in 1936, a great jubilee 
was organized for the SVB movement and Yaroslaysky used it as a 
possibility to advertise the results of the Soviet antireligious work and 
justify its activity. In doing so he did not miss a chance to claim the 
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	 ideological "orthodoxy" and social usefulness of the SVB movement. 
Moreover, as a sign of his openness to self-criticism, Yaroslaysky was 
also ready to acknowledge the persistent strength of religion and even 
some weaknesses and mistakes made inside the SVB movement. 
Among the mistakes mentioned by him were such things as the weak 
education of antireligious cadres inside the SVB movement.83 
Nevertheless, when we examine the background of the leaders of 
the Soviet antireligious movement, it is fascinating to find some 
common features in their destinies. Firstly, the majority of the purged 
leaders were actually working more or less as genuine scholars in the 
Soviet social sciences. For instances, Matorin, Ignatyuk and 
81 	 Oleshchuk 1937, 23. See also VA 1931, No. 8-9. 46. "KnaccoBasl 6asa nenaMa 
B KpbIMy." 
82 	 AR 1938, No. 3, 47. "Ilocraxosneune IV paculnpennoro nnetlyMa IIC CBS 
CCCP or 4.2.1938 r.." The "tit-for-tat" game, i.e., when accusers suddenly became 
the accused was part of Soviet social life in 1930s. The meritocratic Soviet system 
and the purges helped people to climb quickly the social ladders in Soviet society. 
Purges were the sudden advancement of political and civil careers. Andrle 1994, 
206. As James von Geldern has stressed:."..The mythology of opportunity had a 
strong base in fact: aggressive working-class promotion was a state policy. 
Positions once filled by the educated and experienced were given to factory 
workers. Men and women of simple birth saw limitless horizons: Aleksei 
Stakhanov could break world coal-mining records; Pasha Angelina could break 
tractor-driving records and inspire women across the country." Geldern 1995, xix. 
83 PZM 1936, No. 2-3. 78-79, 80-81, 83, 86. "JlecslTb ner 6opb6bl 
BonHCTByIOutero arenaMa." See also self-criticism, Bolshevik 1937, No. 5-6, 
50-51. "O IIOArOTOBKe K BM6OpaM B COBeTbI .tenyTaTOB TpyasumiXCA." 
Lukachevsky had made a career in the folkloristics and anthropology. 
No doubt, the academic style and standards of these cadres came to 
the attention of many ordinary apparatchiks. These leaders were easy 
targets for accusations and ideological sins such as "plekhanovism" 
and "mechanism." The late 1930s were the era of so-called "little 
people" and this could be seen throughout in the Soviet antireligious 
activity. The machinery of terror and its main architect, Gensec 
himself, were eager to show that it was activists and the people with 
minor responsibility who had denounced the enemies of the people. 
In the general witch-hunt atmosphere, the ordinary people hoping, 
i.e., to get better living quarters could castigate leaders. Consequently, 
the moral issues were not decisive anymore, i.e., the ordinary people 
could inform on their neighbours, friends, etc. only in order to obtain 
better apartment. As a matter of fact, the auto-da fe of the NKVD 
could be ignited for the most trivial reasons. For example, I.N. Uzkov, 
the secretary of the Cult Commission in Moscow, sent a furious letter 
to the editors of Rabochaya Moskva in which he protested that he had 
not received a flat via the Cult Commission, although Oleshchuk had 
allocated flats for other people, who had no connection whatsoever 
to the CSCRQ. In his letter, he warned that the leaders of the SVB 
movement did not seem to have learned Lukachevsky's lesson; the 
enemy who had been guilty of "Trotskism, Zinovevianism, Fascism, 
and hooliganism of all sorts." As could be expected, the flat was soon 
found and the matter was finally settled by removing Uzkov to the 
Kalinin oblast, where he was "promoted" to do local CSCRQ work.84 
Secondly, the condemned leaders had often very superficial links 
to the party or were not notorious either, as in Matorin's case (linked 
with Zinovev). Moreover, in the case of the Ukrainian Ignatyuk and 
Nyrchuk, officials were sometimes wiped out because they belonged 
to the convicted intelligentsia of some Soviet minority nation. When 
Stalin was purging minor nationalities in the 1930s these people had 
to go. To put it bluntly, these men were much too obvious targets 
when the Soviet reign of terror was searching for its victims. 
Nevertheless, the terror crippled the Soviet antireligious activity, as 
these victims had often constituted also the "civilized" echelon of the 
SVB movement and it was difficult to find new specialists of similar 
84 GARF f. 5263, op.1, d. 43, rol. 2. See also Dunaevsky 1932, 451-452, 456. See 
also Bolshevik 1937, No. 5, 2-3. "OBnauerb 6oJIbHIeBH3MOM, riummanponarb 
6ecnevnocm." 
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"God reads "Pravda' and it does not please him.' (Workers answer to the Pope). The 
caricature was first published in Pravda in 1930. This picture was originally a part of the 
propaganda campaign against the Pope. Source: Bezbozhnik 1935, No. 4. 
calibre to take their place.85 
However, as previously mentioned, it was not only the leaders of 
the Soviet SVB movement who were suffering, but the entire country. 
After the military conflict with Japan in 1937, a campaign was set up 
in order to start a new hunt for clergy, who were now accused of 
spying for Japan. According to the Soviet press, all the clergy in the 
Soviet Union had been more or less collaborating with foreign security 
services. The Soviet ideologists now had a very difficult mission: to 
establish and explain charges against the Orthodox clergy, who were 
supposed to have been controlled and used by non-Christian Japan. 
One way of justifying this was to accuse Soviet Buddhists, the ROC 
and Catholics working jointly in Manchuria in order to undermine the 
local Soviet rule there. During the heated atmosphere of the late 1930s, 
this strange cooperation was considered as a serious threat although 
this plot did not make much demands on logic. Nevertheless, as a 
certain B. Kandidov put it in an article, "the Japanese intelligence 
utilizes services of all religious organizations, Orthodox, Catholics, 
Moslems, Buddhists, Old Believers, Sectarians."86 
These delirious above accusations characterize the general 
atmosphere of Soviet society at the time. Actually, the Soviet religious 
organizations were caught between the Scylla of orgiastic terror and 
the Charybdis of semi-liberal gestures. Moreover, Gensec himself was 
recommending a new kind of national- minded Communism and the 
sponsoring of old Russian traditional values. During the mid-1930s, 
the government, in fact, had approved of a partial retreat to old 
traditional values. For example, Christmas trees, which had been 
banned in 1929 together with Santa Claus, were now allowed back 
under new names; for example, the Christmas tree was renamed the 
85 See the activity of Matorin, Ignatyuk and other "enemies of people" in the 
antireligious journal "Militant Atheism" in the early 1930s. VA, No. 1, 180-181, 
183. "Bcecolo3Hoe cosetuaHHe aHTHpenH1H03HbMX oTueneHHH HaynHo-
Hccneuosarenbcxxx yYpeacueHHit CCCP. MocxBa 14-15.12.1930 r." On the role 
of Matorin in the Soviet "real" social sciences, see VAN 1931, No.2, 2. 
"OpraHH3auHOHHo-atMHHHCTpaTHBHaa XpOHHKa"; VAN 1931, No. 5, 52. 
"OpraHH3BHHOHHo-auMHHHcrpaTHBHaa xponnxa." VAN 1931, No.6, 54. 
86 ."..5lnoHcxaa pa33erxa nonb3yerca ycnyraMH nx)6bIX penHrHo3HbIX 
opraHM3auHii: npasocnasHbtx, KaronH9ecKHx, MaroMeTaHcxax,6y1UHilcKHx. 
crapoo6pauvecicHx, ceKraHrcKHx.." See also Bezbozhnik 1937, No. 7, 7. "IIonbl 
- =Hom ; Bezbozhnik 1937, No. 11, 6-7. "IIIHHOHbt H uHBepcaHTbi B !max"; 
Bezbozhnik 1938, No. 8-9. "Pennrxa Ha cnyxc6e smoHcxxx caMypaea" KP, 
1938, No. 50, 3. "IIpouecc anrxcosercKoro "npaBo-rpouxacTcxoro 6noxa." 
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New Year Tree. In addition, on Easter 1934, Moscow shops had been 
permitted to sell ingredients for traditional paskha-cake, etc. However, 
the change of mind did come easy. In the late 1930s, the newspaper 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, attacked believers who were "systematically 
utilizing Christmas to celebrate and thus to conduct counter-
revolutionary propaganda and agitation."87 
As noted, during the delirious witchhunt of Soviet society in the 
1930s, Soviet society observed its own peculiar laws. As the third 
great trial that of Bukharin's group implied, the prosecutors of this 
inquisition invented charges which bore some kind of perverted 
humour. The partisans of the opposition were to die as "traitors, as 
perpetrators of crimes beyond the reach of reason.88" For example, 
when the prosecutor invented conspiracies; i.e., Bukharin was charged 
with advising a certain "English spy" (sic!) A.I. Ikramov (1898-1938). 
He was accused of having been organizing the clergy and inciting 
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	 backward religious masses to oppose the Soviet rule. During this 
notorious trial of 1938, Ikramov himself testified against Bukharin 
and declared that Bukharin had ordered him to organize kulaks and 
utilize their religious fanatism to undermine the Soviet system.89 
It was not surprising therefore that the late 1930s proved to be 
fatal, not only for communists themselves but for all potential 
"enemies", i.e., for the clergy of every kind. The NKVD was eagerly 
fulfilling its abominable quotas of terror by every means and servants 
of the religious organizations formed a suitable target for mass 
repressions. The "need of terror" was part of a psychosis of the late 
1930s in the Soviet society. Soviet society was welcoming the terror, 
and the praxis of worshiping the state terror was an ordre du jour. 
For example, as a sign of the vicious circle of both terror and fear, 
Oleshchuk praised "the NKVD, which had exposed quite a few 
ecclesiasticals and sectarian leaders who had utilized religion to hide 
their destructive andspying activities."" 
87 	 KP, 1938, No. 2, 2. "IlpoHcxoJxAeHHe H CynlHocrb nonoscxoro poHcuecTBa' ; 
KP, 1938, No. 88, 1. "Tepnennso H Hacroli9Hso BecrH aHrxpenxrxo3Hyro 
nponaraHay." See also Stites 1991, 306. 
88 	 Deutscher 1967, 378. 
89 Izvestiya 1938, March 8, No.55(6522). "rlpouecc aHTHCOBeTCxorO npaso- 
rpouxHcrCKoro 6noxa"; Bezbozhnik 1938, No. 3, 3. "Ec71H spar He caaerca. 
ero yHH4TONCaIOT"; Bezbozhnik 1938, No. 3, 4. "COO6HIHHKH TpouxHcrcxo- 
6yxapHHcKoO 6aHabi nInHOHOB H y6HNu." 
90 '....opraebi HKBJI pa3o6navHnH HeMano uepKOBHHKOB H CeKTBHTCKHX 
5. The Fall of the Cult Commission 
The Great Purge had a devastating impact on the activity and the 
work of the Cult Commission both in Moscow and in the provinces. 
The network of the Cult Commission was more and more in a state 
of chaos and the central commission in Moscow could do nothing but 
wait. During its last years, this commission was little more than a 
lame duck; in 1937-1938, it convened only five times. In its last year, 
1938, the Cult Commission did not convene at all. On March 29, 
1938, Krasikov asked Kalinin to confirm the status of the Cult 
Commissions but he also acknowledged the possibility of dissolving 
this organ. Moreover, as a last attempt to extricate themselves from 
the accusations made by the SCE and other institutions, the Cult 
Commission had tried to find out how local organs were really using 
the premises of confiscated churches. As a means of enforcing its 
official inquiries, it had asked that the local officials send 
photographies and detailed descriptions of the new uses these premises 
were being put to.9' 
However, although the central Cult Commission seldom convened, 
the members of the commission were active in sending letters to local 
officials. See, for example, how Krasikov tried to stress that the 
closure of churches required political thinking and local officials 
should take into consideration local circumstances when they 
liquidated religious organizations. The most important thing was, as 
Krasikov put it, to evaluate the political necessities of closing churches 
in relation to local concrete circumstances.92 Some local officials did 
in fact comply with this request regarding confiscated churches, but 
the days of the Cult Commission were, in any event, numbered.93 
BOMCaKOB. Hcnonb30BaBmHx penNrNlo xax npHKpblTHe anB CBOe}"i 
aHBepcnoHHO-mnnoacxOH aeBTenbHOcrH." Bolshevik 1938, No.16, 35. "SOeBble 
Bonpocbl aHTHpenH11103HON nponaraHabl." 
91 	 GARF f.5263, op.l, d. 52, 1. 1-68. 
92 ."..CymHOCTb Bonpoca 3axn1o4aeTC51 B TOM. 9TO6b1 npH 3aKpbITHH uepKBH 
cTporo co6nloaaB 3aKOHHOCTb pyKOBOaCTBOBBTbCB no11HTH4eCKOFI 
neneC0o6pa3HOCTbK) aaHHOrO MepOnpHBTHB B CBB314 C KOHKpeTHON 
06cTaHOBK011 MeCTHOCTH...." See, GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 988. "11peaceaarenKl 
.T1eHHHrpaacxoro Cosera PK H KU Ha 011.17 o or 1.11-37r.." 
93 	 See the explanations of local officials. See GARF f. 5263, op. 1, d. 51, rol.1, "B 
lIpe3HaxyM BIZI4K. ,1ZoxnaaxaB 3anHcxa o Bb1nOnHeHHH fopCOBeTOM H Pl'1KaM 
H nOCTaHOBneHMll r1pe3HaHyMa BIII3K 0 nHKBHaagHH H HCHOnb30BaHHH 
MO.IIHTBeHHbIX 3aaHHii noa KynbTypHo-npOCBeTHTe.RbHble neut." 
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The formal reason for the liquidation of the CSCRQ was simple: 
at that time, the TsIK was rationalizing its activities, and as a sign of 
the new era it closed many of its permanent commissions, including 
the Cult Commission. Consequently, on 16 April 1938, on orders from 
the Presidium of the Highest Soviet of the USSR, the nation-wide 
network of the CSCRQ was dissolved.94 The duties of this organ were 
transferred to the security organs. However, the fare for this organ 
was long in the balance. The constant arguing with local officials, the 
lack of authority, and the lack of resources had made it a suitable 
target for criticism. For example, negative publicity such as the report 
of the SCE and the general evaluations of the CSCRQ in 1936, no 
doubt had the effect of frustrating the position of this organ. Moreover, 
there was a shadow of an ideological suspicion on the leading cadres 
of the Cult Commission, who seemed to be too soft and ineffective 
in relation to religious organizations.95 However, the main reason for 
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	 closing down this organ was simpler than just the suspicion or purges. 
The most likely reason was the Stalinist concept of the new socialist 
society. According to the official Stalinist interpretation, the USSR 
was taking a giant step towards full socialism. According to this 
interpretation, the Soviet Union and socialism had been victorious. 
Once disenfrancizhed lishentsy had received their political rights and 
the whole Soviet system had moved to a new stage it was obvious 
that there was no need for special organs dedicated to dealing with 
religious organizations — in theory. 
The magic word of this change was the new victorious society 
which already had consolidated its achievements. With its 
collectivized agriculture, new industry and the adoption of the new 
Constitution, it had already paved the way to the new society. 
One of the signs of this transition to socialism was the reform of 
the Soviet administrative apparatus. Accordingly, when the Soviet 
governmental apparatus was reconstructed in the late 1930s, the 
system of Cult Commissions was abolished, together with other 
standing commissions as a relic of the old pre-communist society. 
Thus, the story of the Cult Commission ends with quiet funerals and 
administrative orders. Some of its members had been purged but others 
not. Krasikov, for instance, was buried in the Kremlin wall as an "Old 
94 	 GARF f. 7523, op. 4, d. 3, I. 3, 14. 
95 	 Martin I995b, 147. 
Bolshevik" in 1939. However, the story of the Cult Commission has 
hopefully shed some light on the religious policy of the 1930s and 
on the machinations of the Stalinist state as such. Especially, the 
archival evidence has, it is to be hoped, contradicted some of the well 
established stereotypes and studies based on less reliable sources. 
Indeed, we must always be ready to question our hypotheses and 
assumptions. This is particularly the case when we are dealing with 
such complicated challenges as Stalinism and the history of the 1930s. 
The ground rule suggested by Arch Getty really pays heed to this 
problem... 
."..the simplest explanation with the fewest assumptions and 
consistent with evidence is usually the best."96 
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96 Getty 1993b, 62. 
V Conclusions 
The rise and fall of the Cult Commission coincides with one of the 
most turbulent periods in Russian history. During the collectivization 
period, the traditional and cultural roots of the Russian countryside 
were destroyed. Moreover, at the same time agricultural Russia was 
transformed into an industrial giant; the Russian people built pyramids 
of heavy industry - simultaneously, the great Pharaoh, Stalin, imposed 
purges and the Great Terror on Russian society. The price of this new 
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	 industrial greatness was paid for the Russians themselves; those who 
suffered most were those who believed in the old traditional values, 
such as religion. 
The story of the Cult Commission is inextricably linked with the 
general Soviet experience of the 1930s. On the one hand, the Cult 
Commission seemed to be just another ad hoc Soviet commission set 
up by the Communist party. On the other hand, unlike the numerous 
commissions inside to the Soviet state apparatus, the Cult Commission 
in Moscow was more stable by nature. The Commission of Cults was 
designed to resolve not only some acute political problems but also 
to deal with one of the main ideological enemies of the Soviet regime. 
Even so, a cursory glance at the rise and the fall the CSCRQ during 
the period 1929-1938 might give one the impression that this 
commission amounted to little more than a minor episode or a short 
interlude in the turbulent history of the Bolshevik party. The reality, 
however, proved to be quite different. 
The history of the Cult Commission, with all its ups and downs, 
reflects the basic dilemmas of the Stalinist system in the Soviet Union. 
The basic function of this commission was to create a uniform method 
and to coordinate procedures in dealing with religious organizations. 
Moreover, unlike many other standing commissions set up by the 
Politburo or the VTsIK, this commission had a clear profile. The 
Commission of Cults had a distinct mission and it was profoundly 
anchored to the activity of the VTsIK. 
As a matter of fact, by examining the history of this commission, 
we are able to get a clearer picture, not only of the Soviet religious 
policy, but of the problems relating to general decision-making in the 
Soviet system during the 1930s. Moreover, the history of this 
commission contributes to an understanding of the dynamics of 
party-bureaucratic interaction during 1929-1938. Thus, the picture we 
get from the rise and fall of the Cult Commission also verifies the 
findings about the "weight" of the Russian past on Utopian social 
engineering, and what is more interesting, the story of the Cult 
Commission gives us some clues as to one of the most burning 
questions among specialists in Soviet history: why did the communist 
experiment fail and why did one of the mightiest military powers 
armed with nuclear weapons and resorting to totalitarian ways of 
governing, collapse.' 
It seems that the Stalinist society, despite its rigid ideological credo 
and unified policy-making, encountered great problems when dealing 
with local officials. The Commission of Cults, as was also the case 
with other Soviet state organs, had a problem in dealing with local 
officials; these people had their own stubborn network of power - 
Soviet "anarchy in the middle." This problem had been constituted an 
eternal problem as far as the history of Russia is concerned. Stalin 
faced the same dilemma as all of his predecessors in Russia; how to 
govern this vast country, how to implement the will of Moscow? The 
basic question was: how to keep tabs on the local satraps, how to 
implement the will of Moscow?' 
At the beginning, the Cult Commission was one of the standing 
Soviet commissions set up to assist in the battles of the Cultural 
Revolution. Its practical function was to handle the economic 
exploitation of the religious organizations and especially to coordinate 
the confiscations of church-bells. As was the case with many other 
1 	 It seems that there were only few scholars who could predict the collapse of the 
Soviet system. Moreover, these people, such as Andrei Amalrik or Helene Carrere 
D'Encausse, were not taken overly seriously. See Helene Carrere D'Encausse: 
Decline of an Empire. The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt. Translated by 
Martin Sokolinsky and Henry A. La Farge. Newsweek Books. New York. See 
also Brzezinski 1971, 78. 1978. 
2 	 The problem with local networks of power and their stubborn resistance to 
Moscow is familiar from the history of Imperial Russia. The local aristocracy, 
landed gentry, the church, and other groups constituted the "national opposition" 
which was carrying on a fight against all reforms. It was ready to cooperate only 
if the monarchy gave it some material inducements or privileges. After the 1917 
revolution, the old local nobility was de-throned and replaced by new echelons 
of Soviet rulers. Quite soon, this new local network reimposed the practices of 
the old system. See Pipes 1966, 7-8. 
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Soviet institutions in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, the Cult 
Commission had two ambigious missions. Firstly, it was assigned the 
rather pompous role as the leading organ of the Soviet religious policy 
(at first in RSFSR). This grandiose mission given to the Cult 
Commission reflected something of the resolute atmosphere of the 
Cultural Revolution; it was , at any rate essential that religion and 
other ideological relics were supposed to be rooted out before the 
emergence of the new socialist society. However, these ambitious 
goals of the commission collided with reality; the Cult Commission 
was supposed to be the leading organ in this sphere but it was all too 
clear that it did not have the capacity to carry out its mandate. As 
usual, the demands of political reality and economics turned out to 
be more significant than the ideology. 
According to archival material, the second and a real role of the 
Cult Commission during the early 1930s was to assist the Soviet 
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	 industrialization — to collect the valuable bells from the Soviet 
churches. Only after confiscating the valuable items, bells, etc., the 
churches were allowed to close and the parishes were dissolved. 
Therefore, we could assert that the Cult Commission was rather an 
auxiliary organ to take care of economic strangling of the Soviet 
religious organizations. 
Therefore, it is rather riveting to see how this commission was 
supposed to handle major problems and the drawing of strategic 
outlines of Soviet religious policy. As pointed out, the Commission 
of Cults turned out to be a cashier of the Soviet state, a institution 
for looting the last remaining valuable items from the churches. Here 
we may discern a clear contradiction. In actual fact, the commission 
was dealing with the technical execution of Soviet religious policy, 
and not with its formulation. This could be seen, of course, as a loss 
of authority, although the commission had officially obtained a 
prestigious mandate from the VTsIK. The real decisions were made 
elsewhere, not by the Cult Commission. 
However, as time went by, the commission and its political 
importance increased. As the waves of the Cultural Revolution 
receded, this commission became a place for "private debates" among 
Soviet officials. As we may detect from the documentary material, 
the VTsIK and the Cult Commission were not ideal places for party 
ideologists or communist vigilantes. On the contrary, the weight of 
the history was loaded on the shoulders of the Cult Commission. As 
during the period of Imperial Russia, the central officials in Moscow 
were engaged in an endless battle against the local resistance. The 
Cult Commission became the place for the Soviet apparatchiki, which 
had a natural interest in normal govememental procedures. 
Interestingly enough, the VTsIK had, among other things, the duty of 
preserving the goodwill of the Soviet citizens. This institution was a 
place where ordinary Soviet people could deliver their complaints and 
requests. Thus, whether it liked it or not, Cult Commission was part 
of the Soviet institution which had as its basic mission supervising 
the actions of the local satraps and "correcting" the excesses and 
brutality of these local officials. 
Subsequently, when examining the relations between the 
commission and local organs, we may get a good glimpse into 
everyday Soviet administrative practices and the constant struggle 
between Moscow and Soviet peripheries. The officials working on the 
Cult Commission in Moscow realized from the very beginning that 
local Soviet officials exceeded the limits of the Soviet legislation. 
However, during the Cultural Revolution, this was considered more 
of a virtue than a vice. In fact, the overall emphasis of the Soviet 	 183 
regime in the early 1930s was to settle scores with class enemies once 
and for all. 
However, with Stalin's "Dizzy with Success" intervention, the 
overall frontal attack on religious organizations was temporarily 
halted. From now on, the commission started to emphasize 
"revolutionary legality" as one of its main principles. The reason for 
this new line was obvious: the Cult Commission favoured this 
expression as a weapon against the local officials in order to achieve 
a unified and coordinated religious policy in the Soviet Union. 
Although this organ could not conduct any real discussions, officials 
inside the Cult Commission were able to write memos and reports to 
higher institutions. Moreover, it also worked as a "court of appeal" 
when dealing with the closure of churches and putting an end to other 
"activities" of the local officials. 
Afterwards, during the "good years" of the 1930s, the Cult 
Commission started to restrict the "illegal" activities of local leaders. 
As pointed out, it was Stalin's "Dizzy with success" article that 
inspired these calls for "revolutionary legality" and complaints against 
"excesses." As an example of the famous Bolshevik jargon, the term 
"revolutionary legality" could be interpreted in many different ways 
to different people. On the one hand, the hard-liners of the Soviet 
regime understood this term as an excuse for harsh methods against 
class enemies. On the other hand, "moderate" communists understood 
it as a way of observing "normal" legal practices. 
However, when examining the general situation in the Soviet 
Union, we may say that Stalin's lip service to "revolutionary legality" 
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did infect Soviet religious policy. The central organs now had some 
kind of weapon to use against the unauthorized actions of local 
officials. Especially the local Soviet security organs had been reluctant 
to comply with orders coming from the VTsIK or the CSCRQ. 
However, the burning question remained the same as earlier: how to 
execute the policy of the central organs and how to control the 
periphery, which was conducting its own policy. This constituted the 
principal concern of the Soviet regime in Moscow. 
The basic problem was the fact that the Cult Commission had no 
means to enforce its resolutions or demands for more "revolutionary 
legality." When the Cult Commission turned to Soviet judicial 
officials, they received very little help. Consequently, the Cult 
Commission, in order to fight against the excesses of local officials 
and to reclaim its authority in the Soviet religious policy, needed basic 
information on the prevailing situation in the provinces. Besides, it 
needed more authority so that it could fight against the excesses of 
local officials and reclaim a leading role in pursuing Soviet religious 
policy. The Soviet judiciary apparatus was, in any case, in an 
impossible situation. It could not fight against the demands of the 
security organs. 
When summing up the roles of the Cult Commission we may realize 
that although the CSCRQ had rather limited powers to decide upon 
the outlines of the Soviet religious policy, nevertheless, it played a 
substantial role, as mentioned, as a "court of appeal" between the 
demands of local militant atheists and local believers. Moreover, an 
examination of the piles of delos emanating from this organ seems to 
suggest that decisions to close or open the churches constituted the 
real battlefield of the Cult Commission. In this work, the people in 
that commission were compelled to vacillate between the demands of 
the militant atheists - those who were in favour of closing down all 
churches - and simultaneously complaints coming from local believers 
who appealed to the VTsIK. Furthermore, the reaction of the outside 
world proved to be significant in this sphere. Especially some 
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were obliged to act as "salesmen" for communism when foreign guests 
were trying to understand the state of affairs in religious policy in 
Soviet Russia. Moreover, when the Comintern declared the so-called 
"open-hand policy" it was more than consequential for the communist 
regime to keep up a facade of decency. 
As we sum up the rise and fall of the Cult Commission during its 
short period of existence, 1929-1938, we may draw a few significant 
conclusions. Firstly, central-peripherial relations in the religious 
political decision-making of the Stalinist state constitute a missing key 
for understanding the patterns of Soviet religious policy in the 1930s. 
This point of view has been somewhat neglected in earlier studies. It 
seems that in earlier books the crimes of the Bolshevik regime were 
seen either as manifestations of the satanic people or simply as 
necessary broken eggs on the frying pan of the proletarian revolution 
in Soviet Russia. Unfortunately, there have been only a very few 
studies that have sought to examine the facts in a dispassionate 
fashion. 
According to archives, the religious policy of the Stalinist state was 
not a diabolical phenomenon per se. The people inside the Cult 
Commission were not executing an all-schemed-up-plan (devised by 
the SVB) to exterminate the church, at least not after the Cultural 
Revolution. In many respects, the Cult Commission in Moscow often 
acted, paradoxically enough, as a guardian of the religious 
organizations. Actually this consistory of atheists was engaged in a 
constant battle between local and central administrative organs. Its 
officials in this commission were not, de facto, contemplating satanic 
plans of total destruction but rather wrestling with the eternal dilemma 
of how really to govern Russia. It was in their administrative interest 
to restrict the most obvious and brutal violations of Soviet laws. 
However, this interest did not emanate from any benign feelings of 
these central officials but rather from the desire of Moscow to control 
the Soviet periphery. 
We may also find common features of how the central government 
tried to solve the problem of samotek with regard to religious 
organizations. At first, the Cult Commission approached Soviet justice 
officials and Soviet procurators, but to no avail. The Soviet procurators 
were unable to restrict local excesses. The reason for this was 
apparent; local officials often established their own social networks; 
party officials could always defend themselves when the Cult 
Commission made inquiries about how they were treating religious 
organizations. Moreover, the local Soviet satraps often funded their 
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activities by "squeezing" believers or by often confiscating suitable 
religious premises for their own use. 
When considering the foregoing, one may also be tempted to 
speculate that the terror against these local party organizations would 
have been welcomed by the officials of the central Cult Commission. 
However, this solution "a la Arch Getty" is just too pat to be true. It 
must be remembered that the overall scale of the purges fell also on 
the central officials in Moscow. The vicious hammer of terror struck 
both at NKVD officers and at Orthodox bishops; the execution 
chambers were meant for both believers and godless people. "The 
enemies of people" such as priests and other lishentsy were killed 
during the "ezhovshchina" but not for their presumed ideological or 
counter-revolutionary sins but just "in case." 
As noted, the methods of the Soviet religious policy understandably 
changed greatly during the 1920s and 1930s. During the NEP, the 
Soviet regime had often tried to find a "neutral" position in its relation 
with religious organizations. People responsible for this kind of policy 
could still be found in the Soviet administration. As a rule, these 
Soviet officials favoured steady and gradual development. The Cult 
Commission, however, was not populated with this type of officials; 
Krasikov, Smidovich and Tuchkov were party apparatchiki and had 
extensive experience in manipulating Soviet religious policy. 
However, when dealing with the reality of the 1930s, these people 
gradually became mouthpieces of Soviet state officials. In their memos 
and letters, they identified themselves with the goals of Soviet 
"democracy" and actually turned them into "administrators" who 
favoured a firm hand in dealing with local satraps. This represented 
a great dilemma for the commission, which functioned in the middle 
of a conformist Stalinist society. To sum up, the Cult Commission 
turned from being an ad hoc, technical commission into a stable 
mouthpiece of Soviet bureaucrats maintaining firm control over locals 
Soviet officials. Thus, as mentioned earlier, the commission was "a 
guardian angel" of the religious organizations rather than a leader of 
an organized attack on religion. 
Consequently, the ultimate reason why the Cult Commission could 
not succeed in its basic mission to supervise and coordinate Soviet 
religious policy was actually the same reason that has so often blocked 
all reforms in Russia. For example, when there was no material gain 
to entice local organizations to obey (as there was during the 
confiscating of the church bells in the early 1930s) or terror to be 
feared, the authority of the central Cult Commission declined rapidly. 
It seems that the fall of this commission can be traced from the time 
when the "commission of loot" could no longer offer anything more 	 187 
to be looted. 
When summing up the earlier academic discussion, this work has 
sought to present a more detailed picture of Soviet religious policy in 
the 1930s. However, Soviet archives suggest us a more complicated 
picture than earlier "Cold War" studies which portrayed Soviet power 
as a monolithic monster. According to archival findings, the Soviet 
officials in the Cult Commission did not function according to some 
perverted plan in order to destroy religion. New information from 
Soviet archives allow us to get a general picture of Soviet religious 
policy and to comprehend the inner dilemmas of Soviet administration. 
Since the Cold War is over, we may also leave moral judgments and 
questions of moral responsibility for specialists in these particular 
fields to resolve. 
As a matter of fact, instead of sniping from trenches of the past, 
we have a unique opportunity to gain an insight into one important 
religious political organ of the Soviet state. Consequently, it is hoped 
that the results of this study will contribute something new to the old 
debate between the "totalitarian" and "revisionist" schools, which for 
the "outsider" seems like a fight between generations of scholars. 
Firstly, in the light of the documents utilized in this study, there is 
no particular "school", which could explain these complicated 
problems of Stalinism. In one sense, the revisionist approach with its 
understanding of the need for a social approach to the history of 
Stalinist Russia is more appropriate. But, the author of this monograph 
wishes to share some of the opinions of the old totalitarian school. 
Consequently, instead of fighting as a zealot for this or that 
methodology, the author of the present study wishes to find a kind of 
mediating solution, keeping in mind both the recently revealed 
documentation and the questions of social history alongside the 
peculiarities of Soviet institutional life. Secondly, this monograph has 
hopefully shed some light on the enormous problems involved in 
governing such a large country as Russia. The centre-periphery 
relationship; the question of how to rule Russia effectively is the key 
concept when dealing with these kind of problems. 
Thirdly, it seems that there is hardly a place in the universe where 
Marxist formulas and doctrines could be adjusted to reality without 
encountering problems. Actually, it happened once, in Aelita, Aleksei 
Tolstois science fiction novel. According to this work, the class 
struggles of Mars occur strictly according to Marxist principles. No 
problems derived from a bureaucratic stiffness or because of tension 
in central-peripheral relation on this strange planet. However, in this 
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Epilogue 
Conducting an academic discussion on church-state relationships has 
some practical value when we are dealing with the contemporary 
situation in Russia. There are fields where the results of research and 
the contemporary political situation are linked together; one might 
even state that history dictates contemporary politics and academic 
speculations correlate with today's issues. In this respect, Alexander 
Yanov has encouraged researchers to abandon overly academic 
speculation in Soviet studies. In his view, Sovietology should assist 
Russia in finding its path to modernity and time should not be waisted 
with trivial academic questions. In the 1980s, he stated enthusiasti-
cally... 
3 	 A note from the Russian Review editor is pertinent. The note declares that to 
study Stalinism is to study unsuccessful attempts to change the Russian people. 
Even Stalin failed to create a new Russian man. 
."..Systems come and go, but governmental fiat cannot remake the human 
material of as large a social conglomeration as the peasantry. Neither the 
Mongols, nor Peter the Great nor Reformer Alexander II — nor did Stalin." "Is 
a Social History of Stalinist Russia Possible?" Russian Review, vi. Vol. 52. no. 
3. July 1993. 
."..if ever there were a time for Sovietology to guide the process 
of Russia's traditionally dangerous transition to political modernity, 
it is now. Abstract academic discussions on the fate of Soviet Russia 
are out of date at the end of the 1980s."4 
Nevertheless, it seems that theoretical academic discussion still has 
some relevance. Studies concentrating on the history of Soviet 
religious policy are still not up-to-date. After the Soviet Union 
collapsed, we are now able to shed light on the fate of the Soviet 
system and the way it treated its "tricky" ideological enemy, i.e., 
religion, thanks the availability of new archival documents. 
The new role of religion and especially the ROC, became more 
stable during the last days of Soviet power. Especially the 
intelligentsia and new democratic leaders were anxious to underline 
the importance of the national church for the Russians. For example, 
in September 1990, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote his famous article 
"How to Rebuild (obustroit) Russia." This article received a positive 
response, including one written by B.N. Yeltsin. The general 
consensus of the various responses was that the Orthodox tradition 
could assist in some way in national rebuilding process. The ROC 
took a central role at that time. In a situation where the state had lost 
its ideological justification, the role of the church and all national 
traditions seems to be of utmost importance. 
However, it is difficult to make predictions about the future of the 
ROC. On the one hand, nearly all the political parties recognize the 
significance of religion and a general goodwill prevails among 
Russians towards the ROC. On the other hand, there are many pitfalls, 
too. To mention but a few of these dangers, along with a desperate 
economic situation, the ROC suffers from a lack of competent clergy. 
Moreover, the church has been politicized lately, some members of 
its clergy being involved in the activities of anti-Semitic, 
national-fascist movements of the far-right. These political factions 
try to use the ROC as their demagogical forum for disseminating 
radical propaganda. 
Moreover, the skeletons of the past are also troubling the leadership 
of the ROC. Neither the leadership of the Holy Synod nor Patriarch 
Aleksi II himself has been able to give any satisfactory explanation 
4 	 Yanov 1989, 651. 
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concerning their activities during the Soviet era. Accusations of 
"collaboration" and "betrayal" have been levelled at the present 
leadership of the ROC by the Russian media and liberal clergymen 
such as Gleb Yakunin. Obviously, this discussion concerning the role 
of the eminent clergymen during the Soviet era has not spent its 
course. The present leadership of the ROC has been more than 
reluctant to discuss their own activity as former KGB "agents". 
Nevertheless, despite all the wild allegations and denials, the fact 
remains that the Soviet state interfered in the affairs of nearly all the 
religious organizations in the USSR. Especially now, that the new 
Russian state has lost its earlier ideology — Marxism-Leninism — the 
role of the church and all national traditions are more crucial. The 
leading politicians and especially Yeltsin's presidential staff have been 
more than eager to utilize the ROC and the well-known figure of 
Aleksi II. His legendary white klobuk, representing national decorum, 
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	 has been seen near Yeltsin nearly everywhere.' 
To sum up, the creation of a new Russia and a "reformed" ROC 
are still in progress; the same problems that worried Russian Czars 
and the Bolsheviks are confronting the new rulers of Russia. The 
question now is: how to construct something new while taking into 
account what has happened in history. Although predicting the future 
goes far beyond the powers of the author, one can not escape seeing 
the breathtaking prospects of the contemporary situation in Russia. 
The great question is whether the ROC will subordinate itself to the 
ruling regime, discrediting (again) itself in the eyes of the new Russian 
intelligentsia and populace, or will it try to establish a more 
independent position, thus becoming a real alternative for the 
Russians. Borb 3HaeT... 
5 	 See Yury Buydas article "For Church, No Hope" in St. Petersburg Times, 4 
October 1996. See also Luukkanen 1996b, 49-53. 
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Kuibyshev oblast 163, 171 
Leningrad 
	
20,51,81,83,101,103,109, 
113, 120, 156, 160, 161, 162, 164, 
171, 
Leningrad Oblast 63,63,77,83 
Magnitogorsk 29 
Manchuria 175 
Mordvinian ASSR 171 
Moscow, Moscow oblast 21,61,63,70, 
72,74,77,82,83,84,85,96,97,103,107, 
113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 120, 125, 
126, 139, 141, 146, 151, 153, 154, 
157, 158, 167, 173, 176, 177, 181, 
182, 183, 184, 185, 186 
Murmansk okrug,83 
Noginsk 57 
Northern oblast 171 
Novgorod 70 
Omsk oblast 139 
Orekhovo-Zuevo 93 
Orenburg oblast 139 
Petrograd (Leningrad) 70, 161 
Petrogradsky raion (Leningrad) 
Poland 90, 123 
RSFSR, Russia 19,60,61,75,90,106, 139, 
140, 143, 147, 180, 181, 182, 187, 
188, 190 
Saarland 125 
Samara 79 
Saratov, Saratov krai, Saratov oblast 
93, 140, 156, 171 
Siberya 85 
Shakhty 51 
Smolensk 51, 67, 79, 83 
Soviet Union, USSR 27,45,56,57,63,64, 
66,71,72,90,91,92,101,107, 119, 121, 
123, 126, 129, 127, 130, 135, 137, 
138, 	 139, 140, 151, 160, 161, 166, 
171, 175, 178, 183, 189, 190 
Spain 	 129, 133 
St. Petersburg 23,78 
Stockholm 45 
Stalingrad oblast 	 171 
Sverdlovskaya oblast, Sverdlovsk 162, 
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171 
Sweden 45 
Switzerland 133 
Tatarstan 166 
Udmurt ASSR, Udmurt 171 
Ufa 68 
Ukraine, Ukraine SSR 75, 139, 140, 
156, 163, 165, 169, 171 
Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan SSR 75, 139, 
140, 156, 171  
Vatican 92, 121, 123, 133 
Volga area, Volga German Republic 35, 
71, 140 
Vyasma okrug 67 
Vyatka 51 
Weimar Republic 124 
Western oblast 163, 165 
Zvenigorod 93 
Yakutia 140 
Yaroslavl 79 
214 
~. ~ 


a~.~.~...__ 




